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[Music]

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what's up everybody

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that's red we're live streaming this

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and they're already late

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so

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to a hot start here you know

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hopefully it's because they're preparing

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questions

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[Music]

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thanks everybody for joining us today

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so bright and early

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we got uh we got a lot of people here

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with us

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everybody wants to say what's up

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you're more than welcome to

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we got vinnie with graeme rendell jay

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hello dan priscilla

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wouldn't this be so cool if we could all

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do this in a bar you know near to where

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this was actually happening

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or preferably in the room itself i mean

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yeah we'd probably be there but i i

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don't think they let you drink so

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yeah yeah can you turn the sound a

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bartender oh my gosh

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uh what's up to everybody in the chat

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andres mostly space christian

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teemo joes jonathan jason eckos

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lara chris daniel

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lamb chop that's a really good band

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actually a lamp chop if you haven't

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checked them out

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um

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tj

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disclosure team glad you could make it

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priscilla what's up

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mentos

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yawn

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charlie

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king of clubs

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wow this is just

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we're not going to get to the the

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hearings if i keep doing this

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okay first question if you made 174 000

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a year as each member of the house of

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representatives does uh would you show

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up late for hearings or would you show

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up on time

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if i was late it would be because i was

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at casolina with my census

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everyone's on the subways right now like

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freaking out to their staff members

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trying to get there as fast as possible

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we'll trust you on that

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she's been there

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i'm curious to see how full it's going

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to be you know how much interest there

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is from the public because i mean it's

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just a curiosity even if you're not

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fully in this you know

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yeah true

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um i'll keep my eye on that for when it

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starts i'll bring it right up

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but for now we can put our faces

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right up in the cameras for everybody so

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they can see us for themselves

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vinnie as you can see is there live just

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waiting sharing the session man i'm

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chairing the session

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nobody's around not yet i didn't know

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your background

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[Laughter]

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i was looking for one like that and i

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was like i'll just go with the spaceship

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because i couldn't find one that looked

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good

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uh well

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depending

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wait a minute here

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i've got it up as well sean so i'll keep

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an eye on it too yeah they got 12 000

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watching at the moment that's pretty

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cool well awesome let's go around the

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room and uh what what would your uh

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what's your question vinnie you first

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question for who for the for the the

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i don't so much have a question but i

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have a thought and that is that

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i think this is just just the start of

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more hearings i don't think we'll get

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anything juicy disclosure-wise today i

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think this is just the first step

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and then i think we'll start seeing

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more interesting people appear who may

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have more information

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you know it's just

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i've tempered my expectations before we

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get started i want to recognize a moment

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of silence for the victims of white

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supremacist hate crime in buffalo new

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york the subcommittee has focused

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intently on that threat in both open and

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closed hearings

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it is utterly devastating to see more

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victims of this violence buffalo

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with that i ask my colleagues to join

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pardon me

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we will now turn to the business of this

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more than 50 years ago

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the u.s government ended project blue

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book

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an effort to catalog and understand

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sightings of objects in the air

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that could not otherwise be explained

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for more than 20 years that project

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treated unidentified anomalies in our

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airspace as a national security threat

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to be monitored and investigated

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in 2017 we learned for the first time

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that the department of defense had

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quietly restarted a similar organization

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tracking what we now call unidentified

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aerial phenomena

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or

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uaps

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last year congress rewrote the charter

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for that organization now called the

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airborne object identification and

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management synchronization group

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or

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aim sog

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for short today we will bring that

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organization out of the shadows this

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hearing and oversight work

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has

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a simple idea at its core

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unidentified aerial phenomena are a

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potential national security threat and

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they need to be treated that way for

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long the stigma associated with uaps has

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gotten in the way of good intelligence

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analysis

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pilots avoided reporting or were laughed

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at when they did

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dod officials relegated the issue to the

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back room or swept it under the rug

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entirely fearful of a skeptical national

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security community

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today

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we know better

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uaps are unexplained it's true

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but they are real

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they need to be investigated and many

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threats they pose need to be mitigated

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under secretary moultrie mr bray

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thank you for coming today

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first we need you to update us on the

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status of aim salk

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the legislation creating it was passed

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in december the deadline for

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implementation is fast approaching

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but the group does not even have a named

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director

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we need to know sirs the status of the

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organization and the obstacle to getting

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it up and running

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secondly

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you have to convince the audience today

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and most especially

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our military and civilian aviators

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the culture

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has changed

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that those who report uaps will be

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treated as witnesses not as kooks

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thirdly you need to show us

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congress and the american public whose

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imaginations you have captured

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you are willing to follow the facts

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where they lead

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you know we fear sometimes that the dod

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is focused more on emphasizing what it

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can explain

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not investigating what it can

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i'm looking for you to assure us today

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that all conclusions are on the table

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one final note we are mindful today that

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aims is not starting from scratch

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this is the third version of this task

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force in dod and civil society groups

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like the mutual ufo network

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mr corbell and others have been

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collecting data on this issue for years

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i hope you'll explain how you can

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leverage the knowledge and experience of

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our prior work on this matter to move

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the aim salk along the last time

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congress had a hearing on uaps was half

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a century ago

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i hope that it does not take 50 more

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years for congress to hold another

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because transparency is desperately

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needed i now turn to ranking member

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crawford for comments he'd like to make

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thank you mr chairman um honorable

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moultrie mr bray thank you for coming

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here today we appreciate it to begin the

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open dialogue between congress and

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executive branch on this important topic

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while this topic evokes creative

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imaginations of many aside from all the

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hype and speculation there are important

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underlying issues posed by uaps despite

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the serious nature of this topic i have

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to say i'm more interested in our

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understanding of chinese and russian

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hypersonic weapon development or

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understanding why this administration

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was so slow to share actionable

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intelligence with the ukrainians however

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as much as this topic may help us better

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understand the unknown activities of

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russia and china

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i am on board the intelligence community

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has a serious duty to our taxpayers to

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prevent potential adversaries such as

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china and russia from surprising us with

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unforeseen new technologies

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as overseers of the intelligence

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community this committee has an

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obligation to understand what you are

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doing to determine whether any uaps are

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new technologies or not and if they are

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where they coming from in general the ic

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spends much of its time and resources

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trying to understand what we call known

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unknowns when it comes to foreign

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nations weapons systems and sensors

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known unknowns are those features that

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we don't fully understand yet the

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challenge associated with uap is that

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they are completely unknown and require

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a more expansive collection analysis

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effort the intelligence community must

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balance addressing known threats to our

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nation national security with preventing

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technical surprise we must continue to

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follow the facts where they lead us and

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ensure that there are no technical

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surprises the ic must take it seriously

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when there are credible observations of

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phenomena that seem to perform in ways

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that could pose a threat to safe flight

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operations or they could be signs of a

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foreign adversary's attempt to develop a

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strategic

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technological surprise against the

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united states

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it's also essential that our pilots and

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others feel they can report uaps they

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observe without any stigma for doing so

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this is the open unclassified portion of

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our hearing we'll have a closed

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classified part later it's important for

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the public to know that the

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classification of information exists to

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protect national security not to try to

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hide the truth when we're trying to

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determine if any uaps are new

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technologies being developed by foreign

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governments we are inevitably going to

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run into classified information about

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what new systems and technologies we do

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know or in the works here or abroad but

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where information does not risk national

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security it should be shared with our

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allies and the public when feasible i

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hope that we can have your assurance to

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this end today it's my hope that the

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intelligence community will continue to

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try to determine the nature of uaps

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we've observed and will keep congress

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fully apprised of all developments i

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look forward to this hearing and can

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continue dialogue and oversight with the

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intelligence community on this topic and

286
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without a yield back

287
00:10:54,949 --> 00:10:53,600
gentleman yields back and now turn to

288
00:10:56,949 --> 00:10:54,959
our distinguished chairman adam schiff

289
00:10:58,949 --> 00:10:56,959
for any comments he wishes to make

290
00:11:01,190 --> 00:10:58,959
thank you chairman carson uh for holding

291
00:11:03,110 --> 00:11:01,200
this open hearing on unidentified aerial

292
00:11:04,310 --> 00:11:03,120
phenomenon and for your leadership on

293
00:11:05,670 --> 00:11:04,320
this issue

294
00:11:08,389 --> 00:11:05,680
holding a portion of our discussion

295
00:11:10,790 --> 00:11:08,399
today in open session is critical to the

296
00:11:12,389 --> 00:11:10,800
cause of transparency and openness

297
00:11:14,230 --> 00:11:12,399
which was congress's intent in

298
00:11:15,430 --> 00:11:14,240
authorizing and funding this new task

299
00:11:16,790 --> 00:11:15,440
force

300
00:11:19,430 --> 00:11:16,800
the larger effort that is being

301
00:11:20,470 --> 00:11:19,440
undertaken to study and characterize uap

302
00:11:21,910 --> 00:11:20,480
reports

303
00:11:23,910 --> 00:11:21,920
is an important step towards

304
00:11:25,750 --> 00:11:23,920
understanding these phenomena what we

305
00:11:27,350 --> 00:11:25,760
know and don't know

306
00:11:28,949 --> 00:11:27,360
and i look forward to hearing more

307
00:11:30,230 --> 00:11:28,959
during both the open session and the

308
00:11:33,350 --> 00:11:30,240
closed setting

309
00:11:34,710 --> 00:11:33,360
about how dod and the ic are undertaking

310
00:11:36,949 --> 00:11:34,720
that task

311
00:11:38,630 --> 00:11:36,959
uap reports have been around for decades

312
00:11:41,110 --> 00:11:38,640
and yet we haven't had an orderly way

313
00:11:42,949 --> 00:11:41,120
for them to be reported without stigma

314
00:11:45,350 --> 00:11:42,959
and to be investigated

315
00:11:47,269 --> 00:11:45,360
that needs to change uap reports need to

316
00:11:49,430 --> 00:11:47,279
be understood as a national security

317
00:11:51,670 --> 00:11:49,440
matter and that message needs to go out

318
00:11:52,949 --> 00:11:51,680
across dod the ic and the whole of the

319
00:11:54,230 --> 00:11:52,959
us government

320
00:11:56,230 --> 00:11:54,240
when we spot something we don't

321
00:11:58,069 --> 00:11:56,240
understand or can't identify in our

322
00:12:00,150 --> 00:11:58,079
airspace it's the job of those we

323
00:12:02,550 --> 00:12:00,160
entrust with our national security to

324
00:12:04,150 --> 00:12:02,560
investigate and to report back

325
00:12:05,910 --> 00:12:04,160
that is why it's important that we hold

326
00:12:08,310 --> 00:12:05,920
this open hearing for the public to hear

327
00:12:10,470 --> 00:12:08,320
directly from the department of defense

328
00:12:12,790 --> 00:12:10,480
on the steps it's taking to track

329
00:12:14,230 --> 00:12:12,800
analyze and transparently communicate

330
00:12:15,190 --> 00:12:14,240
the work that is being done on this

331
00:12:16,870 --> 00:12:15,200
issue

332
00:12:18,310 --> 00:12:16,880
it is also the responsibility of our

333
00:12:21,030 --> 00:12:18,320
government and this panel to share as

334
00:12:23,269 --> 00:12:21,040
much as we can with the american people

335
00:12:25,990 --> 00:12:23,279
since excessive secrecy only breeds

336
00:12:27,590 --> 00:12:26,000
distrust and speculation

337
00:12:29,190 --> 00:12:27,600
i look forward to hearing how the uap

338
00:12:31,030 --> 00:12:29,200
task force is being stood up what

339
00:12:32,550 --> 00:12:31,040
challenges they still face

340
00:12:34,949 --> 00:12:32,560
and how this committee can make sure the

341
00:12:37,430 --> 00:12:34,959
task force is able to shed light on one

342
00:12:40,150 --> 00:12:37,440
of the world's most enduring mysteries

343
00:12:42,389 --> 00:12:40,160
i thank you gentlemen for your work and

344
00:12:43,430 --> 00:12:42,399
i'll be very interested to hear what you

345
00:12:45,350 --> 00:12:43,440
have to say

346
00:12:46,710 --> 00:12:45,360
to me among the most fascinating

347
00:12:49,350 --> 00:12:46,720
questions

348
00:12:51,269 --> 00:12:49,360
are these phenomena that we can

349
00:12:52,790 --> 00:12:51,279
measure that is

350
00:12:55,670 --> 00:12:52,800
instruments report there is something

351
00:12:57,750 --> 00:12:55,680
there it is not the human eye

352
00:12:59,350 --> 00:12:57,760
confusing objects in the sky

353
00:13:01,590 --> 00:12:59,360
uh there is something there measurable

354
00:13:02,870 --> 00:13:01,600
by multiple instruments and yet it seems

355
00:13:05,190 --> 00:13:02,880
to move in directions that are

356
00:13:08,310 --> 00:13:05,200
inconsistent with what we know of

357
00:13:11,269 --> 00:13:08,320
physics or science uh more broadly and

358
00:13:13,829 --> 00:13:11,279
uh that to me poses uh questions of of

359
00:13:16,230 --> 00:13:13,839
tremendous interest and uh as well as

360
00:13:18,069 --> 00:13:16,240
potential national security significance

361
00:13:19,430 --> 00:13:18,079
so we look forward to hearing what

362
00:13:20,949 --> 00:13:19,440
you're able to report to us today in

363
00:13:23,030 --> 00:13:20,959
open session and i want to thank

364
00:13:24,790 --> 00:13:23,040
chairman carson again for his

365
00:13:26,870 --> 00:13:24,800
extraordinary leadership on this issue

366
00:13:28,870 --> 00:13:26,880
and i yield back

367
00:13:29,990 --> 00:13:28,880
chairman yields back thank you with that

368
00:13:32,629 --> 00:13:30,000
we will start our hearing under

369
00:13:34,710 --> 00:13:32,639
secretary moultrie the floor is your sir

370
00:13:36,710 --> 00:13:34,720
thank you

371
00:13:38,629 --> 00:13:36,720
chairman schiff committee chairman

372
00:13:39,670 --> 00:13:38,639
carson ranking member crawford

373
00:13:41,829 --> 00:13:39,680
distinguished members of the

374
00:13:43,590 --> 00:13:41,839
subcommittee it's a privilege to be here

375
00:13:45,750 --> 00:13:43,600
with you today to address your questions

376
00:13:47,189 --> 00:13:45,760
regarding unidentified aerial phenomena

377
00:13:49,030 --> 00:13:47,199
or uap

378
00:13:51,030 --> 00:13:49,040
i'm pleased to be joined by mr scott

379
00:13:52,310 --> 00:13:51,040
bray the deputy director of naval

380
00:13:54,629 --> 00:13:52,320
intelligence who will speak to the

381
00:13:56,949 --> 00:13:54,639
navy's unidentified aerial phenomenon

382
00:13:59,590 --> 00:13:56,959
task force which laid the foundation for

383
00:14:01,110 --> 00:13:59,600
the efforts we will discuss today

384
00:14:03,750 --> 00:14:01,120
first i'd like to thank congress for

385
00:14:07,189 --> 00:14:03,760
supporting the department's uap efforts

386
00:14:09,590 --> 00:14:07,199
the ndaa for fiscal year 2022 has helped

387
00:14:12,069 --> 00:14:09,600
us to establish a dedicated office to

388
00:14:14,629 --> 00:14:12,079
oversee processes and procedures for the

389
00:14:17,590 --> 00:14:14,639
timely collection processing analysis

390
00:14:19,110 --> 00:14:17,600
and reporting of uap related data

391
00:14:22,310 --> 00:14:19,120
what are you ap

392
00:14:24,870 --> 00:14:22,320
put simply uap or airborne objects that

393
00:14:26,150 --> 00:14:24,880
when encountered cannot be immediately

394
00:14:27,670 --> 00:14:26,160
identified

395
00:14:28,870 --> 00:14:27,680
however it is the department's

396
00:14:30,629 --> 00:14:28,880
contention

397
00:14:33,110 --> 00:14:30,639
that by combining appropriately

398
00:14:34,710 --> 00:14:33,120
structured collected data with rigorous

399
00:14:37,110 --> 00:14:34,720
scientific analysis

400
00:14:39,430 --> 00:14:37,120
any object that we encounter

401
00:14:42,829 --> 00:14:39,440
can likely be

402
00:14:45,670 --> 00:14:42,839
isolated characterized identified and if

403
00:14:48,389 --> 00:14:45,680
necessary mitigate it

404
00:14:50,790 --> 00:14:48,399
we know that our service members have

405
00:14:53,350 --> 00:14:50,800
encountered unidentified aerial

406
00:14:55,030 --> 00:14:53,360
phenomena and because uaps pose

407
00:14:56,310 --> 00:14:55,040
potential flight safety and general

408
00:14:58,470 --> 00:14:56,320
security risk

409
00:15:00,629 --> 00:14:58,480
we are committed to a focused effort to

410
00:15:02,470 --> 00:15:00,639
determine their origins

411
00:15:04,069 --> 00:15:02,480
our effort will include the thorough

412
00:15:06,150 --> 00:15:04,079
examination of

413
00:15:08,710 --> 00:15:06,160
adversarial platforms and potential

414
00:15:10,629 --> 00:15:08,720
breakthrough technologies us government

415
00:15:13,590 --> 00:15:10,639
or commercial platforms

416
00:15:14,870 --> 00:15:13,600
allied or partner systems and other

417
00:15:18,069 --> 00:15:14,880
natural

418
00:15:23,430 --> 00:15:20,310
we also understand that there has been a

419
00:15:25,590 --> 00:15:23,440
cultural stigma surrounding uap

420
00:15:27,430 --> 00:15:25,600
our goal is to eliminate the stigma by

421
00:15:29,670 --> 00:15:27,440
fully incorporating our operators and

422
00:15:31,910 --> 00:15:29,680
mission personnel into a standardized

423
00:15:35,269 --> 00:15:31,920
data gathering process

424
00:15:37,749 --> 00:15:35,279
we believe that making uap reporting a

425
00:15:39,509 --> 00:15:37,759
mission imperative will be instrumental

426
00:15:41,189 --> 00:15:39,519
to the effort's success

427
00:15:43,189 --> 00:15:41,199
the defense intelligence and security

428
00:15:44,949 --> 00:15:43,199
enterprise provides real-time support to

429
00:15:46,710 --> 00:15:44,959
our warfighters and mission personnel

430
00:15:49,670 --> 00:15:46,720
across all domains

431
00:15:51,509 --> 00:15:49,680
to optimize the department's uap work we

432
00:15:53,269 --> 00:15:51,519
are establishing an office

433
00:15:54,389 --> 00:15:53,279
within the office of the secretary of

434
00:15:56,949 --> 00:15:54,399
defense

435
00:15:58,629 --> 00:15:56,959
that office's function is clear to

436
00:16:00,629 --> 00:15:58,639
facilitate the identification of

437
00:16:03,430 --> 00:16:00,639
previously unknown or unidentified

438
00:16:05,430 --> 00:16:03,440
airborne objects in a methodical logical

439
00:16:07,749 --> 00:16:05,440
and standardized manner

440
00:16:09,269 --> 00:16:07,759
these goals will ensure that we are

441
00:16:10,949 --> 00:16:09,279
working closely with operational

442
00:16:13,269 --> 00:16:10,959
personnel on training and reporting

443
00:16:15,189 --> 00:16:13,279
requirements developing data and

444
00:16:17,189 --> 00:16:15,199
intelligence requirements

445
00:16:18,790 --> 00:16:17,199
standardizing and integrating processes

446
00:16:20,710 --> 00:16:18,800
and procedures for collection

447
00:16:21,749 --> 00:16:20,720
operational surveillance analysis and

448
00:16:23,509 --> 00:16:21,759
reporting

449
00:16:25,910 --> 00:16:23,519
leveraging our research and development

450
00:16:28,069 --> 00:16:25,920
capabilities to improve detection

451
00:16:30,949 --> 00:16:28,079
characterization and identification of

452
00:16:33,430 --> 00:16:30,959
uaps developing mitigating solutions and

453
00:16:35,269 --> 00:16:33,440
procedures and identifying strategy and

454
00:16:37,269 --> 00:16:35,279
policy solutions

455
00:16:39,110 --> 00:16:37,279
this effort will maximize collaboration

456
00:16:40,949 --> 00:16:39,120
and build upon already existing

457
00:16:42,949 --> 00:16:40,959
relationships with the office of the

458
00:16:46,710 --> 00:16:42,959
director of national intelligence the

459
00:16:48,310 --> 00:16:46,720
faa dhs and the fbi

460
00:16:49,509 --> 00:16:48,320
we are also committed to strong

461
00:16:50,470 --> 00:16:49,519
partnerships with the department of

462
00:16:53,590 --> 00:16:50,480
energy

463
00:16:55,749 --> 00:16:53,600
noaa the dea nasa

464
00:16:57,670 --> 00:16:55,759
and the national labs and just as

465
00:16:59,350 --> 00:16:57,680
importantly our international partners

466
00:17:00,710 --> 00:16:59,360
and allies

467
00:17:03,590 --> 00:17:00,720
with regard to the importance of

468
00:17:04,470 --> 00:17:03,600
transparency the department is fully

469
00:17:06,309 --> 00:17:04,480
committed

470
00:17:09,189 --> 00:17:06,319
to the principle of openness and

471
00:17:11,350 --> 00:17:09,199
accountability to the american people

472
00:17:13,669 --> 00:17:11,360
however we are also mindful of our

473
00:17:15,750 --> 00:17:13,679
obligation to protect sensitive sources

474
00:17:18,309 --> 00:17:15,760
and methods our goal is to strike that

475
00:17:20,470 --> 00:17:18,319
delicate balance one that enables us to

476
00:17:22,309 --> 00:17:20,480
maintain the public's trust while

477
00:17:24,470 --> 00:17:22,319
preserving those capabilities that are

478
00:17:26,470 --> 00:17:24,480
vital to the support of our service

479
00:17:28,630 --> 00:17:26,480
personnel

480
00:17:29,909 --> 00:17:28,640
in closing the department is committed

481
00:17:31,590 --> 00:17:29,919
to this effort and welcomes the

482
00:17:32,950 --> 00:17:31,600
challenge we thank you for your

483
00:17:40,150 --> 00:17:32,960
committed support

484
00:17:44,470 --> 00:17:42,310
chairman carson ranking member

485
00:17:45,830 --> 00:17:44,480
crawford and committee members thank you

486
00:17:47,270 --> 00:17:45,840
very much for the opportunity to be here

487
00:17:49,110 --> 00:17:47,280
today to highlight the ongoing work of

488
00:17:51,750 --> 00:17:49,120
the department of defense regarding

489
00:17:53,830 --> 00:17:51,760
unidentified aerial phenomena since the

490
00:17:55,830 --> 00:17:53,840
early 2000s

491
00:17:57,990 --> 00:17:55,840
we have seen an increasing number of

492
00:17:59,029 --> 00:17:58,000
unauthorized and or unidentified

493
00:18:01,270 --> 00:17:59,039
aircraft or objects in

494
00:18:03,110 --> 00:18:01,280
military-controlled training areas

495
00:18:04,230 --> 00:18:03,120
and training ranges and other designated

496
00:18:06,470 --> 00:18:04,240
airspace

497
00:18:07,750 --> 00:18:06,480
reports of sightings are frequent and

498
00:18:09,750 --> 00:18:07,760
continuing

499
00:18:11,430 --> 00:18:09,760
we attribute this increase in reporting

500
00:18:13,750 --> 00:18:11,440
to a number of factors including our

501
00:18:15,750 --> 00:18:13,760
work to destigmatize reporting an

502
00:18:17,750 --> 00:18:15,760
increase in the number of new systems

503
00:18:19,990 --> 00:18:17,760
such as quadcopters and unmanned aerial

504
00:18:21,669 --> 00:18:20,000
systems that are in our airspace

505
00:18:23,590 --> 00:18:21,679
identification of what we can classify

506
00:18:25,669 --> 00:18:23,600
as clutter mylar balloons and other

507
00:18:27,510 --> 00:18:25,679
types of air trash

508
00:18:29,909 --> 00:18:27,520
and improvements in the capabilities of

509
00:18:31,430 --> 00:18:29,919
our various sensors to detect things in

510
00:18:33,430 --> 00:18:31,440
our airspace

511
00:18:34,870 --> 00:18:33,440
almost two years ago in august of 2020

512
00:18:36,150 --> 00:18:34,880
deputy secretary defense nordquist

513
00:18:38,470 --> 00:18:36,160
directed the establishment of the

514
00:18:40,950 --> 00:18:38,480
unidentified aerial phenomena task force

515
00:18:42,789 --> 00:18:40,960
within the department of the navy the

516
00:18:45,029 --> 00:18:42,799
uap task force was built on the

517
00:18:46,549 --> 00:18:45,039
foundation of the navy's initial efforts

518
00:18:49,190 --> 00:18:46,559
to respond to the reports from our

519
00:18:51,110 --> 00:18:49,200
aviators on unidentified objects

520
00:18:53,669 --> 00:18:51,120
observed in our training ranges

521
00:18:55,669 --> 00:18:53,679
the basic issues then and now are

522
00:18:57,270 --> 00:18:55,679
twofold first

523
00:18:59,350 --> 00:18:57,280
incursions in our training ranges by

524
00:19:01,350 --> 00:18:59,360
unidentified objects represent serious

525
00:19:04,390 --> 00:19:01,360
hazards to safety of flight

526
00:19:06,710 --> 00:19:04,400
in every aspect of naval aviation safety

527
00:19:07,830 --> 00:19:06,720
of our air crews is paramount

528
00:19:09,830 --> 00:19:07,840
second

529
00:19:12,150 --> 00:19:09,840
intrusions by unknown aircraft or

530
00:19:14,870 --> 00:19:12,160
objects pose potential threats to the

531
00:19:17,190 --> 00:19:14,880
security of our operations our aviators

532
00:19:19,350 --> 00:19:17,200
train as they would fight

533
00:19:21,430 --> 00:19:19,360
so any intrusions that may compromise

534
00:19:23,669 --> 00:19:21,440
the security of our operations by

535
00:19:25,510 --> 00:19:23,679
revealing our capabilities our tactics

536
00:19:27,990 --> 00:19:25,520
techniques or procedures

537
00:19:29,909 --> 00:19:28,000
are of great concern to the navy and the

538
00:19:31,909 --> 00:19:29,919
department of defense

539
00:19:35,029 --> 00:19:31,919
from the very beginning we took these

540
00:19:36,789 --> 00:19:35,039
reports very seriously we instituted a

541
00:19:38,549 --> 00:19:36,799
data-driven approach to the

542
00:19:40,710 --> 00:19:38,559
investigations where we could collect as

543
00:19:43,110 --> 00:19:40,720
much data as possible and use all

544
00:19:44,549 --> 00:19:43,120
available resources to analyze and make

545
00:19:47,029 --> 00:19:44,559
informed decisions on the best ways to

546
00:19:49,669 --> 00:19:47,039
address our findings our main objective

547
00:19:52,470 --> 00:19:49,679
was to transition uap efforts from an

548
00:19:55,110 --> 00:19:52,480
anecdotal or narrative based

549
00:19:58,070 --> 00:19:55,120
approach to a rigorous science and

550
00:19:59,990 --> 00:19:58,080
technology engineering focused study

551
00:20:01,990 --> 00:20:00,000
this data-driven approach

552
00:20:03,350 --> 00:20:02,000
requires input from a wide variety of

553
00:20:05,510 --> 00:20:03,360
sources

554
00:20:06,870 --> 00:20:05,520
in the early stages the task force

555
00:20:08,870 --> 00:20:06,880
worked to standardize the reporting

556
00:20:10,390 --> 00:20:08,880
mechanisms and processes to make it as

557
00:20:12,149 --> 00:20:10,400
easy as possible

558
00:20:14,149 --> 00:20:12,159
for personnel to report any engagement

559
00:20:15,990 --> 00:20:14,159
so that we were getting that wide range

560
00:20:17,990 --> 00:20:16,000
of reporting that we needed

561
00:20:19,350 --> 00:20:18,000
we also spent considerable efforts

562
00:20:21,270 --> 00:20:19,360
engaging directly with our naval

563
00:20:23,830 --> 00:20:21,280
aviators and building relationships to

564
00:20:25,750 --> 00:20:23,840
help destigmatize the act of reporting

565
00:20:27,510 --> 00:20:25,760
sightings or encounters

566
00:20:28,950 --> 00:20:27,520
and we work with naval aviation

567
00:20:31,750 --> 00:20:28,960
leadership to provide additional

568
00:20:33,909 --> 00:20:31,760
equipment to record any encounter navy

569
00:20:35,590 --> 00:20:33,919
and air force crews now have

570
00:20:38,230 --> 00:20:35,600
step-by-step procedures for reporting on

571
00:20:40,549 --> 00:20:38,240
the uap on their knee board

572
00:20:41,909 --> 00:20:40,559
in their in the cockpit and

573
00:20:44,390 --> 00:20:41,919
in their post

574
00:20:46,470 --> 00:20:44,400
flight debrief procedures

575
00:20:48,630 --> 00:20:46,480
the direct result of those efforts has

576
00:20:50,070 --> 00:20:48,640
been increased reporting with increased

577
00:20:52,710 --> 00:20:50,080
opportunities to focus a number of

578
00:20:53,830 --> 00:20:52,720
sensors on any objects the message is

579
00:20:55,909 --> 00:20:53,840
now clear

580
00:20:56,710 --> 00:20:55,919
if you see something you need to report

581
00:20:58,470 --> 00:20:56,720
it

582
00:21:01,029 --> 00:20:58,480
and the message has been received in

583
00:21:02,789 --> 00:21:01,039
fact recently i received a call from a

584
00:21:04,390 --> 00:21:02,799
senior naval aviator with over 2000

585
00:21:05,830 --> 00:21:04,400
flight hours he called me personally

586
00:21:07,110 --> 00:21:05,840
from the flight line

587
00:21:08,950 --> 00:21:07,120
after landing

588
00:21:10,310 --> 00:21:08,960
to talk about

589
00:21:12,390 --> 00:21:10,320
an encounter that he had just

590
00:21:14,070 --> 00:21:12,400
experienced

591
00:21:15,510 --> 00:21:14,080
those were just the initial steps we

592
00:21:16,870 --> 00:21:15,520
also made a concerted effort to assemble

593
00:21:17,830 --> 00:21:16,880
subject matter experts from across the

594
00:21:19,510 --> 00:21:17,840
department of defense and the

595
00:21:21,270 --> 00:21:19,520
intelligence community and other us

596
00:21:22,630 --> 00:21:21,280
government agencies and departments we

597
00:21:24,310 --> 00:21:22,640
forged partnerships with the research

598
00:21:25,990 --> 00:21:24,320
development and acquisition communities

599
00:21:28,470 --> 00:21:26,000
with industry partners and with academic

600
00:21:30,310 --> 00:21:28,480
research labs and we brought many allies

601
00:21:32,549 --> 00:21:30,320
and international partners into our

602
00:21:34,470 --> 00:21:32,559
discussions on uab

603
00:21:36,630 --> 00:21:34,480
additionally subject matter experts from

604
00:21:40,310 --> 00:21:36,640
a wide variety of fields including

605
00:21:43,750 --> 00:21:40,320
physics optics metallurgy meteorology

606
00:21:45,590 --> 00:21:43,760
just to name a few have been brought

607
00:21:48,630 --> 00:21:45,600
expand our understanding in areas where

608
00:21:50,230 --> 00:21:48,640
me we may not have organic expertise

609
00:21:52,710 --> 00:21:50,240
in short we've endeavored to bring an

610
00:21:54,710 --> 00:21:52,720
all hands on deck approach uh to the to

611
00:21:57,190 --> 00:21:54,720
better understand this phenomena so what

612
00:22:00,630 --> 00:21:57,200
have we learned so far

613
00:22:04,070 --> 00:22:00,640
any given observation may be fleeting

614
00:22:07,350 --> 00:22:04,080
or longer it may be recorded or not it

615
00:22:09,029 --> 00:22:07,360
may be observable by one or multiple

616
00:22:11,430 --> 00:22:09,039
assets

617
00:22:12,870 --> 00:22:11,440
in short there's rarely an easy answer

618
00:22:15,110 --> 00:22:12,880
for example let me share with you the

619
00:22:27,029 --> 00:22:15,120
first video that we have here today

620
00:22:29,190 --> 00:22:28,390
there it was

621
00:22:31,110 --> 00:22:29,200
that's

622
00:22:34,470 --> 00:22:31,120
in many cases it was the acorn right

623
00:22:38,070 --> 00:22:34,480
that's all that a report may include

624
00:22:41,270 --> 00:22:38,830
than

625
00:22:43,270 --> 00:22:41,280
this as we detailed in both the

626
00:22:44,549 --> 00:22:43,280
unclassified and classified versions of

627
00:22:45,590 --> 00:22:44,559
the preliminary assessment released by

628
00:22:47,669 --> 00:22:45,600
the office of the director of national

629
00:22:50,630 --> 00:22:47,679
intelligence last june this often

630
00:22:52,230 --> 00:22:50,640
limited amount of high quality data

631
00:22:54,070 --> 00:22:52,240
and reporting hampers our ability to

632
00:22:55,990 --> 00:22:54,080
draw firm conclusions about the nature

633
00:22:58,149 --> 00:22:56,000
or intent of uap

634
00:22:59,750 --> 00:22:58,159
as detailed in the odni report if and

635
00:23:02,230 --> 00:22:59,760
when individual uap incidents are

636
00:23:04,390 --> 00:23:02,240
resolved they likely fall into one of

637
00:23:06,630 --> 00:23:04,400
five potential explanatory categories

638
00:23:09,029 --> 00:23:06,640
airborne clutter natural atmospheric

639
00:23:11,270 --> 00:23:09,039
phenomena us government or u.s industry

640
00:23:12,950 --> 00:23:11,280
developmental programs foreign adversary

641
00:23:16,149 --> 00:23:12,960
systems or

642
00:23:17,990 --> 00:23:16,159
a other bin that allows for a holding

643
00:23:19,590 --> 00:23:18,000
bin of difficult cases and for the

644
00:23:21,510 --> 00:23:19,600
possibility of surprise and potential

645
00:23:23,909 --> 00:23:21,520
scientific discovery

646
00:23:25,190 --> 00:23:23,919
we stand by those initial results

647
00:23:27,510 --> 00:23:25,200
since the release of that preliminary

648
00:23:29,029 --> 00:23:27,520
report uap task force databases we're

649
00:23:31,909 --> 00:23:29,039
here for the other ben

650
00:23:34,870 --> 00:23:31,919
approximately 400 reports

651
00:23:36,310 --> 00:23:34,880
the stigma has been reduced

652
00:23:38,149 --> 00:23:36,320
we've also made progress in resolving

653
00:23:39,750 --> 00:23:38,159
the character of a limited number of uap

654
00:23:42,549 --> 00:23:39,760
encounters for example let me show you a

655
00:23:46,310 --> 00:23:42,559
couple of another video and image

656
00:23:47,830 --> 00:23:46,320
taken years apart in different areas

657
00:23:49,830 --> 00:23:47,840
in this video

658
00:23:52,070 --> 00:23:49,840
us navy personnel recorded what appears

659
00:23:53,990 --> 00:23:52,080
to be triangles some flashing recorded

660
00:23:55,430 --> 00:23:54,000
several years ago off the coast of the

661
00:23:57,029 --> 00:23:55,440
united states

662
00:23:57,750 --> 00:23:57,039
this was recorded while the u.s navy

663
00:23:59,750 --> 00:23:57,760
ship

664
00:24:02,230 --> 00:23:59,760
observed a number of small unmanned

665
00:24:04,549 --> 00:24:02,240
aerial systems in the area

666
00:24:06,070 --> 00:24:04,559
and importantly the video was taken

667
00:24:08,470 --> 00:24:06,080
through night vision goggles with a

668
00:24:10,549 --> 00:24:08,480
single lens reflex camera

669
00:24:18,549 --> 00:24:10,559
these remained unresolved for several

670
00:24:21,830 --> 00:24:20,149
unresolved is he going to explain what

671
00:24:30,310 --> 00:24:21,840
they are

672
00:24:34,630 --> 00:24:31,909
uh to the person asking yes this is the

673
00:24:37,190 --> 00:24:34,640
one that corbell put out

674
00:24:39,350 --> 00:24:37,200
several years later

675
00:24:42,149 --> 00:24:39,360
and off a different coast

676
00:24:43,830 --> 00:24:42,159
u.s navy personnel again in a swarm of

677
00:24:46,310 --> 00:24:43,840
unmanned aerial systems and again

678
00:24:47,590 --> 00:24:46,320
through night vision goggles and an slr

679
00:24:49,750 --> 00:24:47,600
camera

680
00:24:51,110 --> 00:24:49,760
recorded this image

681
00:24:52,870 --> 00:24:51,120
but this time

682
00:24:55,029 --> 00:24:52,880
other us navy assets also observed

683
00:24:57,590 --> 00:24:55,039
unmanned aerial systems nearby and we're

684
00:24:59,269 --> 00:24:57,600
now reasonably confident that these

685
00:25:01,669 --> 00:24:59,279
triangles correlate the unmanned aerial

686
00:25:02,870 --> 00:25:01,679
systems in the area the triangular

687
00:25:05,029 --> 00:25:02,880
appearance

688
00:25:06,950 --> 00:25:05,039
is a result of light passing through the

689
00:25:09,269 --> 00:25:06,960
night vision goggles and then being

690
00:25:11,029 --> 00:25:09,279
recorded by an slr camera

691
00:25:12,630 --> 00:25:11,039
i don't mean to suggest that everything

692
00:25:15,430 --> 00:25:12,640
that we observe

693
00:25:16,310 --> 00:25:15,440
is is identifiable but

694
00:25:19,909 --> 00:25:16,320
um

695
00:25:22,630 --> 00:25:19,919
it but this is a great example of how it

696
00:25:25,029 --> 00:25:22,640
takes considerable effort to understand

697
00:25:27,909 --> 00:25:25,039
what we're seeing uh in the examples

698
00:25:29,190 --> 00:25:27,919
that we are able to collect

699
00:25:30,950 --> 00:25:29,200
in this example we accumulated

700
00:25:32,950 --> 00:25:30,960
sufficient data from two similar

701
00:25:34,950 --> 00:25:32,960
encounters from two different time

702
00:25:38,070 --> 00:25:34,960
periods in two different geographic

703
00:25:39,990 --> 00:25:38,080
areas to help us draw these conclusions

704
00:25:42,870 --> 00:25:40,000
that's not always the case though we

705
00:25:45,350 --> 00:25:42,880
recognize that that can be unsatisfying

706
00:25:47,110 --> 00:25:45,360
or insufficient in the eyes of many this

707
00:25:48,310 --> 00:25:47,120
is a popular topic in our nation with

708
00:25:51,110 --> 00:25:48,320
various theories as to what these

709
00:25:52,390 --> 00:25:51,120
objects may be and where they originate

710
00:25:53,830 --> 00:25:52,400
by nature

711
00:25:55,269 --> 00:25:53,840
we are all curious and we seek to

712
00:25:57,110 --> 00:25:55,279
understand the unknown

713
00:25:59,750 --> 00:25:57,120
and as a lifelong intelligence

714
00:26:01,430 --> 00:25:59,760
professional i'm impatient i want

715
00:26:02,789 --> 00:26:01,440
immediate explanations for this as much

716
00:26:03,990 --> 00:26:02,799
as anyone else

717
00:26:05,909 --> 00:26:04,000
however

718
00:26:07,350 --> 00:26:05,919
understanding can take significant time

719
00:26:09,669 --> 00:26:07,360
and effort it's why we've endeavored to

720
00:26:12,230 --> 00:26:09,679
concentrate on this data-driven process

721
00:26:13,590 --> 00:26:12,240
to drive fact-based results and given

722
00:26:16,390 --> 00:26:13,600
the nature of our business national

723
00:26:18,390 --> 00:26:16,400
defense we've had to sometimes be less

724
00:26:20,950 --> 00:26:18,400
forthcoming with information in open

725
00:26:23,430 --> 00:26:20,960
forums than many would hope

726
00:26:24,870 --> 00:26:23,440
if uap do indeed represent a potential

727
00:26:26,950 --> 00:26:24,880
threat to our security then the

728
00:26:28,950 --> 00:26:26,960
capabilities systems processes and

729
00:26:30,870 --> 00:26:28,960
sources we use to observe record study

730
00:26:32,630 --> 00:26:30,880
or analyze these phenomena

731
00:26:33,750 --> 00:26:32,640
need to be classified at appropriate

732
00:26:36,870 --> 00:26:33,760
levels

733
00:26:39,110 --> 00:26:36,880
we do not want we do not want potential

734
00:26:41,350 --> 00:26:39,120
adversaries to know exactly what we're

735
00:26:43,750 --> 00:26:41,360
able to see or understand or how we come

736
00:26:44,630 --> 00:26:43,760
to the conclusions we make therefore

737
00:26:46,870 --> 00:26:44,640
public

738
00:26:48,870 --> 00:26:46,880
disclosures must be carefully considered

739
00:26:50,710 --> 00:26:48,880
on a case-by-case basis

740
00:26:52,149 --> 00:26:50,720
so what's next we're concentrating on a

741
00:26:54,710 --> 00:26:52,159
seamless transition to the new

742
00:26:57,669 --> 00:26:54,720
organization and future analysis of

743
00:26:59,190 --> 00:26:57,679
complicated uh issues of uap issues will

744
00:27:01,269 --> 00:26:59,200
greatly benefit from the infrastructure

745
00:27:02,870 --> 00:27:01,279
of the process and the procedures that

746
00:27:04,470 --> 00:27:02,880
we've developed to date i'm confident

747
00:27:06,070 --> 00:27:04,480
that the task force under navy

748
00:27:08,070 --> 00:27:06,080
leadership has forged a path forward

749
00:27:09,350 --> 00:27:08,080
that will allow us to anchor assessments

750
00:27:11,510 --> 00:27:09,360
in science and engineering vice

751
00:27:15,750 --> 00:27:11,520
anecdotal evidence we remain committed

752
00:27:17,510 --> 00:27:15,760
to that goal as i know the usdi uh

753
00:27:19,430 --> 00:27:17,520
organization does as well

754
00:27:21,110 --> 00:27:19,440
so thank you very much for your interest

755
00:27:22,789 --> 00:27:21,120
in continuing support for the uap task

756
00:27:24,310 --> 00:27:22,799
force the team's made a lot of progress

757
00:27:25,430 --> 00:27:24,320
but we really are just establishing the

758
00:27:26,950 --> 00:27:25,440
foundation

759
00:27:28,389 --> 00:27:26,960
for the more detailed analysis that's

760
00:27:30,389 --> 00:27:28,399
yet to be done and with your continued

761
00:27:32,230 --> 00:27:30,399
support we can sustain that momentum

762
00:27:33,990 --> 00:27:32,240
necessary to produce data-centric

763
00:27:35,350 --> 00:27:34,000
analysis and understanding the phenomena

764
00:27:37,190 --> 00:27:35,360
look forward to your questions thank you

765
00:27:39,350 --> 00:27:37,200
thank you mr bray

766
00:27:41,190 --> 00:27:39,360
this is the third version of this task

767
00:27:43,830 --> 00:27:41,200
force and to be frank

768
00:27:45,990 --> 00:27:43,840
one of congress's concerns is

769
00:27:48,549 --> 00:27:46,000
that the executive branch

770
00:27:52,149 --> 00:27:48,559
and administration of both parties

771
00:27:54,870 --> 00:27:52,159
uh has been sweeping concerns about uaps

772
00:27:56,310 --> 00:27:54,880
under the rug by focusing on events

773
00:27:58,630 --> 00:27:56,320
that can be explained and avoiding

774
00:27:59,750 --> 00:27:58,640
events that cannot be explained

775
00:28:04,710 --> 00:27:59,760
what can you

776
00:28:07,750 --> 00:28:04,720
the american people

777
00:28:09,350 --> 00:28:07,760
confidence that you aren't just focusing

778
00:28:15,430 --> 00:28:09,360
our attention on

779
00:28:20,630 --> 00:28:17,430
congressman i'll start and then uh mr

780
00:28:21,590 --> 00:28:20,640
bray um please feel free to uh to weigh

781
00:28:22,470 --> 00:28:21,600
in

782
00:28:24,310 --> 00:28:22,480
so

783
00:28:26,630 --> 00:28:24,320
the way that we're approaching this is

784
00:28:28,870 --> 00:28:26,640
with a more

785
00:28:30,149 --> 00:28:28,880
thorough standardized methodology than

786
00:28:31,590 --> 00:28:30,159
what we have in the past first and

787
00:28:34,549 --> 00:28:31,600
foremost the secretary of defense is

788
00:28:36,149 --> 00:28:34,559
chartering this effort this is not uh

789
00:28:39,029 --> 00:28:36,159
someone lower in the department of

790
00:28:40,870 --> 00:28:39,039
defense and he has assigned that task to

791
00:28:42,789 --> 00:28:40,880
the office of secretary of defense uh

792
00:28:44,950 --> 00:28:42,799
the uh under secretary for intelligence

793
00:28:46,549 --> 00:28:44,960
security that's me because i'm

794
00:28:48,230 --> 00:28:46,559
responsible for looking at intelligence

795
00:28:50,389 --> 00:28:48,240
matters i'm responsible for security

796
00:28:52,789 --> 00:28:50,399
matters this is potentially both

797
00:28:54,870 --> 00:28:52,799
so when you start

798
00:28:56,310 --> 00:28:54,880
concerning the

799
00:28:58,230 --> 00:28:56,320
ourselves with the safety of our

800
00:29:00,310 --> 00:28:58,240
personnel the the safety of our

801
00:29:02,230 --> 00:29:00,320
installations and basis there's no other

802
00:29:04,549 --> 00:29:02,240
higher priority than what we have than

803
00:29:05,750 --> 00:29:04,559
actually getting after this and as you

804
00:29:09,350 --> 00:29:05,760
have stated

805
00:29:11,430 --> 00:29:09,360
we have been assigned that task to

806
00:29:13,110 --> 00:29:11,440
actually stand up in office the aim sog

807
00:29:14,389 --> 00:29:13,120
which i believe the name server will

808
00:29:16,389 --> 00:29:14,399
likely change

809
00:29:19,110 --> 00:29:16,399
but we have moved forward in terms of

810
00:29:22,389 --> 00:29:19,120
moving to establish that office we have

811
00:29:25,190 --> 00:29:22,399
uh as of this week

812
00:29:27,269 --> 00:29:25,200
pick the director for that effort a very

813
00:29:28,070 --> 00:29:27,279
established and

814
00:29:30,389 --> 00:29:28,080
and

815
00:29:32,310 --> 00:29:30,399
accomplished individual we've identified

816
00:29:34,870 --> 00:29:32,320
spaces we've

817
00:29:36,710 --> 00:29:34,880
worked with personnel across the

818
00:29:38,870 --> 00:29:36,720
department of defense with the services

819
00:29:41,029 --> 00:29:38,880
and we've worked with the ic which is on

820
00:29:44,310 --> 00:29:41,039
board in helping us work through this

821
00:29:47,350 --> 00:29:44,320
standardized methodology for now

822
00:29:49,830 --> 00:29:47,360
bringing in data analyzing that data and

823
00:29:51,590 --> 00:29:49,840
reporting that data in the appropriate

824
00:29:52,950 --> 00:29:51,600
method appropriate means so we can

825
00:29:55,430 --> 00:29:52,960
either get it

826
00:29:57,830 --> 00:29:55,440
to our service personnel to ensure their

827
00:29:59,430 --> 00:29:57,840
safety or get it to you and the congress

828
00:30:01,269 --> 00:29:59,440
and to the public to ensure that you

829
00:30:03,110 --> 00:30:01,279
have oversight to what we're doing so

830
00:30:06,070 --> 00:30:03,120
chartered by the secretary of defense

831
00:30:07,750 --> 00:30:06,080
standardized and

832
00:30:08,950 --> 00:30:07,760
really a methodical approach it's

833
00:30:09,990 --> 00:30:08,960
something we're doing that has not been

834
00:30:12,149 --> 00:30:10,000
done before

835
00:30:14,070 --> 00:30:12,159
can we get some kinds of assurances that

836
00:30:16,470 --> 00:30:14,080
your analysts will follow the facts

837
00:30:18,870 --> 00:30:16,480
where they lead and assess all

838
00:30:21,110 --> 00:30:18,880
hypotheses absolutely so we're open to

839
00:30:23,830 --> 00:30:21,120
all hypotheses we're open to

840
00:30:25,269 --> 00:30:23,840
any uh conclusions that uh that we may

841
00:30:26,789 --> 00:30:25,279
encounter

842
00:30:29,029 --> 00:30:26,799
uh quickly before i pass it to the

843
00:30:31,110 --> 00:30:29,039
ranking member uh and and chairman

844
00:30:32,710 --> 00:30:31,120
schiff i wanna thank you both for taking

845
00:30:34,870 --> 00:30:32,720
the time and i had a good time meeting

846
00:30:36,149 --> 00:30:34,880
with you last week uh director moultrie

847
00:30:37,190 --> 00:30:36,159
under secretary

848
00:30:39,669 --> 00:30:37,200
moultrie

849
00:30:44,070 --> 00:30:41,909
it's fair to say that you are a science

850
00:30:46,230 --> 00:30:44,080
fiction fan is that correct

851
00:30:49,510 --> 00:30:46,240
it is fair to say that i am an

852
00:30:51,350 --> 00:30:49,520
inquisitive mind who has uh spent 40

853
00:30:53,110 --> 00:30:51,360
years in the intelligence field and has

854
00:30:54,789 --> 00:30:53,120
focused on both science and science

855
00:30:55,669 --> 00:30:54,799
fiction that is fair could you tell us

856
00:30:58,149 --> 00:30:55,679
about it

857
00:30:59,509 --> 00:30:58,159
yeah well yeah look my generation grew

858
00:31:01,190 --> 00:30:59,519
up uh

859
00:31:05,110 --> 00:31:01,200
looking at uh

860
00:31:07,909 --> 00:31:05,120
space sagas and and the apollo program

861
00:31:10,789 --> 00:31:07,919
so all of us who uh grew up in the 60s

862
00:31:11,590 --> 00:31:10,799
uh were were just thrilled by watching

863
00:31:13,350 --> 00:31:11,600
um

864
00:31:15,750 --> 00:31:13,360
our first astronaut land on the moon

865
00:31:16,630 --> 00:31:15,760
that was a momentous occasion to people

866
00:31:18,950 --> 00:31:16,640
who

867
00:31:20,549 --> 00:31:18,960
were of different generations uh some of

868
00:31:22,230 --> 00:31:20,559
them didn't believe that happened i

869
00:31:23,669 --> 00:31:22,240
still have relatives and friends who

870
00:31:25,750 --> 00:31:23,679
don't believe it happened right science

871
00:31:27,669 --> 00:31:25,760
fiction to them but to us it was no

872
00:31:28,630 --> 00:31:27,679
that's the progress that we've made

873
00:31:30,789 --> 00:31:28,640
and so

874
00:31:33,909 --> 00:31:30,799
i was enthralled by that and i've taken

875
00:31:39,029 --> 00:31:36,710
the challenge of what may be out there i

876
00:31:40,870 --> 00:31:39,039
have mentioned to you that yes i have

877
00:31:42,310 --> 00:31:40,880
followed science fiction i have gone to

878
00:31:43,669 --> 00:31:42,320
conventions even i'll say it on the

879
00:31:46,470 --> 00:31:43,679
record uh

880
00:31:48,149 --> 00:31:46,480
uh gotta break the ice somehow but uh

881
00:31:50,230 --> 00:31:48,159
you know i have done that right but

882
00:31:52,870 --> 00:31:50,240
there's nothing wrong with that um don't

883
00:31:54,710 --> 00:31:52,880
necessarily dress up but i do uh you

884
00:31:56,950 --> 00:31:54,720
know i do believe that it's important to

885
00:31:58,950 --> 00:31:56,960
show that the department of defense has

886
00:32:00,310 --> 00:31:58,960
um you know we have character and we're

887
00:32:03,190 --> 00:32:00,320
people just like you just like the

888
00:32:04,950 --> 00:32:03,200
american people we have our um

889
00:32:07,110 --> 00:32:04,960
we have our uh

890
00:32:08,950 --> 00:32:07,120
our inquisitiveness uh we have our

891
00:32:10,470 --> 00:32:08,960
questions we want to know what's out

892
00:32:12,310 --> 00:32:10,480
there as much as you want to know what's

893
00:32:13,909 --> 00:32:12,320
out there we get the questions not just

894
00:32:15,830 --> 00:32:13,919
from you we get it from family members

895
00:32:17,590 --> 00:32:15,840
and we get them night and day

896
00:32:19,269 --> 00:32:17,600
not just in committee hearings so

897
00:32:21,029 --> 00:32:19,279
finding what's out there is important

898
00:32:23,029 --> 00:32:21,039
but first and fore and foremost it's

899
00:32:25,430 --> 00:32:23,039
important for us to do that so we can

900
00:32:27,669 --> 00:32:25,440
ensure that our people our personnel our

901
00:32:29,110 --> 00:32:27,679
aviators our bases and installations are

902
00:32:30,950 --> 00:32:29,120
safe

903
00:32:32,870 --> 00:32:30,960
and then that curiosity factor is

904
00:32:35,029 --> 00:32:32,880
something else that that we just want to

905
00:32:36,870 --> 00:32:35,039
know because that's the human race it's

906
00:32:39,430 --> 00:32:36,880
just you know that insatiable desire to

907
00:32:42,950 --> 00:32:41,590
thank you sir thank you mccrawford

908
00:32:47,190 --> 00:32:42,960
to know what to do

909
00:32:47,990 --> 00:32:47,200
he said you don't necessarily dress up

910
00:32:50,760 --> 00:32:48,000
uh

911
00:32:53,029 --> 00:32:50,770
that wasn't a real strong statement

912
00:32:54,630 --> 00:32:53,039
[Laughter]

913
00:32:56,630 --> 00:32:54,640
gentlemen thank you for being here today

914
00:32:58,310 --> 00:32:56,640
we appreciate it um

915
00:33:00,470 --> 00:32:58,320
and thank you mr mulled for breaking the

916
00:33:02,389 --> 00:33:00,480
ice the way you did appreciate that the

917
00:33:03,830 --> 00:33:02,399
inability to understand objects in our

918
00:33:05,430 --> 00:33:03,840
sensitive

919
00:33:07,269 --> 00:33:05,440
operating areas is tantamount to an

920
00:33:09,190 --> 00:33:07,279
intelligence failure that we certainly

921
00:33:11,190 --> 00:33:09,200
want to avoid it's not about finding

922
00:33:12,630 --> 00:33:11,200
alien spacecraft but about delivering

923
00:33:14,230 --> 00:33:12,640
dominant intelligence across the

924
00:33:15,509 --> 00:33:14,240
tactical operational and strategic

925
00:33:17,830 --> 00:33:15,519
spectrum

926
00:33:22,149 --> 00:33:17,840
so my question is how can aimsog lead to

927
00:33:26,950 --> 00:33:24,630
sure i'll start with that uh so the goal

928
00:33:28,950 --> 00:33:26,960
of our effort is to integrate it into

929
00:33:31,909 --> 00:33:28,960
what we already do on a normal basis

930
00:33:33,269 --> 00:33:31,919
which is look for the unknown unknowns

931
00:33:35,430 --> 00:33:33,279
congressman as you stated in your

932
00:33:36,870 --> 00:33:35,440
opening remarks across all domains so

933
00:33:39,269 --> 00:33:36,880
we've been doing this for decades we've

934
00:33:41,190 --> 00:33:39,279
been looking at the space domain looking

935
00:33:43,430 --> 00:33:41,200
at space objects looking at space

936
00:33:45,269 --> 00:33:43,440
weather looking at space phenomena

937
00:33:47,830 --> 00:33:45,279
we've been looking at things in the air

938
00:33:49,430 --> 00:33:47,840
domain and we as you know we and i'll

939
00:33:51,350 --> 00:33:49,440
talk more about this in classified

940
00:33:53,990 --> 00:33:51,360
session but we have a very concerted

941
00:33:56,070 --> 00:33:54,000
effort to understand adversarial

942
00:33:57,830 --> 00:33:56,080
platforms and adversarial developmental

943
00:33:59,029 --> 00:33:57,840
programs and we do that also in the

944
00:34:01,430 --> 00:33:59,039
ground domain and of course we're very

945
00:34:03,750 --> 00:34:01,440
interested in what happens in the uh

946
00:34:05,509 --> 00:34:03,760
in the underwater or c domain if you

947
00:34:08,589 --> 00:34:05,519
will subsurface domain

948
00:34:11,829 --> 00:34:08,599
so if there are objects that our

949
00:34:16,790 --> 00:34:11,839
aviators or air crews are encountering

950
00:34:18,710 --> 00:34:16,800
in this air domain and their sensors are

951
00:34:20,950 --> 00:34:18,720
are discovering or detecting some of

952
00:34:23,510 --> 00:34:20,960
these objects we want to just bring that

953
00:34:25,430 --> 00:34:23,520
in to the normal process that we have

954
00:34:26,869 --> 00:34:25,440
for identifying unknown unknowns we want

955
00:34:29,030 --> 00:34:26,879
to make sure we have the intelligence

956
00:34:31,349 --> 00:34:29,040
requirements that allow us not only to

957
00:34:34,230 --> 00:34:31,359
look at that event from the time that it

958
00:34:35,909 --> 00:34:34,240
occurs forward but maybe retrospectively

959
00:34:37,589 --> 00:34:35,919
we want to go back and see if we can get

960
00:34:39,589 --> 00:34:37,599
to the left of that event to say was

961
00:34:41,270 --> 00:34:39,599
there some developmental program

962
00:34:42,470 --> 00:34:41,280
that we to get to your technical

963
00:34:44,149 --> 00:34:42,480
surprise

964
00:34:46,869 --> 00:34:44,159
issue sir that we should have known

965
00:34:48,310 --> 00:34:46,879
about and if so how do we put that

966
00:34:51,190 --> 00:34:48,320
intelligence requirement in place to

967
00:34:53,190 --> 00:34:51,200
ensure that we are following an

968
00:34:55,109 --> 00:34:53,200
adversarial development or any other

969
00:34:56,950 --> 00:34:55,119
development that may be out there so

970
00:34:58,550 --> 00:34:56,960
that's what we we want to do in terms of

971
00:35:00,550 --> 00:34:58,560
normalizing this and bringing it into

972
00:35:02,710 --> 00:35:00,560
the normal process of how we identify

973
00:35:05,190 --> 00:35:02,720
unknown unknowns so you mentioned

974
00:35:07,750 --> 00:35:05,200
fidelity and i think it's important to

975
00:35:11,030 --> 00:35:07,760
talk about the relationship

976
00:35:13,430 --> 00:35:11,040
from the navy is the lead agency on this

977
00:35:15,990 --> 00:35:13,440
how do you interact with

978
00:35:17,270 --> 00:35:16,000
space force air force to create that

979
00:35:19,430 --> 00:35:17,280
degree of fidelity we're talking about

980
00:35:21,030 --> 00:35:19,440
sensors and so on and i guess

981
00:35:22,710 --> 00:35:21,040
where i have some concerns that many of

982
00:35:25,030 --> 00:35:22,720
the images that we see

983
00:35:26,550 --> 00:35:25,040
commonly

984
00:35:29,270 --> 00:35:26,560
in this committee and even in open

985
00:35:31,510 --> 00:35:29,280
source the resolution and the clarity

986
00:35:33,510 --> 00:35:31,520
that would allow a robust technical

987
00:35:34,550 --> 00:35:33,520
intelligence analysis is

988
00:35:36,390 --> 00:35:34,560
challenging

989
00:35:38,230 --> 00:35:36,400
so is aimshot

990
00:35:40,310 --> 00:35:38,240
prepared to address the quality and and

991
00:35:41,990 --> 00:35:40,320
quantity of data collected on uap to

992
00:35:44,069 --> 00:35:42,000
advance intelligence collection and do

993
00:35:46,470 --> 00:35:44,079
you have the adequate sensors you need

994
00:35:48,230 --> 00:35:46,480
to collect that high quality data

995
00:35:50,230 --> 00:35:48,240
one of the lines of effort that we have

996
00:35:53,030 --> 00:35:50,240
is looking at our sensor capabilities

997
00:35:55,750 --> 00:35:53,040
and to understand whether or not

998
00:35:57,270 --> 00:35:55,760
the video showed that mr bray

999
00:35:59,750 --> 00:35:57,280
displayed

1000
00:36:01,270 --> 00:35:59,760
sometimes it's very fleeting uh data

1001
00:36:02,069 --> 00:36:01,280
that we have on some of these objects

1002
00:36:04,310 --> 00:36:02,079
and

1003
00:36:06,470 --> 00:36:04,320
we want to make sure that one

1004
00:36:08,390 --> 00:36:06,480
our systems are calibrated uh to

1005
00:36:10,150 --> 00:36:08,400
actually be able to collect on the

1006
00:36:11,750 --> 00:36:10,160
objects you know our sensors today are

1007
00:36:13,349 --> 00:36:11,760
they're calibrated for

1008
00:36:15,349 --> 00:36:13,359
specific things we want to make sure to

1009
00:36:16,950 --> 00:36:15,359
calibrate it for things of this nature

1010
00:36:19,510 --> 00:36:16,960
things of this size things of this

1011
00:36:21,910 --> 00:36:19,520
velocity if i can use that term we want

1012
00:36:24,790 --> 00:36:21,920
to make sure that once we have that that

1013
00:36:27,030 --> 00:36:24,800
that data is stored in some standardized

1014
00:36:28,870 --> 00:36:27,040
method that we can then extract and that

1015
00:36:31,430 --> 00:36:28,880
we can feed into our system real time so

1016
00:36:32,870 --> 00:36:31,440
we do not like want this to take some uh

1017
00:36:35,910 --> 00:36:32,880
prolonged period of time for us to get

1018
00:36:37,910 --> 00:36:35,920
that data but our goal is absolutely to

1019
00:36:39,589 --> 00:36:37,920
have that high fidelity information that

1020
00:36:41,430 --> 00:36:39,599
we get from all sensors and we want to

1021
00:36:43,510 --> 00:36:41,440
be able to integrate that with what we

1022
00:36:44,790 --> 00:36:43,520
may have off a ground-based sensor so

1023
00:36:45,990 --> 00:36:44,800
whatever you may have on a platform

1024
00:36:47,670 --> 00:36:46,000
whatever we may have on the ground

1025
00:36:50,310 --> 00:36:47,680
whatever we may have

1026
00:36:51,750 --> 00:36:50,320
from uh other sensors that we may have

1027
00:36:53,109 --> 00:36:51,760
in different domains we want to be able

1028
00:36:55,270 --> 00:36:53,119
to integrate that all and get this

1029
00:36:57,190 --> 00:36:55,280
integrated picture as we would as i said

1030
00:36:58,710 --> 00:36:57,200
with any other unidentified objects or

1031
00:37:00,230 --> 00:36:58,720
things that we are tracking

1032
00:37:01,910 --> 00:37:00,240
as a part of our normal intelligence

1033
00:37:03,510 --> 00:37:01,920
responsibilities

1034
00:37:06,790 --> 00:37:03,520
thank you last question mr bray if you

1035
00:37:08,790 --> 00:37:06,800
would uh i'm a navy pilot i've

1036
00:37:10,390 --> 00:37:08,800
encountered a uap walk me through the

1037
00:37:12,710 --> 00:37:10,400
reporting protocol

1038
00:37:14,310 --> 00:37:12,720
um once i see something that i think

1039
00:37:15,349 --> 00:37:14,320
needs reported

1040
00:37:16,870 --> 00:37:15,359
uh

1041
00:37:19,030 --> 00:37:16,880
the first thing that the aviator would

1042
00:37:21,349 --> 00:37:19,040
do after landing as a part of their

1043
00:37:23,829 --> 00:37:21,359
normal debriefing is they would

1044
00:37:25,670 --> 00:37:23,839
contact their intelligence officer their

1045
00:37:28,310 --> 00:37:25,680
intelligence officer would then uh walk

1046
00:37:30,550 --> 00:37:28,320
them through first filing a first

1047
00:37:33,349 --> 00:37:30,560
actually data preservation doing to

1048
00:37:35,190 --> 00:37:33,359
ensure that that whatever sensor data

1049
00:37:37,270 --> 00:37:35,200
may be on the aircraft that we preserve

1050
00:37:39,750 --> 00:37:37,280
that so that it's available for for

1051
00:37:42,150 --> 00:37:39,760
later analysis um second they would

1052
00:37:44,230 --> 00:37:42,160
actually fill out a a form

1053
00:37:45,910 --> 00:37:44,240
that that includes details like where

1054
00:37:48,630 --> 00:37:45,920
they were operating altitudes their

1055
00:37:50,790 --> 00:37:48,640
operating speeds what they observed

1056
00:37:52,550 --> 00:37:50,800
whatever sense of data sensor data they

1057
00:37:55,430 --> 00:37:52,560
may have recorded from that

1058
00:37:57,910 --> 00:37:55,440
and then that report is filed it goes

1059
00:38:00,230 --> 00:37:57,920
two places one it goes through um

1060
00:38:02,069 --> 00:38:00,240
through the operational uh chain of

1061
00:38:04,550 --> 00:38:02,079
command so that operational units are

1062
00:38:05,829 --> 00:38:04,560
aware of what what's being observed and

1063
00:38:08,390 --> 00:38:05,839
also

1064
00:38:09,750 --> 00:38:08,400
to the uap task force so that they can

1065
00:38:11,829 --> 00:38:09,760
take that data

1066
00:38:14,630 --> 00:38:11,839
database it and

1067
00:38:17,510 --> 00:38:14,640
quite often uh have individuals from the

1068
00:38:19,030 --> 00:38:17,520
task force contact the aviator

1069
00:38:20,870 --> 00:38:19,040
and ask them additional questions if

1070
00:38:23,270 --> 00:38:20,880
there were things that weren't clear uh

1071
00:38:24,550 --> 00:38:23,280
in the in the report uh that thing goes

1072
00:38:27,430 --> 00:38:24,560
into a um

1073
00:38:29,910 --> 00:38:27,440
into a database uh where we been compare

1074
00:38:32,390 --> 00:38:29,920
it with other um observations that we

1075
00:38:36,230 --> 00:38:32,400
have again comparing for locations

1076
00:38:38,230 --> 00:38:36,240
comparing for altitude speeds shapes uh

1077
00:38:40,390 --> 00:38:38,240
if any rf emissions were detected from

1078
00:38:42,069 --> 00:38:40,400
the platform uh all of that so that we

1079
00:38:42,870 --> 00:38:42,079
can try to reach some conclusions on

1080
00:38:47,109 --> 00:38:42,880
that

1081
00:38:51,829 --> 00:38:49,589
thanks chairman um mr bray can you rerun

1082
00:38:53,910 --> 00:38:51,839
that first uh image it looked like it

1083
00:38:55,990 --> 00:38:53,920
was outside of a plane window

1084
00:38:58,310 --> 00:38:56,000
um and if you wouldn't mind going up to

1085
00:39:00,310 --> 00:38:58,320
the screen and tell us what we're what

1086
00:39:01,750 --> 00:39:00,320
we're seeing uh

1087
00:39:03,510 --> 00:39:01,760
not that you can necessarily tell us

1088
00:39:05,270 --> 00:39:03,520
what we're saying but right explain what

1089
00:39:08,069 --> 00:39:05,280
we should be looking at in that first

1090
00:39:11,030 --> 00:39:08,079
image absolutely uh and alexi what i'll

1091
00:39:22,870 --> 00:39:11,040
ask is if you can stop it at a certain

1092
00:39:27,190 --> 00:39:24,390
damn it alex

1093
00:39:29,349 --> 00:39:27,200
lexi not there

1094
00:39:31,270 --> 00:39:29,359
jesus

1095
00:39:33,030 --> 00:39:31,280
does anybody else want alexi to just

1096
00:39:35,530 --> 00:39:33,040
accidentally click top secret video do

1097
00:39:39,190 --> 00:39:35,540
not play yeah whoops

1098
00:39:41,750 --> 00:39:39,200
[Laughter]

1099
00:39:44,230 --> 00:39:41,760
alexi uh just put the georgenet version

1100
00:39:53,589 --> 00:39:44,240
up outside of a civilian aircraft window

1101
00:39:53,599 --> 00:40:00,870
for alexis like panicking

1102
00:40:04,790 --> 00:40:02,950
the shortcuts for vlc media player she

1103
00:40:07,030 --> 00:40:04,800
needs to be hit in the comment that will

1104
00:40:15,829 --> 00:40:07,040
go backwards frame by frame we need dan

1105
00:40:18,069 --> 00:40:17,109
it shows a bit of a lack of planning

1106
00:40:19,589 --> 00:40:18,079
doesn't it that they haven't actually

1107
00:40:20,790 --> 00:40:19,599
got this queued up already that they can

1108
00:40:22,630 --> 00:40:20,800
just show it

1109
00:40:24,790 --> 00:40:22,640
as well yeah you think you'd have it

1110
00:40:26,230 --> 00:40:24,800
screenshot it or something by now yeah

1111
00:40:27,589 --> 00:40:26,240
especially with the object passing

1112
00:40:29,510 --> 00:40:27,599
because before that it's just a bunch of

1113
00:40:31,510 --> 00:40:29,520
you know cockpit

1114
00:40:32,710 --> 00:40:31,520
well exactly i mean i couldn't even see

1115
00:40:34,710 --> 00:40:32,720
it first time around it was the second

1116
00:40:36,470 --> 00:40:34,720
time they showed it when i saw it it

1117
00:40:38,150 --> 00:40:36,480
just goes straight past well i think

1118
00:40:40,069 --> 00:40:38,160
that's important to note though they

1119
00:40:42,069 --> 00:40:40,079
tried to intentionally choose a video

1120
00:40:44,470 --> 00:40:42,079
that is hard to see and i think that's

1121
00:40:46,710 --> 00:40:44,480
telling in and of itself you know

1122
00:40:48,950 --> 00:40:46,720
yeah well they've tried they've used the

1123
00:40:50,950 --> 00:40:48,960
the bokeh one haven't they like what the

1124
00:40:52,790 --> 00:40:50,960
hell whatever you call it um because

1125
00:40:55,109 --> 00:40:52,800
that's that's the low-hanging fruit that

1126
00:40:57,030 --> 00:40:55,119
andre carson talked about and now

1127
00:41:00,550 --> 00:40:57,040
they've got something which is the party

1128
00:41:05,510 --> 00:41:02,069
can you point to the screen again what

1129
00:41:10,470 --> 00:41:08,470
good question mr chef

1130
00:41:12,630 --> 00:41:10,480
because it's becoming a bit of a an

1131
00:41:14,710 --> 00:41:12,640
sh-1t show at the moment

1132
00:41:15,990 --> 00:41:14,720
yeah absolutely they they were prepared

1133
00:41:18,150 --> 00:41:16,000
to give the bog standard answers and

1134
00:41:20,790 --> 00:41:18,160
basically read the report out loud and

1135
00:41:21,510 --> 00:41:20,800
now they can't even queue up this video

1136
00:41:22,710 --> 00:41:21,520
and

1137
00:41:24,630 --> 00:41:22,720
you know we've heard about that 23

1138
00:41:27,030 --> 00:41:24,640
minute video and so on so forth and just

1139
00:41:29,270 --> 00:41:27,040
what is this but this is this is amateur

1140
00:41:30,630 --> 00:41:29,280
hour and you're the journalist

1141
00:41:33,510 --> 00:41:30,640
the journalists in the room are going to

1142
00:41:35,270 --> 00:41:33,520
be shaking their heads at this going

1143
00:41:36,710 --> 00:41:35,280
why are we doing this for

1144
00:41:38,390 --> 00:41:36,720
yeah

1145
00:41:39,910 --> 00:41:38,400
is this good though because it's showing

1146
00:41:41,990 --> 00:41:39,920
like how unprepared they are so more

1147
00:41:43,510 --> 00:41:42,000
legislation might be forthcoming that's

1148
00:41:44,870 --> 00:41:43,520
a good point that's a positive way to

1149
00:41:46,870 --> 00:41:44,880
look at it and i'm glad that he's saying

1150
00:41:54,710 --> 00:41:46,880
slow it down and you know at least

1151
00:41:59,109 --> 00:41:57,270
yeah i'd be much less optimistic i would

1152
00:42:00,950 --> 00:41:59,119
say that it's even possible this is

1153
00:42:03,190 --> 00:42:00,960
intentional

1154
00:42:06,230 --> 00:42:03,200
know i know that's skeptical but like no

1155
00:42:08,390 --> 00:42:06,240
i i understand yeah so we you can barely

1156
00:42:10,309 --> 00:42:08,400
see it it's we couldn't even queue it up

1157
00:42:12,150 --> 00:42:10,319
like what are we doing yeah like kind of

1158
00:42:18,630 --> 00:42:12,160
doing it it's not that hard to like find

1159
00:42:23,030 --> 00:42:21,030
let me get my son over there

1160
00:42:24,550 --> 00:42:23,040
between him and down they'll find it and

1161
00:42:26,630 --> 00:42:24,560
slow it down

1162
00:42:28,630 --> 00:42:26,640
what i really want right now is to see

1163
00:42:36,470 --> 00:42:28,640
adam schiff's face

1164
00:42:39,109 --> 00:42:37,670
so if you guys are having trouble

1165
00:42:41,460 --> 00:42:39,119
stopping in the right spot how did you

1166
00:42:47,190 --> 00:42:41,470
analyze it

1167
00:42:49,670 --> 00:42:48,420
victory set for dan

1168
00:42:51,990 --> 00:42:49,680
[Laughter]

1169
00:43:02,390 --> 00:42:52,000
um the laptop we're working with uh is

1170
00:43:08,710 --> 00:43:05,670
aircraft that is uh operating in a uh uh

1171
00:43:12,230 --> 00:43:08,720
in a us navy uh training range uh

1172
00:43:15,430 --> 00:43:12,240
observed a spherical object

1173
00:43:17,270 --> 00:43:15,440
uh in that area uh and as they fly by it

1174
00:43:18,309 --> 00:43:17,280
they take a video you see a

1175
00:43:20,470 --> 00:43:18,319
um

1176
00:43:22,870 --> 00:43:20,480
it looks uh reflective in this video

1177
00:43:24,309 --> 00:43:22,880
somewhat reflective uh and it quickly

1178
00:43:27,349 --> 00:43:24,319
passes by

1179
00:43:29,349 --> 00:43:27,359
uh the cockpit of the uh of the aircraft

1180
00:43:31,190 --> 00:43:29,359
and is this one of the phenomena that

1181
00:43:33,910 --> 00:43:31,200
we've been able to pass it i do not have

1182
00:43:35,829 --> 00:43:33,920
an explanation for what this

1183
00:43:37,750 --> 00:43:35,839
this specific uh

1184
00:43:40,950 --> 00:43:37,760
object is and is this one of the

1185
00:43:42,470 --> 00:43:40,960
situations where it is that's that's the

1186
00:43:43,589 --> 00:43:42,480
object that we're looking at right there

1187
00:43:44,710 --> 00:43:43,599
thank you

1188
00:43:47,109 --> 00:43:44,720
um

1189
00:43:48,870 --> 00:43:47,119
and is this a situation where

1190
00:43:50,870 --> 00:43:48,880
it was observed by the pilot and it was

1191
00:43:53,270 --> 00:43:50,880
also recorded by the aircraft's

1192
00:43:59,910 --> 00:43:53,280
instruments uh we'll talk about the

1193
00:44:04,470 --> 00:44:01,829
but in this case uh

1194
00:44:05,349 --> 00:44:04,480
we have at least that

1195
00:44:06,309 --> 00:44:05,359
um

1196
00:44:08,150 --> 00:44:06,319
in the

1197
00:44:10,870 --> 00:44:08,160
director of national intelligence uh

1198
00:44:14,790 --> 00:44:10,880
2021 unclassified report

1199
00:44:19,109 --> 00:44:14,800
um the odni reported 144

1200
00:44:21,109 --> 00:44:19,119
uaps between 2004 and 2021

1201
00:44:23,589 --> 00:44:21,119
80 of which were

1202
00:44:24,550 --> 00:44:23,599
recorded on multiple instruments

1203
00:44:26,470 --> 00:44:24,560
um

1204
00:44:27,589 --> 00:44:26,480
and i take it with respect to some of

1205
00:44:29,910 --> 00:44:27,599
those

1206
00:44:32,230 --> 00:44:29,920
you had the pilot a pilot seeing them it

1207
00:44:34,230 --> 00:44:32,240
was observed by a pilot and you had

1208
00:44:35,829 --> 00:44:34,240
multiple instruments recording it so you

1209
00:44:37,430 --> 00:44:35,839
really have three sensors the human

1210
00:44:39,430 --> 00:44:37,440
sensor and two

1211
00:44:41,510 --> 00:44:39,440
uh technical uh

1212
00:44:45,190 --> 00:44:41,520
sensors detecting the object is that for

1213
00:44:47,510 --> 00:44:45,200
them for the majority of uh

1214
00:44:49,030 --> 00:44:47,520
incidents that we had in the uh

1215
00:44:52,550 --> 00:44:49,040
last year's report

1216
00:44:54,230 --> 00:44:52,560
the majority had multi-sensor data

1217
00:44:55,430 --> 00:44:54,240
when i talk about the 400 reports that

1218
00:44:56,710 --> 00:44:55,440
we have now

1219
00:44:58,550 --> 00:44:56,720
that number will certainly go down

1220
00:44:59,990 --> 00:44:58,560
because a lot of those

1221
00:45:01,829 --> 00:45:00,000
new reports that we have are actually

1222
00:45:04,550 --> 00:45:01,839
historic reports that are narrative

1223
00:45:07,430 --> 00:45:04,560
based so that percentage will go down

1224
00:45:09,270 --> 00:45:07,440
just as a factor of uh the fact that the

1225
00:45:10,950 --> 00:45:09,280
that the destigmatization has resulted

1226
00:45:12,390 --> 00:45:10,960
in more narrative reports and that's the

1227
00:45:14,630 --> 00:45:12,400
object we're looking at right there now

1228
00:45:18,069 --> 00:45:14,640
that's it right there okay

1229
00:45:23,750 --> 00:45:20,390
last year's report also said that of

1230
00:45:25,910 --> 00:45:23,760
those 144 18 of them

1231
00:45:28,309 --> 00:45:25,920
uh reportedly appeared to exhibit

1232
00:45:29,750 --> 00:45:28,319
unusual flight characteristics

1233
00:45:31,990 --> 00:45:29,760
appear to demonstrate advanced

1234
00:45:33,109 --> 00:45:32,000
technology

1235
00:45:34,630 --> 00:45:33,119
and

1236
00:45:36,630 --> 00:45:34,640
some of them appeared to remain

1237
00:45:38,950 --> 00:45:36,640
stationary in winds aloft move against

1238
00:45:40,710 --> 00:45:38,960
the wind maneuver abruptly or move at

1239
00:45:43,910 --> 00:45:40,720
considerable speed without discernible

1240
00:45:43,920 --> 00:45:48,470
that's pretty intriguing uh

1241
00:45:51,910 --> 00:45:50,390
and and if you're able to answer this in

1242
00:45:55,750 --> 00:45:51,920
this setting

1243
00:45:58,390 --> 00:45:55,760
are we aware of any uh foreign adversary

1244
00:46:00,390 --> 00:45:58,400
capable of moving objects

1245
00:46:02,230 --> 00:46:00,400
uh without any discernible means of

1246
00:46:04,069 --> 00:46:02,240
propulsion

1247
00:46:06,150 --> 00:46:04,079
um

1248
00:46:08,470 --> 00:46:06,160
i think i would uh without discernible

1249
00:46:10,550 --> 00:46:08,480
means of propulsion i would say that uh

1250
00:46:12,309 --> 00:46:10,560
we're not aware of any adversary that

1251
00:46:14,150 --> 00:46:12,319
can move an object without discernible

1252
00:46:16,230 --> 00:46:14,160
means of propulsion

1253
00:46:17,750 --> 00:46:16,240
the question then becomes in many of

1254
00:46:19,910 --> 00:46:17,760
these cases where we don't have a

1255
00:46:21,829 --> 00:46:19,920
discernible mean of propulsion in the

1256
00:46:24,150 --> 00:46:21,839
data that we have

1257
00:46:27,750 --> 00:46:24,160
in some cases

1258
00:46:30,230 --> 00:46:27,760
there is likely sensor artifacts that

1259
00:46:32,550 --> 00:46:30,240
that may be hiding some of that

1260
00:46:34,470 --> 00:46:32,560
there's certainly some degree of

1261
00:46:36,390 --> 00:46:34,480
of something that looks like signature

1262
00:46:38,230 --> 00:46:36,400
management that we have seen from some

1263
00:46:39,910 --> 00:46:38,240
of these

1264
00:46:42,390 --> 00:46:39,920
uap

1265
00:46:44,710 --> 00:46:42,400
but i would i would caution i would

1266
00:46:46,870 --> 00:46:44,720
simply say that there are a number of uh

1267
00:46:48,710 --> 00:46:46,880
of events in which we do not have an

1268
00:46:51,030 --> 00:46:48,720
explanation in which then there are a

1269
00:46:53,109 --> 00:46:51,040
small handful in which there are flight

1270
00:46:55,990 --> 00:46:53,119
characteristics or signature management

1271
00:46:57,430 --> 00:46:56,000
um that we can't explain with the data

1272
00:46:58,870 --> 00:46:57,440
that we have

1273
00:47:01,109 --> 00:46:58,880
we'll continue those are obviously the

1274
00:47:03,109 --> 00:47:01,119
ones that are of most interest to us

1275
00:47:05,430 --> 00:47:03,119
earlier when we asked about how you

1276
00:47:07,190 --> 00:47:05,440
avoid technological surprise the biggest

1277
00:47:09,190 --> 00:47:07,200
way you avoid technological surprises by

1278
00:47:10,630 --> 00:47:09,200
collecting this type of data and by

1279
00:47:12,470 --> 00:47:10,640
importantly

1280
00:47:15,190 --> 00:47:12,480
calibrating the assumptions that you go

1281
00:47:16,870 --> 00:47:15,200
into with how you do that analysis i'll

1282
00:47:17,829 --> 00:47:16,880
tell you within the uap task force we

1283
00:47:20,470 --> 00:47:17,839
have

1284
00:47:22,710 --> 00:47:20,480
one basic assumption and that is that

1285
00:47:25,829 --> 00:47:22,720
generally speaking generally speaking

1286
00:47:27,670 --> 00:47:25,839
our sensors operate as designed

1287
00:47:30,230 --> 00:47:27,680
and we make that assumption because many

1288
00:47:32,549 --> 00:47:30,240
times these are multi-sensor collections

1289
00:47:34,549 --> 00:47:32,559
we make no assumptions about the origin

1290
00:47:36,230 --> 00:47:34,559
of this or that there may or may not be

1291
00:47:38,230 --> 00:47:36,240
some sort of technology that we don't

1292
00:47:40,150 --> 00:47:38,240
understand that's i think the key to

1293
00:47:42,069 --> 00:47:40,160
avoiding technological surprises by

1294
00:47:44,549 --> 00:47:42,079
calibrating those assumptions

1295
00:47:47,270 --> 00:47:44,559
and finally um with respect to the

1296
00:47:49,750 --> 00:47:47,280
second two videos uh showing the

1297
00:47:52,950 --> 00:47:49,760
small triangles

1298
00:47:53,750 --> 00:47:52,960
the hypothesis is that those are

1299
00:47:58,150 --> 00:47:53,760
uh

1300
00:47:59,829 --> 00:47:58,160
use of night vision goggles appear like

1301
00:48:02,230 --> 00:47:59,839
triangles is that the

1302
00:48:04,790 --> 00:48:02,240
operating assessment some type of uh of

1303
00:48:07,750 --> 00:48:04,800
drone some type of unmanned aerial

1304
00:48:10,790 --> 00:48:07,760
system and it is simply that that light

1305
00:48:12,870 --> 00:48:10,800
source uh resolves itself through

1306
00:48:16,150 --> 00:48:12,880
the um through the night vision goggles

1307
00:48:17,829 --> 00:48:16,160
onto the slr camera as a triangle and

1308
00:48:20,790 --> 00:48:17,839
have we in order to prove that

1309
00:48:23,430 --> 00:48:20,800
hypothesis uh flown

1310
00:48:25,589 --> 00:48:23,440
a drone and observed it with that same

1311
00:48:27,910 --> 00:48:25,599
technology to see whether we can

1312
00:48:29,589 --> 00:48:27,920
reproduce the effect the uap task force

1313
00:48:30,630 --> 00:48:29,599
is aware of studies that have done that

1314
00:48:33,430 --> 00:48:30,640
okay

1315
00:48:35,910 --> 00:48:33,440
thank you mr chairman i yield back

1316
00:48:37,510 --> 00:48:35,920
the gentleman yields back

1317
00:48:39,430 --> 00:48:37,520
dr winstrom

1318
00:48:43,349 --> 00:48:39,440
thank you mr chairman thank you all for

1319
00:48:46,950 --> 00:48:45,349
through this process where there's been

1320
00:48:52,230 --> 00:48:46,960
sightings

1321
00:48:55,190 --> 00:48:52,240
have they always been

1322
00:48:57,430 --> 00:48:55,200
cited from a moving object

1323
00:48:58,710 --> 00:48:57,440
from a plane or a ship that may be

1324
00:49:00,630 --> 00:48:58,720
moving

1325
00:49:02,549 --> 00:49:00,640
have these reports ever come from a

1326
00:49:03,990 --> 00:49:02,559
stationary object

1327
00:49:05,430 --> 00:49:04,000
being observed

1328
00:49:08,309 --> 00:49:05,440
in the sky

1329
00:49:10,309 --> 00:49:08,319
the uap task force does have uh reports

1330
00:49:12,309 --> 00:49:10,319
from stationary

1331
00:49:13,270 --> 00:49:12,319
from state reports from a stationary

1332
00:49:15,030 --> 00:49:13,280
observer

1333
00:49:17,190 --> 00:49:15,040
there's a difference observing something

1334
00:49:19,430 --> 00:49:17,200
when you're moving as well it's physics

1335
00:49:20,309 --> 00:49:19,440
right that's why i asked that question

1336
00:49:22,470 --> 00:49:20,319
uh

1337
00:49:24,150 --> 00:49:22,480
are we capable or have we made any

1338
00:49:26,150 --> 00:49:24,160
breakthroughs or anyone made any

1339
00:49:27,190 --> 00:49:26,160
breakthroughs to be able to cite

1340
00:49:30,549 --> 00:49:27,200
something

1341
00:49:33,430 --> 00:49:30,559
and make some determination at all

1342
00:49:35,030 --> 00:49:33,440
of its composition whether it's a solid

1343
00:49:40,470 --> 00:49:35,040
or a gas

1344
00:49:44,390 --> 00:49:42,150
um

1345
00:49:45,829 --> 00:49:44,400
from not asking what i just right

1346
00:49:48,630 --> 00:49:45,839
from some of the returns i mean it's

1347
00:49:50,150 --> 00:49:48,640
clear that uh that the majority well

1348
00:49:52,549 --> 00:49:50,160
it's clear that many of the observations

1349
00:49:55,589 --> 00:49:52,559
we have are physical objects uh from the

1350
00:49:57,510 --> 00:49:55,599
the sensor data that we have

1351
00:49:59,829 --> 00:49:57,520
well gas is physical is a physical

1352
00:50:01,510 --> 00:49:59,839
object it can be and so

1353
00:50:02,950 --> 00:50:01,520
and you see where i'm going with this

1354
00:50:04,470 --> 00:50:02,960
i'm trying to determine what it is we're

1355
00:50:07,109 --> 00:50:04,480
looking at so if we can decide if

1356
00:50:09,270 --> 00:50:07,119
something is a solid or a gas and and if

1357
00:50:12,549 --> 00:50:09,280
there's been any conclusion on its

1358
00:50:13,829 --> 00:50:12,559
capabilities like its capabilities of

1359
00:50:17,190 --> 00:50:13,839
movement

1360
00:50:19,670 --> 00:50:17,200
of turning uh going you know 180 degrees

1361
00:50:21,510 --> 00:50:19,680
or 90 degree turn anything along that

1362
00:50:23,589 --> 00:50:21,520
line that we've been able to determine

1363
00:50:25,910 --> 00:50:23,599
um within the and again i should point

1364
00:50:27,990 --> 00:50:25,920
out that uh you know that there is not a

1365
00:50:29,829 --> 00:50:28,000
single explanation for uap they are make

1366
00:50:32,309 --> 00:50:29,839
up there are a lot of different things

1367
00:50:33,270 --> 00:50:32,319
uh that that are unidentified phenomena

1368
00:50:35,430 --> 00:50:33,280
basically

1369
00:50:37,270 --> 00:50:35,440
we really don't know much on that that's

1370
00:50:39,030 --> 00:50:37,280
that's all i'm trying to get we i'm

1371
00:50:41,349 --> 00:50:39,040
pleased that you have protocol right now

1372
00:50:43,910 --> 00:50:41,359
for our military but are there

1373
00:50:46,069 --> 00:50:43,920
any non-military reports coming forward

1374
00:50:47,589 --> 00:50:46,079
of similar events or is it all coming

1375
00:50:49,030 --> 00:50:47,599
from military

1376
00:50:51,430 --> 00:50:49,040
the uae task force has a very good

1377
00:50:52,950 --> 00:50:51,440
working relationship with the faa

1378
00:50:55,349 --> 00:50:52,960
they have very good working relationship

1379
00:50:58,549 --> 00:50:55,359
with other parts of the us government so

1380
00:51:01,990 --> 00:50:58,559
that we can ingest reports uh from um

1381
00:51:04,150 --> 00:51:02,000
do we have any reports non-military

1382
00:51:06,950 --> 00:51:04,160
yes thank you that's that's that's my

1383
00:51:09,030 --> 00:51:06,960
question um and do we need to put out

1384
00:51:11,270 --> 00:51:09,040
protocol for civilians that may be in

1385
00:51:13,510 --> 00:51:11,280
that arena like through faa do you think

1386
00:51:15,670 --> 00:51:13,520
that would be appropriate and helpful

1387
00:51:18,470 --> 00:51:15,680
i think standardized the reporting

1388
00:51:21,349 --> 00:51:18,480
without a doubt is key to helping us get

1389
00:51:23,270 --> 00:51:21,359
to the to ascertain what some of these

1390
00:51:25,589 --> 00:51:23,280
are i think it would be important as

1391
00:51:28,710 --> 00:51:25,599
well do we um

1392
00:51:30,470 --> 00:51:28,720
there are other people besides uh the us

1393
00:51:32,790 --> 00:51:30,480
that have had these experiences and

1394
00:51:35,910 --> 00:51:32,800
reported them is that correct

1395
00:51:36,870 --> 00:51:35,920
there are that's correct uh is it uh all

1396
00:51:39,750 --> 00:51:36,880
of our

1397
00:51:41,910 --> 00:51:39,760
allies or is it allies and adversaries

1398
00:51:43,750 --> 00:51:41,920
what have we learned publicly so some of

1399
00:51:45,270 --> 00:51:43,760
that i think sir we'll save for closed

1400
00:51:47,589 --> 00:51:45,280
session

1401
00:51:49,109 --> 00:51:47,599
well that goes my next question publicly

1402
00:51:50,950 --> 00:51:49,119
have others

1403
00:51:52,870 --> 00:51:50,960
made anything which would not

1404
00:51:54,470 --> 00:51:52,880
have to be considered close so i don't

1405
00:51:56,230 --> 00:51:54,480
want you to answer what they've said

1406
00:51:58,549 --> 00:51:56,240
necessarily

1407
00:52:00,870 --> 00:51:58,559
allies have uh have seen these china has

1408
00:52:02,950 --> 00:52:00,880
established its own version of a uap

1409
00:52:05,510 --> 00:52:02,960
task force so clearly a number of

1410
00:52:06,870 --> 00:52:05,520
countries have observations of

1411
00:52:09,190 --> 00:52:06,880
of things in the airspace that they

1412
00:52:12,630 --> 00:52:09,200
can't identify and uh

1413
00:52:15,990 --> 00:52:12,640
do we share data with some with all

1414
00:52:19,270 --> 00:52:17,670
we share data with some and some share

1415
00:52:21,030 --> 00:52:19,280
data with us

1416
00:52:22,870 --> 00:52:21,040
but not necessarily all that have

1417
00:52:23,670 --> 00:52:22,880
publicly reported something that's

1418
00:52:24,549 --> 00:52:23,680
correct

1419
00:52:25,750 --> 00:52:24,559
okay

1420
00:52:27,030 --> 00:52:25,760
um

1421
00:52:28,710 --> 00:52:27,040
and i think that's

1422
00:52:30,470 --> 00:52:28,720
an important thing and for the other

1423
00:52:31,589 --> 00:52:30,480
session actually that we we don't

1424
00:52:32,710 --> 00:52:31,599
discuss

1425
00:52:33,829 --> 00:52:32,720
that now

1426
00:52:35,829 --> 00:52:33,839
um

1427
00:52:37,430 --> 00:52:35,839
because you know obviously something

1428
00:52:39,910 --> 00:52:37,440
like this can be

1429
00:52:41,510 --> 00:52:39,920
a national security challenge for us no

1430
00:52:42,950 --> 00:52:41,520
doubt about it if they're developed by

1431
00:52:44,150 --> 00:52:42,960
an adversary

1432
00:52:46,630 --> 00:52:44,160
um

1433
00:52:48,950 --> 00:52:46,640
through some breakthrough technology

1434
00:52:51,750 --> 00:52:48,960
they can be very disruptive to our

1435
00:52:53,670 --> 00:52:51,760
military actions uh or at least serve as

1436
00:52:56,390 --> 00:52:53,680
a destruction

1437
00:52:59,670 --> 00:52:56,400
so my caution would be

1438
00:53:01,910 --> 00:52:59,680
be careful who we share our data with

1439
00:53:04,870 --> 00:53:01,920
and don't necessarily trust some of the

1440
00:53:07,430 --> 00:53:04,880
data we may get from someone else

1441
00:53:12,870 --> 00:53:07,440
and with that i yield back

1442
00:53:16,150 --> 00:53:14,549
thank you mr chairman

1443
00:53:18,309 --> 00:53:16,160
one of the objectives of this open

1444
00:53:20,470 --> 00:53:18,319
hearing is to um

1445
00:53:23,109 --> 00:53:20,480
try to erode some of the stigma that

1446
00:53:24,630 --> 00:53:23,119
attaches to in particular our military

1447
00:53:28,230 --> 00:53:24,640
men and women reporting this it's

1448
00:53:29,910 --> 00:53:28,240
obviously really very serious because

1449
00:53:32,069 --> 00:53:29,920
should one of our adversaries have

1450
00:53:33,750 --> 00:53:32,079
developed a technology that we don't

1451
00:53:35,910 --> 00:53:33,760
know about it we need to know about it

1452
00:53:38,549 --> 00:53:35,920
yesterday and and obviously

1453
00:53:39,510 --> 00:53:38,559
uh any sort of stigma that prevents our

1454
00:53:40,790 --> 00:53:39,520
our

1455
00:53:42,069 --> 00:53:40,800
military

1456
00:53:43,589 --> 00:53:42,079
from reporting this data as

1457
00:53:45,829 --> 00:53:43,599
comprehensively as possible as a

1458
00:53:47,510 --> 00:53:45,839
national security threat so i i really

1459
00:53:49,910 --> 00:53:47,520
just have two questions in the service

1460
00:53:52,150 --> 00:53:49,920
of that goal uh the first is

1461
00:53:54,150 --> 00:53:52,160
um the chairman asked that we run that

1462
00:53:56,790 --> 00:53:54,160
video again most people when they see a

1463
00:53:58,150 --> 00:53:56,800
video we're all used to seeing things

1464
00:54:00,150 --> 00:53:58,160
from a car

1465
00:54:02,790 --> 00:54:00,160
seeing things from a sidewalk very few

1466
00:54:04,549 --> 00:54:02,800
people have the experience of observing

1467
00:54:07,589 --> 00:54:04,559
something through night vision goggles

1468
00:54:10,390 --> 00:54:07,599
at mach 1.5 so just talk for a minute

1469
00:54:12,069 --> 00:54:10,400
about if you would uh whichever of you

1470
00:54:14,069 --> 00:54:12,079
is most appropriate

1471
00:54:16,470 --> 00:54:14,079
how radically different

1472
00:54:18,630 --> 00:54:16,480
observation is at high speed and three

1473
00:54:21,589 --> 00:54:18,640
dimension than it is for most of us who

1474
00:54:23,910 --> 00:54:21,599
walk around and drive cars

1475
00:54:25,430 --> 00:54:23,920
um so the first thing i think that's

1476
00:54:27,829 --> 00:54:25,440
important to note about this is there

1477
00:54:31,030 --> 00:54:27,839
are lots of things when you are moving

1478
00:54:32,630 --> 00:54:31,040
very fast and an object is between you

1479
00:54:33,910 --> 00:54:32,640
and a stationary reference point like

1480
00:54:35,510 --> 00:54:33,920
the ground

1481
00:54:37,990 --> 00:54:35,520
it gives a lot of different impressions

1482
00:54:39,829 --> 00:54:38,000
about how quickly something is or isn't

1483
00:54:42,230 --> 00:54:39,839
moving and it actually

1484
00:54:44,870 --> 00:54:42,240
means it is a challenge

1485
00:54:46,390 --> 00:54:44,880
especially with narrative based data

1486
00:54:48,069 --> 00:54:46,400
to get a lot of information on that

1487
00:54:49,910 --> 00:54:48,079
that's why the sensor data is so

1488
00:54:53,030 --> 00:54:49,920
important because things do happen very

1489
00:54:54,309 --> 00:54:53,040
quickly as you see there and sometimes

1490
00:54:56,150 --> 00:54:54,319
things that happen very quickly

1491
00:54:58,630 --> 00:54:56,160
something may be moving very slow that

1492
00:55:00,789 --> 00:54:58,640
aircraft is moving quite fast how fast

1493
00:55:03,349 --> 00:55:00,799
that object is moving that goes by is

1494
00:55:05,510 --> 00:55:03,359
probably very slow

1495
00:55:07,829 --> 00:55:05,520
so i guess my point is that an

1496
00:55:09,589 --> 00:55:07,839
observation either a visual observation

1497
00:55:12,230 --> 00:55:09,599
or a uh

1498
00:55:13,270 --> 00:55:12,240
a electronic observation infrared or

1499
00:55:15,430 --> 00:55:13,280
whatever

1500
00:55:17,510 --> 00:55:15,440
looks radically different than it does

1501
00:55:19,430 --> 00:55:17,520
to most people

1502
00:55:21,670 --> 00:55:19,440
even instruments

1503
00:55:23,750 --> 00:55:21,680
instruments are on gimbals and that sort

1504
00:55:25,270 --> 00:55:23,760
of thing so that creates a

1505
00:55:27,349 --> 00:55:25,280
very unusual

1506
00:55:29,030 --> 00:55:27,359
uh view to again those of us who are

1507
00:55:32,230 --> 00:55:29,040
used to seeing things on in two

1508
00:55:36,309 --> 00:55:34,789
second question um

1509
00:55:38,470 --> 00:55:36,319
i think mr bray you said something that

1510
00:55:41,910 --> 00:55:38,480
i want to unpack a little bit uh

1511
00:55:43,670 --> 00:55:41,920
uh a number of these uaps you said we

1512
00:55:46,230 --> 00:55:43,680
can't explain

1513
00:55:49,109 --> 00:55:46,240
again in the service of sort of reducing

1514
00:55:50,870 --> 00:55:49,119
uh speculation and conspiracy theories

1515
00:55:52,710 --> 00:55:50,880
we can't explain

1516
00:55:54,950 --> 00:55:52,720
can range from

1517
00:55:56,630 --> 00:55:54,960
a visual observation that was distant on

1518
00:55:58,309 --> 00:55:56,640
a foggy night we don't know what it is

1519
00:56:00,549 --> 00:55:58,319
to

1520
00:56:02,630 --> 00:56:00,559
we've found an organic material that we

1521
00:56:05,349 --> 00:56:02,640
can identify right those are radically

1522
00:56:07,349 --> 00:56:05,359
different world worlds so when you say

1523
00:56:08,470 --> 00:56:07,359
we can't explain give the public a

1524
00:56:10,950 --> 00:56:08,480
little bit

1525
00:56:13,190 --> 00:56:10,960
better sense of where on that spectrum

1526
00:56:15,670 --> 00:56:13,200
of we can't explain we are are we

1527
00:56:17,670 --> 00:56:15,680
holding materials organic or inorganic

1528
00:56:19,430 --> 00:56:17,680
that we don't know about are we

1529
00:56:21,670 --> 00:56:19,440
you know picking up emanations that are

1530
00:56:22,950 --> 00:56:21,680
something other than light or infrared

1531
00:56:24,630 --> 00:56:22,960
that could be

1532
00:56:26,950 --> 00:56:24,640
communications give us a sense for what

1533
00:56:29,270 --> 00:56:26,960
you mean when you say we can't explain

1534
00:56:31,190 --> 00:56:29,280
sure when i say we can't explain i i

1535
00:56:33,270 --> 00:56:31,200
mean exactly as you described there that

1536
00:56:34,789 --> 00:56:33,280
there is a lot of information like the

1537
00:56:36,789 --> 00:56:34,799
video that we showed in which there's

1538
00:56:39,190 --> 00:56:36,799
simply too little data

1539
00:56:40,870 --> 00:56:39,200
to to create a reasonable explanation

1540
00:56:43,190 --> 00:56:40,880
there are a small handful of cases in

1541
00:56:45,109 --> 00:56:43,200
which we have more data

1542
00:56:47,910 --> 00:56:45,119
that our analysis simply hasn't been

1543
00:56:51,430 --> 00:56:47,920
able to uh to fully pull together a

1544
00:56:52,789 --> 00:56:51,440
picture of what happened um the um

1545
00:56:55,349 --> 00:56:52,799
and those are the cases where we talk

1546
00:56:56,789 --> 00:56:55,359
about where we see some indications of

1547
00:56:57,829 --> 00:56:56,799
flight characteristics or signature

1548
00:57:00,470 --> 00:56:57,839
management

1549
00:57:02,069 --> 00:57:00,480
that are not what we had expected

1550
00:57:03,990 --> 00:57:02,079
when it comes to material that we have

1551
00:57:06,549 --> 00:57:04,000
we have no material

1552
00:57:09,990 --> 00:57:06,559
we have detected no emanations

1553
00:57:11,870 --> 00:57:10,000
within the uap task force that that is

1554
00:57:15,829 --> 00:57:11,880
that would suggest it's anything

1555
00:57:17,670 --> 00:57:15,839
non-terrestrial uh in origin so

1556
00:57:18,470 --> 00:57:17,680
when i say unexplained i mean everything

1557
00:57:20,470 --> 00:57:18,480
from

1558
00:57:22,710 --> 00:57:20,480
too little too little data

1559
00:57:25,030 --> 00:57:22,720
to we simply the data that we have

1560
00:57:26,549 --> 00:57:25,040
doesn't point us towards an explanation

1561
00:57:27,829 --> 00:57:26,559
but we'll go wherever the data takes us

1562
00:57:29,829 --> 00:57:27,839
again we've made no assumptions about

1563
00:57:31,910 --> 00:57:29,839
what this is or isn't uh we're committed

1564
00:57:33,750 --> 00:57:31,920
to understanding these and so we'll go

1565
00:57:35,190 --> 00:57:33,760
wherever that data takes us

1566
00:57:37,349 --> 00:57:35,200
thank you that's that's very helpful and

1567
00:57:39,910 --> 00:57:37,359
so i think it bears emphasis

1568
00:57:41,750 --> 00:57:39,920
when you say we can't explain everything

1569
00:57:44,390 --> 00:57:41,760
that you can't explain

1570
00:57:47,109 --> 00:57:44,400
is in a bucket called data

1571
00:57:49,349 --> 00:57:47,119
is that correct and that would mean

1572
00:57:51,670 --> 00:57:49,359
data collected by sensors visual

1573
00:57:53,910 --> 00:57:51,680
observations everything that we can't

1574
00:57:56,870 --> 00:57:53,920
explain quote-unquote is in a bucket

1575
00:57:59,349 --> 00:57:56,880
called data right a narrative report uh

1576
00:58:01,030 --> 00:57:59,359
from uh from the early 2000s if it just

1577
00:58:02,789 --> 00:58:01,040
had a little bit of information on it

1578
00:58:04,789 --> 00:58:02,799
would be in our database and it would be

1579
00:58:06,470 --> 00:58:04,799
unresolved i would add to that it's

1580
00:58:08,710 --> 00:58:06,480
insufficient data i mean that's one of

1581
00:58:11,750 --> 00:58:08,720
the challenges we have insufficient data

1582
00:58:14,630 --> 00:58:11,760
either on the event itself the object

1583
00:58:17,270 --> 00:58:14,640
itself or insufficient data or plug-in

1584
00:58:18,710 --> 00:58:17,280
with some other organization or agency

1585
00:58:21,270 --> 00:58:18,720
that may have had something in that

1586
00:58:22,789 --> 00:58:21,280
space at that time so it's a data issue

1587
00:58:23,430 --> 00:58:22,799
that we're that we're facing in many of

1588
00:58:24,950 --> 00:58:23,440
these

1589
00:58:27,430 --> 00:58:24,960
congressmen understood thank you very

1590
00:58:29,109 --> 00:58:27,440
much yield back yeah but not all of them

1591
00:58:30,710 --> 00:58:29,119
just said there are some cases they have

1592
00:58:31,750 --> 00:58:30,720
plenty of data thank you mr chairman

1593
00:58:33,589 --> 00:58:31,760
thank you for allowing me to join this

1594
00:58:35,750 --> 00:58:33,599
hearing um i really appreciate the

1595
00:58:38,390 --> 00:58:35,760
witnesses testimony

1596
00:58:40,710 --> 00:58:38,400
mr moultrie as the chairman uh mentioned

1597
00:58:42,470 --> 00:58:40,720
uh dod had an initiative to study ufos

1598
00:58:43,910 --> 00:58:42,480
in the 1960s called

1599
00:58:45,829 --> 00:58:43,920
project blue book

1600
00:58:48,309 --> 00:58:45,839
it's also been well reported in our

1601
00:58:49,910 --> 00:58:48,319
briefing and in other places that we

1602
00:58:53,270 --> 00:58:49,920
have more have more recent projects

1603
00:58:55,910 --> 00:58:53,280
specifically atip could you describe any

1604
00:58:58,710 --> 00:58:55,920
other initiatives that the dod or dod

1605
00:59:01,430 --> 00:58:58,720
contractors have managed after project

1606
00:59:03,910 --> 00:59:01,440
blue book ended and prior to atip

1607
00:59:05,510 --> 00:59:03,920
beginning did anything also predate

1608
00:59:07,510 --> 00:59:05,520
project blue book

1609
00:59:08,789 --> 00:59:07,520
so i i can't speak to what may have

1610
00:59:10,710 --> 00:59:08,799
predated

1611
00:59:12,069 --> 00:59:10,720
project blue book i mean of course

1612
00:59:13,190 --> 00:59:12,079
here's roswell and all these other

1613
00:59:14,789 --> 00:59:13,200
things that people have talked about

1614
00:59:16,549 --> 00:59:14,799
over the years

1615
00:59:19,990 --> 00:59:16,559
i'm familiar with blue book i'm familiar

1616
00:59:22,630 --> 00:59:20,000
with uh with atip uh i haven't seen

1617
00:59:24,870 --> 00:59:22,640
other documented uh studies that have

1618
00:59:25,990 --> 00:59:24,880
been done by dod in that regard

1619
00:59:28,549 --> 00:59:26,000
so you're not aware of anything in

1620
00:59:30,069 --> 00:59:28,559
between project bluebook and atip not

1621
00:59:33,349 --> 00:59:30,079
aware of anything that's

1622
00:59:34,789 --> 00:59:33,359
official that was done in between

1623
00:59:36,710 --> 00:59:34,799
brought to my attention

1624
00:59:40,950 --> 00:59:36,720
okay uh additionally are you aware of

1625
00:59:43,030 --> 00:59:40,960
any other dod or dod contract programs

1626
00:59:44,950 --> 00:59:43,040
from a technological engineering

1627
00:59:46,789 --> 00:59:44,960
perspective and by that i mean are you

1628
00:59:48,950 --> 00:59:46,799
aware of any technology initiatives

1629
00:59:50,950 --> 00:59:48,960
focused on this topic other than

1630
00:59:51,750 --> 00:59:50,960
initiatives focused on the individual

1631
00:59:53,829 --> 00:59:51,760
case

1632
00:59:56,710 --> 00:59:53,839
investigations i am not aware of any

1633
00:59:57,670 --> 00:59:56,720
contractual programs that are focused on

1634
01:00:00,789 --> 00:59:57,680
uh

1635
01:00:03,030 --> 01:00:00,799
any anything related to this other than

1636
01:00:04,870 --> 01:00:03,040
what we are doing in the navy task force

1637
01:00:06,069 --> 01:00:04,880
and what we are about to launch in terms

1638
01:00:08,069 --> 01:00:06,079
of our effort

1639
01:00:09,750 --> 01:00:08,079
same question for you mr brown

1640
01:00:11,750 --> 01:00:09,760
uh same answer not aware of anything

1641
01:00:13,349 --> 01:00:11,760
outside what we uh are doing in the uap

1642
01:00:15,270 --> 01:00:13,359
task force so just confirm you're not

1643
01:00:17,349 --> 01:00:15,280
aware of any technology or engineering

1644
01:00:18,710 --> 01:00:17,359
resources that have been focused on

1645
01:00:20,150 --> 01:00:18,720
these efforts besides what we've

1646
01:00:23,190 --> 01:00:20,160
mentioned today

1647
01:00:24,549 --> 01:00:23,200
once again i'll say no contractual uh

1648
01:00:25,589 --> 01:00:24,559
there's so much wiggle room in that

1649
01:00:27,510 --> 01:00:25,599
answer

1650
01:00:30,470 --> 01:00:27,520
programmatic uh efforts that are

1651
01:00:32,309 --> 01:00:30,480
involved the reason why i i qualified

1652
01:00:34,309 --> 01:00:32,319
yeah let me qualify it that way

1653
01:00:35,750 --> 01:00:34,319
i can't speak to what people may be

1654
01:00:37,109 --> 01:00:35,760
looking at in the department somebody

1655
01:00:38,470 --> 01:00:37,119
says i'm looking at something i'm

1656
01:00:40,710 --> 01:00:38,480
looking at something that may be

1657
01:00:42,549 --> 01:00:40,720
unidentified and i can't speak to that

1658
01:00:43,829 --> 01:00:42,559
speak to official programs we have on

1659
01:00:45,510 --> 01:00:43,839
the record

1660
01:00:48,230 --> 01:00:45,520
it's also been reported that there have

1661
01:00:49,750 --> 01:00:48,240
been uap observed and interacting with

1662
01:00:51,510 --> 01:00:49,760
and flying over sensitive military

1663
01:00:52,390 --> 01:00:51,520
facilities particularly not just ranges

1664
01:00:53,910 --> 01:00:52,400
but

1665
01:00:55,829 --> 01:00:53,920
some facilities housing are strategic

1666
01:00:58,230 --> 01:00:55,839
nuclear forces one such incident

1667
01:01:00,230 --> 01:00:58,240
allegedly occurred

1668
01:01:01,829 --> 01:01:00,240
at malmstrom air force base in which 10

1669
01:01:04,069 --> 01:01:01,839
of our nuclear icbms were rendered

1670
01:01:05,829 --> 01:01:04,079
inoperable at the same time a glowing

1671
01:01:07,270 --> 01:01:05,839
red orb was observed overhead i'm not

1672
01:01:09,510 --> 01:01:07,280
commenting on the accuracy of this i'm

1673
01:01:10,870 --> 01:01:09,520
simply asking you whether you're aware

1674
01:01:12,390 --> 01:01:10,880
of it and whether you have any comment

1675
01:01:14,150 --> 01:01:12,400
on the accuracy of that report we passed

1676
01:01:16,069 --> 01:01:14,160
that to mr brave you've been looking at

1677
01:01:17,990 --> 01:01:16,079
uap's overview last three years uh that

1678
01:01:20,470 --> 01:01:18,000
data is not uh within the holdings of

1679
01:01:23,589 --> 01:01:20,480
the uap task force

1680
01:01:25,030 --> 01:01:23,599
okay but are you aware of the the report

1681
01:01:26,950 --> 01:01:25,040
or that the data

1682
01:01:28,789 --> 01:01:26,960
exists somewhere

1683
01:01:30,630 --> 01:01:28,799
i i have uh

1684
01:01:31,910 --> 01:01:30,640
i have heard stories i have not seen the

1685
01:01:34,630 --> 01:01:31,920
official data on that so you've just

1686
01:01:37,109 --> 01:01:34,640
seen informal stories no official

1687
01:01:39,589 --> 01:01:37,119
assessment that you've done or exists

1688
01:01:42,710 --> 01:01:39,599
within dod that you're aware of uh

1689
01:01:44,230 --> 01:01:42,720
regarding the malmstrom incident

1690
01:01:45,990 --> 01:01:44,240
uh all i can speak to is you know what's

1691
01:01:48,309 --> 01:01:46,000
within my cognizance the uap task force

1692
01:01:49,829 --> 01:01:48,319
and we have not looked at that incident

1693
01:01:51,910 --> 01:01:49,839
well i was it's a pretty high profile

1694
01:01:54,470 --> 01:01:51,920
incident i don't claim to be an expert

1695
01:01:56,309 --> 01:01:54,480
on this but that's out there in the

1696
01:01:58,230 --> 01:01:56,319
ether

1697
01:02:00,150 --> 01:01:58,240
you're you're the guy's investigating it

1698
01:02:01,910 --> 01:02:00,160
i mean who else is doing it if something

1699
01:02:03,589 --> 01:02:01,920
was officially brought to our attention

1700
01:02:04,710 --> 01:02:03,599
we would look at it there are many

1701
01:02:06,230 --> 01:02:04,720
things that are out there in the ether

1702
01:02:07,190 --> 01:02:06,240
that aren't officially brought to our

1703
01:02:09,190 --> 01:02:07,200
attention how would it have to be

1704
01:02:10,309 --> 01:02:09,200
officially brought to you i'm bringing

1705
01:02:12,309 --> 01:02:10,319
it to you

1706
01:02:13,910 --> 01:02:12,319
this is pretty official sure so we'll go

1707
01:02:16,710 --> 01:02:13,920
back and take a look at it but generally

1708
01:02:18,069 --> 01:02:16,720
there is some um authoritative figure

1709
01:02:19,990 --> 01:02:18,079
that says there is an incident that

1710
01:02:21,829 --> 01:02:20,000
occurred we'd like you to look at this

1711
01:02:23,190 --> 01:02:21,839
uh but in terms of just tracking what

1712
01:02:24,630 --> 01:02:23,200
may be in the media that says that

1713
01:02:27,349 --> 01:02:24,640
something occurred at this time at this

1714
01:02:28,470 --> 01:02:27,359
place uh there probably a lot of leads

1715
01:02:29,750 --> 01:02:28,480
that we would have to follow up on i

1716
01:02:32,470 --> 01:02:29,760
don't think we were resourced to do that

1717
01:02:34,870 --> 01:02:32,480
right there's actually documentation

1718
01:02:36,230 --> 01:02:34,880
for westworth

1719
01:02:38,470 --> 01:02:36,240
for another reason you could dismiss it

1720
01:02:40,870 --> 01:02:38,480
and say this is not worth wasting

1721
01:02:42,390 --> 01:02:40,880
resources on um and then finally are you

1722
01:02:44,630 --> 01:02:42,400
aware of a document that appeared around

1723
01:02:48,950 --> 01:02:44,640
2019 uh sometimes called the admiral

1724
01:02:51,190 --> 01:02:48,960
wilson memo or ew notes memo

1725
01:02:53,190 --> 01:02:51,200
i am i'm not

1726
01:02:55,589 --> 01:02:53,200
i'm not personally aware of that okay

1727
01:02:57,510 --> 01:02:55,599
this is a document

1728
01:02:59,990 --> 01:02:57,520
veracity i was hoping you would help me

1729
01:03:01,349 --> 01:03:00,000
with that not expecting that head of dia

1730
01:03:03,670 --> 01:03:01,359
claims to have had a conversation with

1731
01:03:05,349 --> 01:03:03,680
the doctor eric wilson and claims to

1732
01:03:06,230 --> 01:03:05,359
have uh sort of been made aware of

1733
01:03:09,430 --> 01:03:06,240
certain

1734
01:03:11,670 --> 01:03:09,440
um contractors or dod programs

1735
01:03:13,270 --> 01:03:11,680
that he tried to get fuller access to

1736
01:03:16,309 --> 01:03:13,280
and was denied

1737
01:03:18,309 --> 01:03:16,319
access to um so you're not aware of that

1738
01:03:19,750 --> 01:03:18,319
i'm not aware of congressman uh in my 10

1739
01:03:21,430 --> 01:03:19,760
seconds remaining then i guess i just

1740
01:03:25,670 --> 01:03:21,440
would ask mr chairman unanimous consent

1741
01:03:29,829 --> 01:03:27,510
without objection thank you mr chairman

1742
01:03:32,230 --> 01:03:29,839
appreciate it

1743
01:03:33,829 --> 01:03:32,240
christie murthy

1744
01:03:35,670 --> 01:03:33,839
thank you mr chair and thank you to both

1745
01:03:38,789 --> 01:03:35,680
of you for appearing today and for your

1746
01:03:41,270 --> 01:03:38,799
public service first question is uh

1747
01:03:44,549 --> 01:03:41,280
there have been no collisions between

1748
01:03:45,750 --> 01:03:44,559
any u.s assets in one of these uaps

1749
01:03:47,190 --> 01:03:45,760
correct

1750
01:03:49,349 --> 01:03:47,200
we have not had a collision we've had at

1751
01:03:51,349 --> 01:03:49,359
least 11 near misses though

1752
01:03:52,950 --> 01:03:51,359
and

1753
01:03:54,710 --> 01:03:52,960
maybe we'll talk about those 11 near

1754
01:03:55,910 --> 01:03:54,720
misses or any place where there's close

1755
01:03:56,710 --> 01:03:55,920
proximity

1756
01:04:02,549 --> 01:03:56,720
um

1757
01:04:05,349 --> 01:04:02,559
been no uh attempt

1758
01:04:07,589 --> 01:04:05,359
there's no communications

1759
01:04:09,750 --> 01:04:07,599
or any kind of

1760
01:04:12,470 --> 01:04:09,760
communication signals that emanate from

1761
01:04:13,829 --> 01:04:12,480
those objects uh that we've detected

1762
01:04:19,430 --> 01:04:13,839
correct

1763
01:04:23,589 --> 01:04:20,870
no

1764
01:04:26,870 --> 01:04:23,599
so we don't we don't even put out a

1765
01:04:27,910 --> 01:04:26,880
alert saying you know uh us

1766
01:04:30,470 --> 01:04:27,920
um

1767
01:04:32,470 --> 01:04:30,480
identi you know identify yourself

1768
01:04:33,990 --> 01:04:32,480
uh you are you know within our flight

1769
01:04:36,390 --> 01:04:34,000
path or something like that we haven't

1770
01:04:38,230 --> 01:04:36,400
said anything like that

1771
01:04:40,950 --> 01:04:38,240
we've not put anything out like that

1772
01:04:42,150 --> 01:04:40,960
generally speaking uh what you know for

1773
01:04:44,470 --> 01:04:42,160
example in the video that we showed

1774
01:04:47,109 --> 01:04:44,480
earlier uh it appears to be something

1775
01:04:48,710 --> 01:04:47,119
that is uh you know unmanned uh appears

1776
01:04:51,109 --> 01:04:48,720
to be something that

1777
01:04:53,349 --> 01:04:51,119
may or may not be in controlled flight

1778
01:04:54,470 --> 01:04:53,359
uh and so we've not attempted any

1779
01:04:55,990 --> 01:04:54,480
communication

1780
01:04:58,230 --> 01:04:56,000
with that

1781
01:05:00,710 --> 01:04:58,240
okay so um

1782
01:05:04,230 --> 01:05:00,720
and i assume we've never discharged any

1783
01:05:05,430 --> 01:05:04,240
armaments against a uap correct

1784
01:05:08,309 --> 01:05:05,440
that's correct

1785
01:05:10,309 --> 01:05:08,319
um how about wreckage have we come

1786
01:05:12,069 --> 01:05:10,319
across any wreckage

1787
01:05:14,870 --> 01:05:12,079
of any kind of

1788
01:05:18,230 --> 01:05:14,880
um object that

1789
01:05:19,589 --> 01:05:18,240
has now been examined by you

1790
01:05:21,029 --> 01:05:19,599
the uap task force doesn't have any

1791
01:05:23,270 --> 01:05:21,039
wreckage that isn't

1792
01:05:24,950 --> 01:05:23,280
explainable that isn't consistent with

1793
01:05:29,589 --> 01:05:24,960
being of terrestrial origin

1794
01:05:33,430 --> 01:05:29,599
do we have any sensors underwater uh to

1795
01:05:35,510 --> 01:05:33,440
detect on submerged uaps uh anything

1796
01:05:37,190 --> 01:05:35,520
that is in the ocean or in the seas so i

1797
01:05:39,750 --> 01:05:37,200
think that would be more appropriately

1798
01:05:41,670 --> 01:05:39,760
addressed in closed session sir okay

1799
01:05:43,109 --> 01:05:41,680
um

1800
01:05:44,630 --> 01:05:43,119
i think one of the biggest questions

1801
01:05:47,510 --> 01:05:44,640
that yes that

1802
01:05:49,829 --> 01:05:47,520
that i have is

1803
01:05:50,870 --> 01:05:49,839
we say with a lot of probability we say

1804
01:05:52,950 --> 01:05:50,880
they

1805
01:05:54,549 --> 01:05:52,960
quote unquote probably do represent

1806
01:05:57,109 --> 01:05:54,559
physical objects

1807
01:05:59,109 --> 01:05:57,119
close quote

1808
01:06:02,309 --> 01:05:59,119
when we say probably

1809
01:06:05,430 --> 01:06:02,319
is that because we cannot conclusively

1810
01:06:08,390 --> 01:06:05,440
say that they are physical objects

1811
01:06:10,230 --> 01:06:08,400
in the task force uh report uh when when

1812
01:06:12,470 --> 01:06:10,240
i say probably uh represent physical

1813
01:06:13,990 --> 01:06:12,480
objects uh most of them represent

1814
01:06:15,990 --> 01:06:14,000
physical objects there could be some

1815
01:06:17,270 --> 01:06:16,000
that are more of a uh

1816
01:06:18,870 --> 01:06:17,280
of a

1817
01:06:20,390 --> 01:06:18,880
meteorological phenomena something like

1818
01:06:23,430 --> 01:06:20,400
that that may not

1819
01:06:24,630 --> 01:06:23,440
uh be a physical object in the

1820
01:06:26,390 --> 01:06:24,640
in the sense that most people think of

1821
01:06:28,950 --> 01:06:26,400
something you go up and touch but the

1822
01:06:31,190 --> 01:06:28,960
ones where you say most of them

1823
01:06:34,069 --> 01:06:31,200
represent physical objects can you say

1824
01:06:36,789 --> 01:06:34,079
that they are definitely like with 100

1825
01:06:38,549 --> 01:06:36,799
certainty that they are physical objects

1826
01:06:40,710 --> 01:06:38,559
i can say with certainty that uh a

1827
01:06:43,109 --> 01:06:40,720
number of these are physical objects

1828
01:06:44,950 --> 01:06:43,119
okay so there we can't rule out that

1829
01:06:47,270 --> 01:06:44,960
some of them may not be physical objects

1830
01:06:49,670 --> 01:06:47,280
so some certainly could be a sensor

1831
01:06:50,549 --> 01:06:49,680
anomaly or something like that some

1832
01:06:53,910 --> 01:06:50,559
could be

1833
01:06:56,390 --> 01:06:53,920
now how about uh with regard to uaps

1834
01:06:57,430 --> 01:06:56,400
we've talked about uips on training

1835
01:06:59,430 --> 01:06:57,440
areas

1836
01:07:01,349 --> 01:06:59,440
but obviously

1837
01:07:04,789 --> 01:07:01,359
there's some sensor bias i would think

1838
01:07:06,789 --> 01:07:04,799
we we put sensors in training areas

1839
01:07:10,470 --> 01:07:06,799
how about with regards to non-training

1840
01:07:13,990 --> 01:07:10,480
areas do we track what's an open source

1841
01:07:16,950 --> 01:07:14,000
um and what civilians and others have

1842
01:07:18,230 --> 01:07:16,960
tracked and have we found similarities

1843
01:07:20,390 --> 01:07:18,240
to

1844
01:07:22,789 --> 01:07:20,400
what they've observed in terms of uaps

1845
01:07:24,950 --> 01:07:22,799
and non-training areas to the ones that

1846
01:07:26,789 --> 01:07:24,960
are in training areas

1847
01:07:28,230 --> 01:07:26,799
the uap task force has

1848
01:07:30,230 --> 01:07:28,240
worked very hard to to make sure the

1849
01:07:32,870 --> 01:07:30,240
data set that we're working with is a

1850
01:07:34,230 --> 01:07:32,880
data set that we have very good control

1851
01:07:36,470 --> 01:07:34,240
over that data

1852
01:07:38,069 --> 01:07:36,480
so we have some partnerships with faa so

1853
01:07:40,549 --> 01:07:38,079
that we get some of that so we get that

1854
01:07:42,630 --> 01:07:40,559
reporting in um but if it comes to just

1855
01:07:43,910 --> 01:07:42,640
you know open source reports or someone

1856
01:07:45,190 --> 01:07:43,920
says that they saw something that

1857
01:07:47,910 --> 01:07:45,200
generally does not make it into our

1858
01:07:51,029 --> 01:07:47,920
database so basically it sounds like we

1859
01:07:52,950 --> 01:07:51,039
have a good partnership with faa

1860
01:07:55,109 --> 01:07:52,960
but apart from faa we don't have

1861
01:07:58,630 --> 01:07:55,119
partnerships with other agencies or

1862
01:07:59,829 --> 01:07:58,640
other entities that might be tracking so

1863
01:08:02,710 --> 01:07:59,839
that we could

1864
01:08:04,630 --> 01:08:02,720
enlarge our data set to make comparisons

1865
01:08:06,549 --> 01:08:04,640
we will so that's the goal of this next

1866
01:08:08,549 --> 01:08:06,559
effort will be to expand that

1867
01:08:10,309 --> 01:08:08,559
relationship with the

1868
01:08:12,069 --> 01:08:10,319
rest of government and the interagency

1869
01:08:14,470 --> 01:08:12,079
so we can understand what they're seeing

1870
01:08:16,789 --> 01:08:14,480
what we're seeing we can correlate on uh

1871
01:08:18,309 --> 01:08:16,799
each other's holdings because i think

1872
01:08:20,550 --> 01:08:18,319
sorry to interrupt but i think that

1873
01:08:22,390 --> 01:08:20,560
we're we might have a bias right now

1874
01:08:24,309 --> 01:08:22,400
going on with regards to just reporting

1875
01:08:26,070 --> 01:08:24,319
on uaps being in training areas when we

1876
01:08:28,149 --> 01:08:26,080
don't really track what's happening

1877
01:08:30,070 --> 01:08:28,159
elsewhere last question have our

1878
01:08:32,870 --> 01:08:30,080
encounters with uaps alter the

1879
01:08:34,950 --> 01:08:32,880
development of our either our offense or

1880
01:08:37,829 --> 01:08:34,960
offensive or defensive capabilities or

1881
01:08:39,669 --> 01:08:37,839
even our sensor capabilities

1882
01:08:42,950 --> 01:08:39,679
take that for the closed session

1883
01:08:45,349 --> 01:08:42,960
okay great thank you

1884
01:08:47,110 --> 01:08:45,359
mr lahood

1885
01:08:50,390 --> 01:08:47,120
thank you mr chairman and i want to

1886
01:08:53,349 --> 01:08:50,400
thank the witnesses for being here today

1887
01:08:55,590 --> 01:08:53,359
obviously this topic of uaps uh has

1888
01:08:56,470 --> 01:08:55,600
attracted a lot of interest in in people

1889
01:08:57,749 --> 01:08:56,480
that are

1890
01:09:01,669 --> 01:08:57,759
um

1891
01:09:03,910 --> 01:09:01,679
curious about uh this this hearing today

1892
01:09:05,829 --> 01:09:03,920
as we talk about um

1893
01:09:08,789 --> 01:09:05,839
and i would say there's a lot of what i

1894
01:09:11,669 --> 01:09:08,799
would call amateur interest groups uh

1895
01:09:15,070 --> 01:09:11,679
that are involved in the uap field

1896
01:09:17,590 --> 01:09:15,080
mike my question is when um there are

1897
01:09:19,749 --> 01:09:17,600
unsubstantiated claims or manufactured

1898
01:09:21,669 --> 01:09:19,759
claims of uaps or

1899
01:09:23,269 --> 01:09:21,679
kind of false information that's put out

1900
01:09:25,510 --> 01:09:23,279
there

1901
01:09:27,269 --> 01:09:25,520
what are the consequences for people

1902
01:09:32,070 --> 01:09:27,279
that are involved with that or groups

1903
01:09:34,630 --> 01:09:33,829
so one of the concerns that we have is

1904
01:09:47,030 --> 01:09:34,640
that

1905
01:09:48,550 --> 01:09:47,040
self-serving

1906
01:09:50,550 --> 01:09:48,560
we're trying to do what's in the what's

1907
01:09:52,630 --> 01:09:50,560
in the best interest of one the

1908
01:09:53,829 --> 01:09:52,640
department of defense and then two

1909
01:09:54,709 --> 01:09:53,839
what's in the best interest of the

1910
01:09:57,430 --> 01:09:54,719
public

1911
01:10:00,070 --> 01:09:57,440
to ensure that we can put factual based

1912
01:10:02,550 --> 01:10:00,080
information back into the mainstream and

1913
01:10:03,750 --> 01:10:02,560
back into the bloodstream of the

1914
01:10:05,830 --> 01:10:03,760
reporting

1915
01:10:07,030 --> 01:10:05,840
media that we have so people understand

1916
01:10:10,470 --> 01:10:07,040
what's there

1917
01:10:12,550 --> 01:10:10,480
it's important because we are attempting

1918
01:10:13,910 --> 01:10:12,560
as this hearing as drawn out to

1919
01:10:16,470 --> 01:10:13,920
understand

1920
01:10:19,669 --> 01:10:16,480
one what may just be natural phenomenon

1921
01:10:21,270 --> 01:10:19,679
to what may be sensor phenomenology or

1922
01:10:22,229 --> 01:10:21,280
things that were happening with sensors

1923
01:10:23,990 --> 01:10:22,239
three

1924
01:10:26,470 --> 01:10:24,000
what may be legitimate counter

1925
01:10:27,990 --> 01:10:26,480
intelligence threats to

1926
01:10:30,470 --> 01:10:28,000
places that we have or bases or

1927
01:10:33,510 --> 01:10:30,480
installations or security threats to our

1928
01:10:35,910 --> 01:10:33,520
platforms and anything that diverts us

1929
01:10:38,149 --> 01:10:35,920
off of what we have with the resources

1930
01:10:39,910 --> 01:10:38,159
that have been allocated to us send us

1931
01:10:41,669 --> 01:10:39,920
off in these spurious

1932
01:10:43,430 --> 01:10:41,679
chases and hunts that are just not

1933
01:10:45,430 --> 01:10:43,440
helpful and they also help well they

1934
01:10:48,310 --> 01:10:45,440
also contribute to the undermining of

1935
01:10:50,709 --> 01:10:48,320
the confidence that the congress and the

1936
01:10:51,510 --> 01:10:50,719
american people have that we are trying

1937
01:10:55,430 --> 01:10:51,520
to

1938
01:10:56,950 --> 01:10:55,440
happening here report on that and then

1939
01:10:59,350 --> 01:10:56,960
feed that back into our national

1940
01:11:01,110 --> 01:10:59,360
security apparatus so we are able to

1941
01:11:03,990 --> 01:11:01,120
protect the american people and our

1942
01:11:05,750 --> 01:11:04,000
allies so it is harmful it is hurtful

1943
01:11:07,830 --> 01:11:05,760
but hopefully if we get more information

1944
01:11:09,750 --> 01:11:07,840
out there we'll start to lessen the

1945
01:11:12,709 --> 01:11:09,760
impact of some of those spurious reports

1946
01:11:14,709 --> 01:11:12,719
so so just taking that a step further so

1947
01:11:16,709 --> 01:11:14,719
though that misinformation false

1948
01:11:18,229 --> 01:11:16,719
narratives manufactured so what are the

1949
01:11:19,910 --> 01:11:18,239
consequences are there legal

1950
01:11:21,430 --> 01:11:19,920
consequences are there examples that you

1951
01:11:23,669 --> 01:11:21,440
can give us where people have been held

1952
01:11:26,070 --> 01:11:23,679
accountable by this misinformation or

1953
01:11:27,910 --> 01:11:26,080
disinformation i i can't give you you

1954
01:11:30,630 --> 01:11:27,920
know any examples where somebody's been

1955
01:11:32,630 --> 01:11:30,640
legally held liable for putting

1956
01:11:34,229 --> 01:11:32,640
something out there but well i guess

1957
01:11:37,189 --> 01:11:34,239
what's the deterrent from people

1958
01:11:39,270 --> 01:11:37,199
engaging in this activity yeah

1959
01:11:41,669 --> 01:11:39,280
i don't i don't know i i don't have that

1960
01:11:44,070 --> 01:11:41,679
answer that's something that uh you know

1961
01:11:46,070 --> 01:11:44,080
welcome to dialogue with congress to

1962
01:11:47,830 --> 01:11:46,080
talk about that with the members who uh

1963
01:11:50,390 --> 01:11:47,840
you know helped legislate those laws to

1964
01:11:52,550 --> 01:11:50,400
say what should be the uh the legal

1965
01:11:54,709 --> 01:11:52,560
ramifications that we could use to

1966
01:11:56,070 --> 01:11:54,719
potentially hold individuals accountable

1967
01:11:57,590 --> 01:11:56,080
whether it be

1968
01:12:00,709 --> 01:11:57,600
citizens or

1969
01:12:03,910 --> 01:12:00,719
information that might be injected into

1970
01:12:05,590 --> 01:12:03,920
our media by other uh other forces or

1971
01:12:07,910 --> 01:12:05,600
other countries if you will

1972
01:12:09,990 --> 01:12:07,920
and in terms of dods and uh you know

1973
01:12:12,470 --> 01:12:10,000
review and analysis in this field i mean

1974
01:12:14,149 --> 01:12:12,480
is there is there a standard in place

1975
01:12:16,229 --> 01:12:14,159
when it comes to uaps i mean is there

1976
01:12:19,430 --> 01:12:16,239
any guidance you look to that's codified

1977
01:12:21,830 --> 01:12:19,440
in law or otherwise within dod that kind

1978
01:12:23,510 --> 01:12:21,840
of sets out the standards for uaps and

1979
01:12:25,270 --> 01:12:23,520
what to look for i think that's part of

1980
01:12:27,430 --> 01:12:25,280
what the the the group that we're uh

1981
01:12:29,350 --> 01:12:27,440
standing up now will be uh charted to do

1982
01:12:31,270 --> 01:12:29,360
we're actually from my organization

1983
01:12:33,590 --> 01:12:31,280
we'll be looking at policy and standards

1984
01:12:35,590 --> 01:12:33,600
that we have uh to uh

1985
01:12:37,590 --> 01:12:35,600
come to you and work with you to

1986
01:12:39,350 --> 01:12:37,600
actually put in place and promulgate

1987
01:12:41,189 --> 01:12:39,360
across our government

1988
01:12:44,310 --> 01:12:41,199
thank you i yield back

1989
01:12:45,750 --> 01:12:44,320
gentleman yields back mr welch

1990
01:12:47,110 --> 01:12:45,760
uh thank you i'm going to file i'm going

1991
01:12:49,750 --> 01:12:47,120
to follow on

1992
01:12:51,669 --> 01:12:49,760
the line of questions from mr lahood

1993
01:12:53,990 --> 01:12:51,679
gentlemen what seems incredibly

1994
01:12:56,310 --> 01:12:54,000
difficult for you is that there's two

1995
01:12:57,830 --> 01:12:56,320
almost competing but different uh

1996
01:13:00,390 --> 01:12:57,840
narratives one is

1997
01:13:01,669 --> 01:13:00,400
uh it's

1998
01:13:03,350 --> 01:13:01,679
no one knows whether there's

1999
01:13:05,990 --> 01:13:03,360
extraterrestrial life it's a big

2000
01:13:07,590 --> 01:13:06,000
universe and it would be

2001
01:13:10,470 --> 01:13:07,600
pretty presumptuous to have a hard and

2002
01:13:12,870 --> 01:13:10,480
fast conclusion and then if there is

2003
01:13:14,870 --> 01:13:12,880
it's not beyond the realm of possibility

2004
01:13:16,149 --> 01:13:14,880
that there is some exploration coming

2005
01:13:17,990 --> 01:13:16,159
here

2006
01:13:20,070 --> 01:13:18,000
and that underlies a lot of the reports

2007
01:13:21,910 --> 01:13:20,080
you get i think mr lahood was asking

2008
01:13:24,070 --> 01:13:21,920
about that people think there must be

2009
01:13:24,790 --> 01:13:24,080
extraterrestrial life and it's not at

2010
01:13:26,950 --> 01:13:24,800
all

2011
01:13:28,390 --> 01:13:26,960
uh beyond the pale that uh there would

2012
01:13:30,470 --> 01:13:28,400
be a visit here

2013
01:13:33,030 --> 01:13:30,480
the other hand you as the dod you have

2014
01:13:35,430 --> 01:13:33,040
the responsibility to make sure

2015
01:13:37,430 --> 01:13:35,440
that our national security is protected

2016
01:13:38,950 --> 01:13:37,440
and that if there are surveillance

2017
01:13:41,189 --> 01:13:38,960
drones or

2018
01:13:44,550 --> 01:13:41,199
uh active drones that can disable our

2019
01:13:45,590 --> 01:13:44,560
systems uh that has to be analyzed and

2020
01:13:48,149 --> 01:13:45,600
stopped

2021
01:13:49,669 --> 01:13:48,159
so how do you divide the

2022
01:13:52,550 --> 01:13:49,679
these how do you separate your

2023
01:13:53,350 --> 01:13:52,560
responsibilities where uh you get all

2024
01:13:54,550 --> 01:13:53,360
these

2025
01:13:56,390 --> 01:13:54,560
reports

2026
01:13:58,550 --> 01:13:56,400
uh from folks who

2027
01:14:00,470 --> 01:13:58,560
may be in good faith maybe not

2028
01:14:03,430 --> 01:14:00,480
uh believe that you should be

2029
01:14:04,709 --> 01:14:03,440
investigating every possible uh

2030
01:14:10,149 --> 01:14:04,719
uh

2031
01:14:12,310 --> 01:14:10,159
incident i'll start with you mr moultrie

2032
01:14:14,390 --> 01:14:12,320
sure indeed congressman and and thank

2033
01:14:17,189 --> 01:14:14,400
you for the question um

2034
01:14:19,669 --> 01:14:17,199
it's important that we um

2035
01:14:21,189 --> 01:14:19,679
as a part of this effort uh

2036
01:14:22,709 --> 01:14:21,199
really uh

2037
01:14:24,790 --> 01:14:22,719
build out the relationship that we have

2038
01:14:26,790 --> 01:14:24,800
with others including nasa and for the

2039
01:14:28,870 --> 01:14:26,800
reasons that you just pointed out

2040
01:14:31,750 --> 01:14:28,880
so there are elements in our government

2041
01:14:34,630 --> 01:14:31,760
that are engaged in

2042
01:14:36,390 --> 01:14:34,640
uh looking for life in other places and

2043
01:14:37,110 --> 01:14:36,400
they have been doing that for decades

2044
01:14:38,790 --> 01:14:37,120
they've been searching for

2045
01:14:40,790 --> 01:14:38,800
extraterrestrial life

2046
01:14:42,550 --> 01:14:40,800
uh there are astro biologists who have

2047
01:14:45,270 --> 01:14:42,560
been doing this too we're a part of that

2048
01:14:47,270 --> 01:14:45,280
same government and so our goal is not

2049
01:14:49,030 --> 01:14:47,280
to

2050
01:14:50,310 --> 01:14:49,040
potentially cover up something if we

2051
01:14:54,149 --> 01:14:50,320
were to find something it's to

2052
01:14:56,390 --> 01:14:54,159
understand what may be out there

2053
01:14:58,870 --> 01:14:56,400
examine what um

2054
01:15:00,709 --> 01:14:58,880
what it may mean for us if there are any

2055
01:15:03,350 --> 01:15:00,719
from a defense perspective any national

2056
01:15:05,830 --> 01:15:03,360
security implications or ramifications

2057
01:15:06,950 --> 01:15:05,840
but then to work with organizations as

2058
01:15:10,149 --> 01:15:06,960
appropriate if it's a weather

2059
01:15:12,390 --> 01:15:10,159
phenomenology with noaa if it's a

2060
01:15:14,229 --> 01:15:12,400
potential for extraterrestrial life or

2061
01:15:15,990 --> 01:15:14,239
an indication of extraordinary life with

2062
01:15:17,750 --> 01:15:16,000
someone like nasa so

2063
01:15:20,149 --> 01:15:17,760
the transparency actually is very

2064
01:15:21,910 --> 01:15:20,159
important completely for public uh

2065
01:15:23,510 --> 01:15:21,920
consumption completely

2066
01:15:26,470 --> 01:15:23,520
we're gonna have a classified briefing

2067
01:15:28,149 --> 01:15:26,480
and without going into the details uh of

2068
01:15:30,870 --> 01:15:28,159
what kinds of secrets

2069
01:15:31,990 --> 01:15:30,880
uh that we can't share here

2070
01:15:34,149 --> 01:15:32,000
uh

2071
01:15:35,590 --> 01:15:34,159
what is it what are we

2072
01:15:38,229 --> 01:15:35,600
protecting i don't know if you can

2073
01:15:40,070 --> 01:15:38,239
answer this question

2074
01:15:42,470 --> 01:15:40,080
in this open forum

2075
01:15:44,229 --> 01:15:42,480
but in fact

2076
01:15:46,070 --> 01:15:44,239
your perception of what it is we have to

2077
01:15:48,630 --> 01:15:46,080
quote so i think right now what's really

2078
01:15:50,390 --> 01:15:48,640
important for us to protect is uh how we

2079
01:15:52,070 --> 01:15:50,400
know certain things so there are a lot

2080
01:15:54,790 --> 01:15:52,080
of things that we know whether it be

2081
01:15:57,189 --> 01:15:54,800
about um

2082
01:15:58,630 --> 01:15:57,199
the thinking of other leaders around the

2083
01:16:00,630 --> 01:15:58,640
world the weapon systems that are being

2084
01:16:02,470 --> 01:16:00,640
developed or how we detect things that

2085
01:16:04,149 --> 01:16:02,480
may be threats to us

2086
01:16:05,830 --> 01:16:04,159
many of those things are

2087
01:16:07,510 --> 01:16:05,840
the result of some of our most sensitive

2088
01:16:09,590 --> 01:16:07,520
sources and methods and we'll use those

2089
01:16:11,910 --> 01:16:09,600
things not just for this effort but

2090
01:16:14,790 --> 01:16:11,920
those same sources and methods are used

2091
01:16:16,630 --> 01:16:14,800
to help protect us from adversaries and

2092
01:16:18,470 --> 01:16:16,640
from others who might mean to do us harm

2093
01:16:21,430 --> 01:16:18,480
there aren't separate

2094
01:16:23,669 --> 01:16:21,440
uap sensors there's not a a separate uap

2095
01:16:26,149 --> 01:16:23,679
processing computer it is not a separate

2096
01:16:28,070 --> 01:16:26,159
uap dissemination chain or whatever so

2097
01:16:29,750 --> 01:16:28,080
it's the same process it's the same

2098
01:16:32,790 --> 01:16:29,760
system that we have that helps us do all

2099
01:16:34,870 --> 01:16:32,800
that we need to protect that because

2100
01:16:36,390 --> 01:16:34,880
this is something that uh that we're

2101
01:16:37,510 --> 01:16:36,400
looking at but we're sure there's going

2102
01:16:39,189 --> 01:16:37,520
to be other things that we'll look at in

2103
01:16:40,950 --> 01:16:39,199
the future that will need those same

2104
01:16:42,550 --> 01:16:40,960
sensors we'll need those same sources

2105
01:16:44,550 --> 01:16:42,560
and methods to help us do so we're

2106
01:16:46,390 --> 01:16:44,560
protecting the fact of the that this

2107
01:16:49,350 --> 01:16:46,400
nation has developed capabilities that

2108
01:16:51,350 --> 01:16:49,360
enable us to know what may be

2109
01:16:54,149 --> 01:16:51,360
threats to us and to counter those

2110
01:16:56,470 --> 01:16:54,159
threats before they uh become something

2111
01:16:58,470 --> 01:16:56,480
of a a national issue thank you very

2112
01:17:00,390 --> 01:16:58,480
much i want to thank both you mr brand

2113
01:17:02,790 --> 01:17:00,400
you mr multry for your appearance today

2114
01:17:05,189 --> 01:17:02,800
i yield back

2115
01:17:07,350 --> 01:17:05,199
goodman yields back

2116
01:17:10,550 --> 01:17:07,360
gentlemen beyond videos

2117
01:17:12,470 --> 01:17:10,560
is there a range of other information

2118
01:17:14,149 --> 01:17:12,480
that the executive branch has that would

2119
01:17:16,550 --> 01:17:14,159
be valuable to the american people

2120
01:17:19,030 --> 01:17:16,560
sources and methods obviously

2121
01:17:20,950 --> 01:17:19,040
the details of individual encounters

2122
01:17:24,310 --> 01:17:20,960
including the time place and details of

2123
01:17:28,310 --> 01:17:24,320
an encounter and does the aim sog have

2124
01:17:30,870 --> 01:17:28,320
a clear and repeatable process

2125
01:17:33,189 --> 01:17:30,880
for considering public release

2126
01:17:35,110 --> 01:17:33,199
uh as part of the process

2127
01:17:36,470 --> 01:17:35,120
chairman carson the um do you commit to

2128
01:17:39,270 --> 01:17:36,480
building that process if it's not in

2129
01:17:41,350 --> 01:17:39,280
place uh the uap task force uh you know

2130
01:17:43,350 --> 01:17:41,360
the the security classification guide uh

2131
01:17:45,910 --> 01:17:43,360
that the uap task force has been

2132
01:17:47,270 --> 01:17:45,920
operating under that i approved um

2133
01:17:48,950 --> 01:17:47,280
really was meant to protect those

2134
01:17:52,470 --> 01:17:48,960
sources and methods and meant to protect

2135
01:17:53,750 --> 01:17:52,480
um uh any knowledge uh that an adversary

2136
01:17:55,189 --> 01:17:53,760
intelligence

2137
01:17:57,430 --> 01:17:55,199
entity may gain

2138
01:18:00,149 --> 01:17:57,440
from under from understanding what we're

2139
01:18:02,790 --> 01:18:00,159
tracking how we track it or

2140
01:18:05,110 --> 01:18:02,800
when we're tracking it or if we're not

2141
01:18:07,110 --> 01:18:05,120
um and so that has been an important

2142
01:18:09,910 --> 01:18:07,120
piece uh in the balance between

2143
01:18:12,310 --> 01:18:09,920
transparency uh and preserving our

2144
01:18:15,669 --> 01:18:12,320
warfighting advantage because the u.s

2145
01:18:16,630 --> 01:18:15,679
military does train as it would fight

2146
01:18:17,990 --> 01:18:16,640
what i

2147
01:18:19,910 --> 01:18:18,000
will commit to

2148
01:18:21,990 --> 01:18:19,920
is at least for that material that's

2149
01:18:23,110 --> 01:18:22,000
under my authority

2150
01:18:25,030 --> 01:18:23,120
as the deputy director of naval

2151
01:18:27,030 --> 01:18:25,040
intelligence

2152
01:18:28,950 --> 01:18:27,040
for uh

2153
01:18:32,390 --> 01:18:28,960
information that we have when it does

2154
01:18:33,750 --> 01:18:32,400
not involve sources of methods uh or and

2155
01:18:35,830 --> 01:18:33,760
when we can

2156
01:18:37,510 --> 01:18:35,840
with a reasonable uh degree of

2157
01:18:39,430 --> 01:18:37,520
confidence determine that it does not

2158
01:18:40,790 --> 01:18:39,440
pose a foreign intelligence or national

2159
01:18:42,550 --> 01:18:40,800
security threat

2160
01:18:44,950 --> 01:18:42,560
and it's within my authority to do so i

2161
01:18:46,630 --> 01:18:44,960
commit to declassifying that so i i

2162
01:18:49,189 --> 01:18:46,640
believe very much in the transparency of

2163
01:18:51,270 --> 01:18:49,199
this uh and we work very hard to balance

2164
01:18:53,430 --> 01:18:51,280
that with our national security needs

2165
01:18:55,990 --> 01:18:53,440
and i'll just add congressman

2166
01:18:58,149 --> 01:18:56,000
just over the last three four months i

2167
01:19:00,470 --> 01:18:58,159
think that the

2168
01:19:02,149 --> 01:19:00,480
the intelligence community and the

2169
01:19:04,149 --> 01:19:02,159
national defense apparatus have

2170
01:19:06,390 --> 01:19:04,159
disclosed more information on various

2171
01:19:09,189 --> 01:19:06,400
events than it has and

2172
01:19:11,110 --> 01:19:09,199
probably see the previous 10 years

2173
01:19:12,550 --> 01:19:11,120
um you have our commitment to work

2174
01:19:15,830 --> 01:19:12,560
closely with the director of national

2175
01:19:17,910 --> 01:19:15,840
intelligence and uh others in the

2176
01:19:19,110 --> 01:19:17,920
declassification and downgrading of

2177
01:19:20,630 --> 01:19:19,120
intel

2178
01:19:22,229 --> 01:19:20,640
apparatus to ensure that we can get

2179
01:19:24,229 --> 01:19:22,239
whatever information that we can out to

2180
01:19:25,830 --> 01:19:24,239
the american people and to the public at

2181
01:19:27,750 --> 01:19:25,840
large

2182
01:19:30,149 --> 01:19:27,760
greatly appreciate it sir ranking member

2183
01:19:32,790 --> 01:19:30,159
crawford thank you mr chairman um

2184
01:19:34,149 --> 01:19:32,800
representative stefanik is in route i

2185
01:19:36,070 --> 01:19:34,159
believe just real quickly but in the

2186
01:19:38,390 --> 01:19:36,080
interim if i could if you'll indulge me

2187
01:19:40,790 --> 01:19:38,400
i just have one a couple of real small

2188
01:19:42,950 --> 01:19:40,800
questions one is uh

2189
01:19:45,510 --> 01:19:42,960
do we have an example can you decide a

2190
01:19:48,149 --> 01:19:45,520
specific example of an object that can't

2191
01:19:52,390 --> 01:19:48,159
be explained as having been human-made

2192
01:19:54,870 --> 01:19:53,630
i mean the the um

2193
01:19:56,790 --> 01:19:54,880
[Music]

2194
01:19:58,149 --> 01:19:56,800
the example that

2195
01:20:00,229 --> 01:19:58,159
that i would say that is still

2196
01:20:02,790 --> 01:20:00,239
unresolved uh that i think everyone

2197
01:20:06,390 --> 01:20:02,800
understands quite well is the 2004 uh

2198
01:20:08,709 --> 01:20:06,400
incident from from nimitz uh we have

2199
01:20:11,350 --> 01:20:08,719
data on that and that simply remains

2200
01:20:13,669 --> 01:20:11,360
unresolved uh does not mean it resolves

2201
01:20:15,990 --> 01:20:13,679
to being something right that is easily

2202
01:20:17,189 --> 01:20:16,000
explainable or uh difficulty or well

2203
01:20:19,270 --> 01:20:17,199
obviously it resolves being something

2204
01:20:21,430 --> 01:20:19,280
that is difficult to explain

2205
01:20:23,510 --> 01:20:21,440
but i i can't point to something that

2206
01:20:24,950 --> 01:20:23,520
definitively was not

2207
01:20:27,030 --> 01:20:24,960
man-made but i can point to a number of

2208
01:20:29,430 --> 01:20:27,040
examples in which remain unresolved

2209
01:20:31,270 --> 01:20:29,440
gotcha uh with regard to videos that

2210
01:20:33,270 --> 01:20:31,280
have appeared in open source channels

2211
01:20:35,270 --> 01:20:33,280
for example the tic tac video

2212
01:20:36,950 --> 01:20:35,280
does aimsog maintain control of videos

2213
01:20:39,030 --> 01:20:36,960
and how do you prevent

2214
01:20:41,430 --> 01:20:39,040
leaks of potentially classified videos

2215
01:20:44,229 --> 01:20:41,440
or other material

2216
01:20:46,870 --> 01:20:44,239
so the aims log as we establish an

2217
01:20:49,830 --> 01:20:46,880
organization we will have a

2218
01:20:51,430 --> 01:20:49,840
a process for classified and compartment

2219
01:20:53,350 --> 01:20:51,440
holdings and we will find a way of

2220
01:20:54,790 --> 01:20:53,360
getting positive control over those we

2221
01:20:56,390 --> 01:20:54,800
have

2222
01:20:58,149 --> 01:20:56,400
our sensitive access programs and

2223
01:20:59,910 --> 01:20:58,159
special access programs that allow us to

2224
01:21:01,910 --> 01:20:59,920
put what we call saps around things and

2225
01:21:04,070 --> 01:21:01,920
then there's controlled access programs

2226
01:21:05,510 --> 01:21:04,080
that allow us put caps around things so

2227
01:21:06,870 --> 01:21:05,520
we'll have that

2228
01:21:08,870 --> 01:21:06,880
in place

2229
01:21:10,470 --> 01:21:08,880
our goal will be

2230
01:21:11,910 --> 01:21:10,480
ensuring that we're sharing that with

2231
01:21:14,070 --> 01:21:11,920
the appropriate analysts and the

2232
01:21:15,510 --> 01:21:14,080
appropriate exploiters if you will who

2233
01:21:17,830 --> 01:21:15,520
can look at that data too what we don't

2234
01:21:20,310 --> 01:21:17,840
want to do is bring something into a dod

2235
01:21:21,590 --> 01:21:20,320
database or a dod holding and then have

2236
01:21:23,830 --> 01:21:21,600
so many wrappers around it's not

2237
01:21:25,590 --> 01:21:23,840
available to those who really need to

2238
01:21:27,270 --> 01:21:25,600
look at it and to exploit it and that's

2239
01:21:29,110 --> 01:21:27,280
one of the reasons we're establishing

2240
01:21:30,629 --> 01:21:29,120
relationships with the interagency with

2241
01:21:33,030 --> 01:21:30,639
the ic and others to be able to do that

2242
01:21:34,790 --> 01:21:33,040
sir but we will do our best to maintain

2243
01:21:36,470 --> 01:21:34,800
positive control over the materials that

2244
01:21:38,390 --> 01:21:36,480
we have within our holdings

2245
01:21:40,550 --> 01:21:38,400
thank you

2246
01:21:42,310 --> 01:21:40,560
chairmanship

2247
01:21:45,430 --> 01:21:42,320
thank you mr chairman just going back to

2248
01:21:47,350 --> 01:21:45,440
the 2021 report um

2249
01:21:49,350 --> 01:21:47,360
you know under the category of

2250
01:21:51,750 --> 01:21:49,360
uap appear to demonstrate advanced

2251
01:21:53,189 --> 01:21:51,760
technology uh those 18

2252
01:21:56,709 --> 01:21:53,199
incidents

2253
01:21:58,070 --> 01:21:56,719
uh in which uh some of the uap

2254
01:21:59,830 --> 01:21:58,080
appeared to remain stationary winds

2255
01:22:02,390 --> 01:21:59,840
aloft move against the wind maneuver

2256
01:22:04,870 --> 01:22:02,400
abruptly or move at considerable speed

2257
01:22:06,390 --> 01:22:04,880
without discernible means of propulsion

2258
01:22:08,950 --> 01:22:06,400
it goes on to say in a small number of

2259
01:22:11,590 --> 01:22:08,960
cases military aircraft systems

2260
01:22:15,189 --> 01:22:11,600
processed radio frequency energy

2261
01:22:16,709 --> 01:22:15,199
associated with uap sightings

2262
01:22:18,629 --> 01:22:16,719
i couldn't tell from that whether that

2263
01:22:22,870 --> 01:22:18,639
small number of cases

2264
01:22:25,910 --> 01:22:22,880
was a part of the subset of 18 that is

2265
01:22:27,350 --> 01:22:25,920
among the 18 which appeared to move uh

2266
01:22:28,790 --> 01:22:27,360
with unusual pattern or flight

2267
01:22:31,030 --> 01:22:28,800
characteristics

2268
01:22:36,790 --> 01:22:31,040
did some of those

2269
01:22:41,830 --> 01:22:39,030
i would have to check with our uap task

2270
01:22:43,750 --> 01:22:41,840
force on that i uh

2271
01:22:45,110 --> 01:22:43,760
i believe without getting into specifics

2272
01:22:47,910 --> 01:22:45,120
that we can do in the in the closed

2273
01:22:51,189 --> 01:22:47,920
session uh at least some that we have

2274
01:22:52,790 --> 01:22:51,199
detected uh rf uh emissions from were

2275
01:22:55,590 --> 01:22:52,800
not uh

2276
01:22:58,310 --> 01:22:55,600
behaving uh oddly otherwise

2277
01:23:02,470 --> 01:22:58,320
uh and and the significance of

2278
01:23:05,030 --> 01:23:02,480
uh measuring that radiofrequency energy

2279
01:23:07,270 --> 01:23:05,040
is what that uh we suspect that this was

2280
01:23:09,669 --> 01:23:07,280
a some form of aircraft in which there

2281
01:23:11,030 --> 01:23:09,679
were radio transmissions

2282
01:23:12,950 --> 01:23:11,040
the biggest thing that you're looking

2283
01:23:15,510 --> 01:23:12,960
for there is any indication of of an

2284
01:23:17,590 --> 01:23:15,520
effort to jam uh whatever sensors that

2285
01:23:20,550 --> 01:23:17,600
we may have looking at it but i would

2286
01:23:22,310 --> 01:23:20,560
also also add to that that the radio

2287
01:23:23,590 --> 01:23:22,320
frequency as you know congressman is

2288
01:23:27,189 --> 01:23:23,600
used to control

2289
01:23:30,229 --> 01:23:27,199
uh various platforms too so the fact of

2290
01:23:33,669 --> 01:23:30,239
uh emanations coming off of any platform

2291
01:23:34,709 --> 01:23:33,679
whether it be a uav or another platform

2292
01:23:36,470 --> 01:23:34,719
could be

2293
01:23:40,070 --> 01:23:36,480
uh radio frequency

2294
01:23:41,990 --> 01:23:40,080
activity related to that entity

2295
01:23:44,149 --> 01:23:42,000
transmitting out or

2296
01:23:46,229 --> 01:23:44,159
something transmitting to that platform

2297
01:23:47,910 --> 01:23:46,239
and of course we have a sensitivity with

2298
01:23:49,350 --> 01:23:47,920
our airborne platforms are picking it up

2299
01:23:50,790 --> 01:23:49,360
which is one of the reasons that we uh

2300
01:23:52,550 --> 01:23:50,800
try to prevent people from using their

2301
01:23:54,550 --> 01:23:52,560
cell phones on airplanes and things like

2302
01:23:56,790 --> 01:23:54,560
that it's very sensitive to rf

2303
01:23:58,390 --> 01:23:56,800
emanations so that's a part of what

2304
01:24:00,149 --> 01:23:58,400
we'll be looking at in the aim so what

2305
01:24:01,669 --> 01:24:00,159
is this is this something that we can

2306
01:24:03,830 --> 01:24:01,679
collect on and can we start to

2307
01:24:05,830 --> 01:24:03,840
characterize the signaling environment

2308
01:24:07,669 --> 01:24:05,840
around the emanations that may be coming

2309
01:24:10,550 --> 01:24:07,679
off of some of these uaps

2310
01:24:13,750 --> 01:24:10,560
so they admit radio frequency

2311
01:24:15,189 --> 01:24:13,760
that was recorded could be either

2312
01:24:20,070 --> 01:24:15,199
an effort to jam or it could be an

2313
01:24:23,430 --> 01:24:20,790
or

2314
01:24:25,669 --> 01:24:23,440
any other communication with that

2315
01:24:28,149 --> 01:24:25,679
craft i would say that's accurate

2316
01:24:31,189 --> 01:24:28,159
right thank you mr chairman

2317
01:24:33,990 --> 01:24:31,199
thank you chairman um

2318
01:24:37,430 --> 01:24:34,000
as the odni report makes clear one

2319
01:24:40,229 --> 01:24:37,440
possible explanation for uaps is that we

2320
01:24:44,149 --> 01:24:40,239
are detecting u.s aircraft either secret

2321
01:24:45,590 --> 01:24:44,159
air programs or even test prototypes

2322
01:24:48,229 --> 01:24:45,600
i won't ask you in this setting

2323
01:24:51,110 --> 01:24:48,239
obviously to describe any secret dod

2324
01:24:53,189 --> 01:24:51,120
programs that said i do want to make

2325
01:24:55,510 --> 01:24:53,199
sure the u.s government isn't chasing

2326
01:24:57,350 --> 01:24:55,520
its own tail

2327
01:24:59,590 --> 01:24:57,360
firstly do you have a clear and

2328
01:25:01,270 --> 01:24:59,600
repeatable process to check with

2329
01:25:02,790 --> 01:25:01,280
compartmented programs about whether a

2330
01:25:06,149 --> 01:25:02,800
uap sighting

2331
01:25:07,430 --> 01:25:06,159
is attributable to a u.s aircraft

2332
01:25:09,910 --> 01:25:07,440
secondly do

2333
01:25:11,189 --> 01:25:09,920
does the aimsaw staff have the

2334
01:25:12,709 --> 01:25:11,199
clearances

2335
01:25:14,629 --> 01:25:12,719
and read-ons

2336
01:25:17,350 --> 01:25:14,639
that they need to investigate all of

2337
01:25:20,390 --> 01:25:17,360
these incidents and and and thirdly

2338
01:25:21,270 --> 01:25:20,400
when your staff cannot be read on

2339
01:25:23,510 --> 01:25:21,280
uh

2340
01:25:25,590 --> 01:25:23,520
are your questions to those who are read

2341
01:25:27,910 --> 01:25:25,600
on even being answered

2342
01:25:30,629 --> 01:25:27,920
so i'll start and then uh i'll pass that

2343
01:25:33,830 --> 01:25:30,639
to uh to mr bray so we're very conscious

2344
01:25:35,910 --> 01:25:33,840
of the potential blue on blue issue or

2345
01:25:37,590 --> 01:25:35,920
us on u.s and so

2346
01:25:40,950 --> 01:25:37,600
we've established relationships with

2347
01:25:44,149 --> 01:25:40,960
organizations and entities that that are

2348
01:25:46,790 --> 01:25:44,159
uh potentially uh flying or developing

2349
01:25:49,189 --> 01:25:46,800
platforms for their own interests if you

2350
01:25:50,790 --> 01:25:49,199
will and our goal is to continue and we

2351
01:25:52,950 --> 01:25:50,800
have a repeatable process i think we've

2352
01:25:56,229 --> 01:25:52,960
had that process for some time

2353
01:25:57,990 --> 01:25:56,239
to deconflict uh activities that we may

2354
01:25:59,830 --> 01:25:58,000
have to ensure that we are not

2355
01:26:00,950 --> 01:25:59,840
potentially reporting on something that

2356
01:26:03,910 --> 01:26:00,960
may be

2357
01:26:06,629 --> 01:26:03,920
a developmental platform or a us

2358
01:26:08,229 --> 01:26:06,639
operational platform that is performing

2359
01:26:11,110 --> 01:26:08,239
uh either testing or performing a

2360
01:26:13,110 --> 01:26:11,120
mission so we will have that uh in place

2361
01:26:16,390 --> 01:26:13,120
we've already had those discussions with

2362
01:26:18,629 --> 01:26:16,400
organizations and entities we want to

2363
01:26:19,990 --> 01:26:18,639
ensure that we're protecting their

2364
01:26:21,590 --> 01:26:20,000
equities we want to ensure that we're

2365
01:26:23,910 --> 01:26:21,600
protecting their sources and methods

2366
01:26:26,390 --> 01:26:23,920
while also getting at what we have here

2367
01:26:28,870 --> 01:26:26,400
we want to be able to deconflict those

2368
01:26:31,430 --> 01:26:28,880
absolutely the uap task force has uh had

2369
01:26:32,310 --> 01:26:31,440
a a process in place to work uh with

2370
01:26:33,350 --> 01:26:32,320
other elements of the department of

2371
01:26:35,510 --> 01:26:33,360
defense and other elements of the

2372
01:26:38,070 --> 01:26:35,520
government to ensure that

2373
01:26:40,390 --> 01:26:38,080
that there's an uh as simple a way as

2374
01:26:42,310 --> 01:26:40,400
possible to deconflict those and when we

2375
01:26:45,030 --> 01:26:42,320
reference that in the uh in the report

2376
01:26:47,590 --> 01:26:45,040
uh i should say that we were um simply

2377
01:26:49,830 --> 01:26:47,600
accounting for the fact that there could

2378
01:26:51,590 --> 01:26:49,840
possibly be one or two

2379
01:26:53,110 --> 01:26:51,600
data points that had that it leaked

2380
01:26:56,709 --> 01:26:53,120
through but we were quite confident that

2381
01:27:01,350 --> 01:26:59,830
um how how are you all liaisoning with

2382
01:27:03,189 --> 01:27:01,360
um

2383
01:27:05,350 --> 01:27:03,199
space command

2384
01:27:07,510 --> 01:27:05,360
specifically how are you

2385
01:27:09,110 --> 01:27:07,520
partnering with the parts

2386
01:27:11,110 --> 01:27:09,120
of the u.s based

2387
01:27:12,149 --> 01:27:11,120
command responsible for space domain

2388
01:27:14,229 --> 01:27:12,159
awareness

2389
01:27:16,470 --> 01:27:14,239
and how if at all are you

2390
01:27:19,830 --> 01:27:16,480
partnering with the space force to

2391
01:27:23,350 --> 01:27:19,840
analyze uaps

2392
01:27:25,590 --> 01:27:23,360
the uap task force uh has um uh

2393
01:27:26,629 --> 01:27:25,600
has a very good relationship with space

2394
01:27:29,110 --> 01:27:26,639
force as it does with the rest of the

2395
01:27:31,189 --> 01:27:29,120
department of defense uh we have uh

2396
01:27:32,709 --> 01:27:31,199
pulled analysts in from space force to

2397
01:27:34,470 --> 01:27:32,719
ensure that uh

2398
01:27:37,350 --> 01:27:34,480
that we're availing ourselves of that

2399
01:27:39,830 --> 01:27:37,360
expertise as well as

2400
01:27:41,669 --> 01:27:39,840
any um any other material they may have

2401
01:27:43,750 --> 01:27:41,679
that would be helpful and the

2402
01:27:45,990 --> 01:27:43,760
congressman as you know

2403
01:27:47,750 --> 01:27:46,000
space force and space command they have

2404
01:27:49,350 --> 01:27:47,760
responsibility for space domain

2405
01:27:51,669 --> 01:27:49,360
awareness so what we've done we

2406
01:27:54,550 --> 01:27:51,679
coordinated with uh with space force we

2407
01:27:56,550 --> 01:27:54,560
coordinated with your j2 and

2408
01:27:57,910 --> 01:27:56,560
she is on board in terms of helping us

2409
01:28:00,229 --> 01:27:57,920
plug into

2410
01:28:02,229 --> 01:28:00,239
what they have and for us to have this

2411
01:28:03,750 --> 01:28:02,239
interactive exchange of information and

2412
01:28:05,430 --> 01:28:03,760
data and we're doing that with all the

2413
01:28:07,350 --> 01:28:05,440
services not just with space force or

2414
01:28:09,110 --> 01:28:07,360
space committee

2415
01:28:10,470 --> 01:28:09,120
thank you sir thank you member any

2416
01:28:12,790 --> 01:28:10,480
additional questions all right

2417
01:28:14,550 --> 01:28:12,800
chairmanship

2418
01:28:16,310 --> 01:28:14,560
all right uh with that i want to thank

2419
01:28:18,229 --> 01:28:16,320
you all for for taking the time out i

2420
01:28:19,910 --> 01:28:18,239
also want to thank my colleagues on both

2421
01:28:22,390 --> 01:28:19,920
sides of the aisle for

2422
01:28:25,910 --> 01:28:22,400
participating in this very

2423
01:28:27,830 --> 01:28:25,920
historical and important uh hearing i

2424
01:28:29,110 --> 01:28:27,840
think it's one of the few times we can

2425
01:28:32,310 --> 01:28:29,120
demonstrate some degree of

2426
01:28:34,390 --> 01:28:32,320
bipartisanship around uaps and ufos so i

2427
01:28:36,390 --> 01:28:34,400
love it i appreciate it thank you and we

2428
01:28:38,149 --> 01:28:36,400
will see you all we will recess this

2429
01:28:47,270 --> 01:28:38,159
hearing for the moment and return in a

2430
01:28:52,870 --> 01:28:49,990
oh my gosh so wilson documents are in

2431
01:28:56,229 --> 01:28:52,880
the record hey wow right right right

2432
01:28:57,669 --> 01:28:56,239
and maelstrom and moleskine yeah i

2433
01:28:59,350 --> 01:28:57,679
appreciated his staff when he did that

2434
01:29:00,790 --> 01:28:59,360
he's like well they're in the record so

2435
01:29:02,470 --> 01:29:00,800
like

2436
01:29:04,550 --> 01:29:02,480
i think that the people questioning did

2437
01:29:06,470 --> 01:29:04,560
well i think that yep

2438
01:29:08,830 --> 01:29:06,480
you know um i wasn't expecting that some

2439
01:29:14,790 --> 01:29:12,870
questions pressure started building

2440
01:29:16,310 --> 01:29:14,800
can i just say katie

2441
01:29:17,990 --> 01:29:16,320
broke the ice right and then they got

2442
01:29:19,189 --> 01:29:18,000
braver or

2443
01:29:21,110 --> 01:29:19,199
yeah i think that's exactly what

2444
01:29:22,470 --> 01:29:21,120
happened yeah i just wanted to say katie

2445
01:29:25,430 --> 01:29:22,480
it's nice to actually finally meet you

2446
01:29:26,950 --> 01:29:25,440
by the way yeah hello

2447
01:29:28,070 --> 01:29:26,960
i feel like i met you but i probably

2448
01:29:29,830 --> 01:29:28,080
because i've just been messaging you

2449
01:29:32,870 --> 01:29:29,840
like a crazy person i was like i feel

2450
01:29:38,229 --> 01:29:35,110
yeah it's interesting i think the the

2451
01:29:40,870 --> 01:29:38,239
main takeaway for me is that they could

2452
01:29:42,709 --> 01:29:40,880
only answer so much because they could

2453
01:29:44,950 --> 01:29:42,719
only answer what was in

2454
01:29:47,030 --> 01:29:44,960
within the uap task force

2455
01:29:49,270 --> 01:29:47,040
and i think there's a lot that's uh

2456
01:29:50,390 --> 01:29:49,280
outside of the uap task force so to

2457
01:29:51,430 --> 01:29:50,400
speak

2458
01:29:53,750 --> 01:29:51,440
um

2459
01:29:55,270 --> 01:29:53,760
and that's unfortunate and

2460
01:29:56,870 --> 01:29:55,280
um

2461
01:29:57,990 --> 01:29:56,880
i think they could have asked a couple

2462
01:30:01,030 --> 01:29:58,000
better

2463
01:30:03,189 --> 01:30:01,040
questions possibly too but you only have

2464
01:30:04,790 --> 01:30:03,199
so much time it seems like it also

2465
01:30:05,990 --> 01:30:04,800
seemed like they were trying to give the

2466
01:30:08,070 --> 01:30:06,000
impression that they were on top of the

2467
01:30:10,229 --> 01:30:08,080
situation they did it wasn't like we

2468
01:30:12,310 --> 01:30:10,239
don't have a clue what's going on that

2469
01:30:14,149 --> 01:30:12,320
they showed that video deliberately the

2470
01:30:16,310 --> 01:30:14,159
one with the bokeh to show that there

2471
01:30:19,669 --> 01:30:16,320
was something they could explain

2472
01:30:21,750 --> 01:30:19,679
um and also then they show that which is

2473
01:30:24,149 --> 01:30:21,760
that the the batman balloon one that's

2474
01:30:26,390 --> 01:30:24,159
the still from that that video they just

2475
01:30:28,229 --> 01:30:26,400
showed right now so the batman balloon i

2476
01:30:30,229 --> 01:30:28,239
don't know yeah because it's definitely

2477
01:30:32,070 --> 01:30:30,239
that looks different but then again it's

2478
01:30:34,390 --> 01:30:32,080
a it's a it's a screen grab isn't it

2479
01:30:35,350 --> 01:30:34,400
certainly yeah it's a lower quality so

2480
01:30:37,350 --> 01:30:35,360
but

2481
01:30:38,870 --> 01:30:37,360
they didn't show the gimbal video

2482
01:30:40,310 --> 01:30:38,880
which i think that's quite telling

2483
01:30:43,110 --> 01:30:40,320
because that's the one that would have

2484
01:30:45,189 --> 01:30:43,120
got that one look we can't necessarily

2485
01:30:46,950 --> 01:30:45,199
directly explain what that is or if they

2486
01:30:49,750 --> 01:30:46,960
can that must be in the classified

2487
01:30:52,390 --> 01:30:49,760
briefing so well did

2488
01:30:53,830 --> 01:30:52,400
mention about uh equipment and gimbling

2489
01:30:55,990 --> 01:30:53,840
and and i thought that he was maybe

2490
01:30:57,430 --> 01:30:56,000
nudging at that yeah

2491
01:30:58,149 --> 01:30:57,440
me too

2492
01:31:00,629 --> 01:30:58,159
but

2493
01:31:02,709 --> 01:31:00,639
it just seems though bray and moultrie

2494
01:31:04,390 --> 01:31:02,719
were it was okay it wasn't necessarily a

2495
01:31:06,790 --> 01:31:04,400
case of look there's nothing to see here

2496
01:31:08,550 --> 01:31:06,800
but it was getting to that point where

2497
01:31:10,149 --> 01:31:08,560
and it's almost the rob

2498
01:31:11,669 --> 01:31:10,159
katie you mentioned the robinson panel

2499
01:31:14,070 --> 01:31:11,679
in the in the quote in the in the

2500
01:31:15,590 --> 01:31:14,080
comments in 1953 when the robertson

2501
01:31:17,430 --> 01:31:15,600
panel made the recommendations they

2502
01:31:19,669 --> 01:31:17,440
effectively said look it's just a

2503
01:31:21,350 --> 01:31:19,679
question of resources it's a question of

2504
01:31:23,910 --> 01:31:21,360
we haven't gotten information enough

2505
01:31:25,350 --> 01:31:23,920
information when we do we'll tell you

2506
01:31:26,870 --> 01:31:25,360
what these are and they'll be something

2507
01:31:29,350 --> 01:31:26,880
mundane

2508
01:31:32,149 --> 01:31:29,360
and that's what that it looked like what

2509
01:31:33,990 --> 01:31:32,159
they were getting at this session was we

2510
01:31:35,830 --> 01:31:34,000
just don't have the resources these

2511
01:31:38,470 --> 01:31:35,840
things in the catch-all of the bin

2512
01:31:40,870 --> 01:31:38,480
will be able to explain them away

2513
01:31:42,070 --> 01:31:40,880
after they get enough thrown at it to

2514
01:31:44,790 --> 01:31:42,080
jump off

2515
01:31:47,350 --> 01:31:44,800
the robertson panel aspect is the

2516
01:31:49,669 --> 01:31:47,360
education campaign which they were also

2517
01:31:51,990 --> 01:31:49,679
pretty much hinting at you know to get

2518
01:31:53,990 --> 01:31:52,000
or we'll get only

2519
01:31:57,030 --> 01:31:54,000
you know particular information so that

2520
01:31:58,470 --> 01:31:57,040
we can put it back out into the public

2521
01:32:00,629 --> 01:31:58,480
well what does that sound like that's

2522
01:32:03,510 --> 01:32:00,639
exactly what the robertson panel did it

2523
01:32:06,070 --> 01:32:03,520
was their education was to take hard

2524
01:32:08,629 --> 01:32:06,080
cases and explain them publicly as

2525
01:32:10,070 --> 01:32:08,639
prosaic yeah bray i don't know if it was

2526
01:32:11,430 --> 01:32:10,080
braille moultrie but one of them early

2527
01:32:13,510 --> 01:32:11,440
on mentioned

2528
01:32:16,870 --> 01:32:13,520
scientific analysis well

2529
01:32:19,990 --> 01:32:16,880
as it sits aimsog i hate the name

2530
01:32:22,149 --> 01:32:20,000
as it sits now under usdi they can't

2531
01:32:24,629 --> 01:32:22,159
outsource they can't contract out to

2532
01:32:26,629 --> 01:32:24,639
scientific organizations to get it

2533
01:32:29,110 --> 01:32:26,639
studied so have they got some internal

2534
01:32:30,550 --> 01:32:29,120
way of studying it scientifically

2535
01:32:32,629 --> 01:32:30,560
it just seems like it's not going to

2536
01:32:33,750 --> 01:32:32,639
meet the needs of congress and it showed

2537
01:32:36,390 --> 01:32:33,760
there that they're not fully

2538
01:32:39,669 --> 01:32:36,400
implementing the law yet um as required

2539
01:32:42,870 --> 01:32:39,679
through ndaa 2022. it's not in place yet

2540
01:32:44,870 --> 01:32:42,880
it should be it's just like it's just

2541
01:32:46,390 --> 01:32:44,880
that shocked me as well that they kept

2542
01:32:48,229 --> 01:32:46,400
saying you know this is coming this is

2543
01:32:50,629 --> 01:32:48,239
coming this is coming how long have you

2544
01:32:52,550 --> 01:32:50,639
had guys and let's just

2545
01:32:54,950 --> 01:32:52,560
say we're not talking about when the ua

2546
01:32:56,709 --> 01:32:54,960
ptf was announced they said that they

2547
01:33:00,149 --> 01:32:56,719
knew about atip what's up steven

2548
01:33:03,510 --> 01:33:00,950
so

2549
01:33:05,270 --> 01:33:03,520
boom then that that previous effort

2550
01:33:07,110 --> 01:33:05,280
should be feeding into these efforts

2551
01:33:07,990 --> 01:33:07,120
they also kept calling at uaptf so maybe

2552
01:33:10,950 --> 01:33:08,000
they're just going to change the name

2553
01:33:12,709 --> 01:33:10,960
for that from it yeah i prefer it

2554
01:33:14,229 --> 01:33:12,719
results they can't be using that

2555
01:33:15,510 --> 01:33:14,239
it was also interesting that they only

2556
01:33:17,750 --> 01:33:15,520
they said that this is the third

2557
01:33:19,990 --> 01:33:17,760
iteration program so i think that clears

2558
01:33:22,870 --> 01:33:20,000
up some of the awesome

2559
01:33:24,070 --> 01:33:22,880
uh drama there um or at least how they

2560
01:33:25,510 --> 01:33:24,080
consider it

2561
01:33:27,030 --> 01:33:25,520
um but yeah i thought it was really

2562
01:33:29,990 --> 01:33:27,040
interesting um you know we've always

2563
01:33:32,070 --> 01:33:30,000
wondered why the uaptf

2564
01:33:34,310 --> 01:33:32,080
only looked at cases from a certain year

2565
01:33:36,629 --> 01:33:34,320
forward and i think it was pretty clear

2566
01:33:38,629 --> 01:33:36,639
that they want to only look at cases

2567
01:33:40,229 --> 01:33:38,639
they wanted to look at

2568
01:33:42,390 --> 01:33:40,239
sure it's a bit of that but also it's a

2569
01:33:44,790 --> 01:33:42,400
little bit of um how much data they can

2570
01:33:46,629 --> 01:33:44,800
get out of the cases as well because

2571
01:33:47,830 --> 01:33:46,639
this stuff much you know much further

2572
01:33:49,669 --> 01:33:47,840
back

2573
01:33:51,830 --> 01:33:49,679
it's just testimony they haven't really

2574
01:33:54,229 --> 01:33:51,840
got the extra bits you know extra

2575
01:33:56,390 --> 01:33:54,239
dimensions such as flear and and other

2576
01:33:57,830 --> 01:33:56,400
things to actually go on so i think

2577
01:34:00,709 --> 01:33:57,840
there's another reason but yeah you're

2578
01:34:03,750 --> 01:34:00,719
right you know they're cherry-picking in

2579
01:34:05,910 --> 01:34:03,760
regards the maelstrom case uh

2580
01:34:08,470 --> 01:34:05,920
they they threw complete shade at that

2581
01:34:10,229 --> 01:34:08,480
and used that as an example to say if we

2582
01:34:11,830 --> 01:34:10,239
you know followed up on everything that

2583
01:34:13,669 --> 01:34:11,840
reached the media or whatever it

2584
01:34:15,590 --> 01:34:13,679
wouldn't be possible

2585
01:34:19,270 --> 01:34:15,600
like without documentation it's like

2586
01:34:21,030 --> 01:34:19,280
there are so many documents right

2587
01:34:24,229 --> 01:34:21,040
absolutely friend

2588
01:34:25,350 --> 01:34:24,239
you sean could currently do a better job

2589
01:34:26,870 --> 01:34:25,360
that's what somebody said in the chat

2590
01:34:27,669 --> 01:34:26,880
and i'm not like you know i'm throwing

2591
01:34:29,350 --> 01:34:27,679
to them as well but i'm

2592
01:34:30,870 --> 01:34:29,360
complimenting you like this is what

2593
01:34:32,149 --> 01:34:30,880
needs to be done like why aren't they

2594
01:34:33,910 --> 01:34:32,159
digging for those documents it's more

2595
01:34:35,430 --> 01:34:33,920
the internal documents isn't it they do

2596
01:34:37,270 --> 01:34:35,440
have the information it's just why

2597
01:34:38,870 --> 01:34:37,280
they're looking at it um you know that

2598
01:34:40,470 --> 01:34:38,880
that's the question they should have

2599
01:34:42,550 --> 01:34:40,480
been better briefed because if you're

2600
01:34:44,390 --> 01:34:42,560
going to look at the the phenomenon they

2601
01:34:45,830 --> 01:34:44,400
know it goes back i mean they say the

2602
01:34:48,390 --> 01:34:45,840
blue book start in the 60s actually it

2603
01:34:50,310 --> 01:34:48,400
started in 1952 so it's not as if they

2604
01:34:51,350 --> 01:34:50,320
had the dates right either and there was

2605
01:34:53,350 --> 01:34:51,360
two

2606
01:34:55,590 --> 01:34:53,360
iterations of it beforehand sign and

2607
01:34:58,709 --> 01:34:55,600
grudge which again they get forgotten

2608
01:35:00,550 --> 01:34:58,719
about so it's not as if you know

2609
01:35:02,229 --> 01:35:00,560
we haven't looked at it for ages

2610
01:35:03,990 --> 01:35:02,239
officially and yet there's all the

2611
01:35:05,830 --> 01:35:04,000
documentation like that why aren't they

2612
01:35:07,830 --> 01:35:05,840
looking at that even just superficially

2613
01:35:09,270 --> 01:35:07,840
to see what has been done before and

2614
01:35:11,030 --> 01:35:09,280
then maybe learn from the mistakes of

2615
01:35:12,950 --> 01:35:11,040
that they would then find out about

2616
01:35:15,270 --> 01:35:12,960
things like maelstrom and other cases

2617
01:35:17,590 --> 01:35:15,280
which are documented within the official

2618
01:35:20,709 --> 01:35:17,600
records it's not just like some somebody

2619
01:35:22,149 --> 01:35:20,719
like nycap or apro doing it or us it's

2620
01:35:24,070 --> 01:35:22,159
actually thing that the us air force

2621
01:35:26,390 --> 01:35:24,080
were doing themselves why is that

2622
01:35:28,390 --> 01:35:26,400
happening and you'll you'll find

2623
01:35:30,310 --> 01:35:28,400
documents that i've posted somewhat

2624
01:35:31,750 --> 01:35:30,320
recently that state that some of the

2625
01:35:34,390 --> 01:35:31,760
things they see

2626
01:35:36,790 --> 01:35:34,400
move against prevailing winds just to

2627
01:35:38,470 --> 01:35:36,800
like is described in in some of these

2628
01:35:40,070 --> 01:35:38,480
reports even the one

2629
01:35:41,669 --> 01:35:40,080
you know the one dude it's moving

2630
01:35:44,629 --> 01:35:41,679
against the wind like that's a

2631
01:35:47,270 --> 01:35:44,639
similarity that could be useful here no

2632
01:35:49,430 --> 01:35:47,280
no visible that means propulsion you see

2633
01:35:51,510 --> 01:35:49,440
that so many times in the reports from

2634
01:35:53,910 --> 01:35:51,520
the 50s and you'll see it again if you

2635
01:35:55,669 --> 01:35:53,920
look up you know 60 70s 80s 90s you'll

2636
01:35:57,030 --> 01:35:55,679
see it again no doubt but that's not

2637
01:35:57,830 --> 01:35:57,040
they haven't done their homework it's

2638
01:35:59,750 --> 01:35:57,840
like

2639
01:36:00,950 --> 01:35:59,760
we've all read so much about this and

2640
01:36:02,149 --> 01:36:00,960
they're going to be in charge of this

2641
01:36:03,590 --> 01:36:02,159
yet they haven't just they haven't

2642
01:36:05,030 --> 01:36:03,600
studied the history

2643
01:36:07,109 --> 01:36:05,040
they're only studying what they have in

2644
01:36:09,350 --> 01:36:07,119
their own little pile or whatever you

2645
01:36:11,350 --> 01:36:09,360
know yeah but is that true i mean you

2646
01:36:13,350 --> 01:36:11,360
know that we're talking about we're

2647
01:36:15,270 --> 01:36:13,360
talking about an office that that has

2648
01:36:17,510 --> 01:36:15,280
been under the umbrella of counter

2649
01:36:19,830 --> 01:36:17,520
intelligence right and we're talking to

2650
01:36:21,270 --> 01:36:19,840
the counter intelligence subcommittee so

2651
01:36:22,310 --> 01:36:21,280
how much transparency are we going to

2652
01:36:23,669 --> 01:36:22,320
get here

2653
01:36:25,109 --> 01:36:23,679
how much deflection are we going to get

2654
01:36:27,030 --> 01:36:25,119
and how much you're going to accept i

2655
01:36:29,590 --> 01:36:27,040
mean so much of the chat has been was

2656
01:36:31,669 --> 01:36:29,600
like when bray lies we can tell and when

2657
01:36:33,030 --> 01:36:31,679
moultrie does it it sounds reasonable

2658
01:36:34,790 --> 01:36:33,040
yeah but they're both deflecting the

2659
01:36:37,109 --> 01:36:34,800
whole entire time graham was just

2660
01:36:39,270 --> 01:36:37,119
talking about you know like you know we

2661
01:36:41,350 --> 01:36:39,280
we saw one video in there and it's from

2662
01:36:42,709 --> 01:36:41,360
like a smartphone you know they're

2663
01:36:44,629 --> 01:36:42,719
talking about all these different

2664
01:36:46,870 --> 01:36:44,639
detection devices and we get a cell

2665
01:36:49,590 --> 01:36:46,880
phone video from like a samsung galaxy

2666
01:36:51,910 --> 01:36:49,600
or some that's not even

2667
01:36:54,709 --> 01:36:51,920
like it's ridiculous i mean it's

2668
01:36:55,590 --> 01:36:54,719
obviously calculated to to

2669
01:36:56,950 --> 01:36:55,600
to

2670
01:36:58,629 --> 01:36:56,960
diminish this

2671
01:36:59,830 --> 01:36:58,639
and not only that but we're talking

2672
01:37:01,430 --> 01:36:59,840
about itself

2673
01:37:04,310 --> 01:37:01,440
yeah i kept thinking that too sean i'm

2674
01:37:06,149 --> 01:37:04,320
like what about the tic-tac-toe

2675
01:37:08,470 --> 01:37:06,159
when we're talking about you know the

2676
01:37:11,750 --> 01:37:08,480
maelstrom case graham like

2677
01:37:14,629 --> 01:37:11,760
that was used it it immediately pivoted

2678
01:37:16,310 --> 01:37:14,639
from oh you know if we if we followed up

2679
01:37:18,310 --> 01:37:16,320
on everything that was commented on the

2680
01:37:20,310 --> 01:37:18,320
press it's like right well and then that

2681
01:37:21,750 --> 01:37:20,320
went to some weird pivot where it seemed

2682
01:37:24,310 --> 01:37:21,760
like there was some kind of like

2683
01:37:26,629 --> 01:37:24,320
softball threat that people that

2684
01:37:28,629 --> 01:37:26,639
civilian reporting would somehow would

2685
01:37:31,750 --> 01:37:28,639
somehow be punished super strange i was

2686
01:37:37,510 --> 01:37:34,629
to shutting down nukes so we can't talk

2687
01:37:41,590 --> 01:37:37,520
about that well i would say every time

2688
01:37:44,070 --> 01:37:41,600
uap go over nuclear facilities it is

2689
01:37:46,830 --> 01:37:44,080
just going to flood their airwaves and

2690
01:37:47,430 --> 01:37:46,840
they don't want to talk about it too

2691
01:37:49,510 --> 01:37:47,440
data enough resources they don't have

2692
01:37:53,750 --> 01:37:51,109
enough time i'm being sarcastic if you

2693
01:37:56,990 --> 01:37:53,760
can't tell you know

2694
01:38:00,709 --> 01:37:57,000
like nuclear entering you know

2695
01:38:02,310 --> 01:38:00,719
intrusions would be of interest um

2696
01:38:04,390 --> 01:38:02,320
to our defense officials but i mean

2697
01:38:05,910 --> 01:38:04,400
let's be real they know about muslim

2698
01:38:07,270 --> 01:38:05,920
right they know about all of these they

2699
01:38:09,270 --> 01:38:07,280
just don't want to talk about it on the

2700
01:38:10,629 --> 01:38:09,280
stand i mean i i don't think anyone

2701
01:38:13,750 --> 01:38:10,639
believes that they have not been

2702
01:38:16,070 --> 01:38:13,760
properly briefed or educated um or if

2703
01:38:18,629 --> 01:38:16,080
they haven't they have been specifically

2704
01:38:21,109 --> 01:38:18,639
told not to look into these cases

2705
01:38:23,350 --> 01:38:21,119
because then they can be asked and would

2706
01:38:25,030 --> 01:38:23,360
have to perjure themselves that's what i

2707
01:38:26,629 --> 01:38:25,040
was about to say did they say anything

2708
01:38:28,629 --> 01:38:26,639
that was illegal in terms of being in

2709
01:38:30,629 --> 01:38:28,639
front of congress when they said they

2710
01:38:32,550 --> 01:38:30,639
were just when they said well i can't

2711
01:38:34,149 --> 01:38:32,560
remember the exact wording what was it

2712
01:38:35,910 --> 01:38:34,159
i'm not aware of it

2713
01:38:37,270 --> 01:38:35,920
is that enough from to get them off the

2714
01:38:39,430 --> 01:38:37,280
hook in terms of

2715
01:38:41,270 --> 01:38:39,440
right it is okay right

2716
01:38:42,709 --> 01:38:41,280
well and i would say a couple things so

2717
01:38:44,390 --> 01:38:42,719
one i was very impressed with the

2718
01:38:45,990 --> 01:38:44,400
knowledge of the representatives and the

2719
01:38:47,910 --> 01:38:46,000
kinds of questions that they asked they

2720
01:38:51,270 --> 01:38:47,920
clearly have done some homework not

2721
01:38:52,950 --> 01:38:51,280
necessarily all of them but they have

2722
01:38:55,270 --> 01:38:52,960
some knowledge of the history of this

2723
01:38:57,189 --> 01:38:55,280
topic and to me that there were a couple

2724
01:38:58,550 --> 01:38:57,199
of instances at least that i think where

2725
01:39:00,790 --> 01:38:58,560
they're entering into the record

2726
01:39:02,070 --> 01:39:00,800
specifically wilson davis but that's the

2727
01:39:03,910 --> 01:39:02,080
one that stands out the most but they're

2728
01:39:06,070 --> 01:39:03,920
entering into the record

2729
01:39:08,790 --> 01:39:06,080
these these moments where

2730
01:39:10,950 --> 01:39:08,800
they can later go back and say you said

2731
01:39:12,550 --> 01:39:10,960
you didn't know this

2732
01:39:15,189 --> 01:39:12,560
we asked you and you said you didn't

2733
01:39:17,510 --> 01:39:15,199
know this and you now you're telling us

2734
01:39:18,709 --> 01:39:17,520
that you did know this so i i think that

2735
01:39:20,470 --> 01:39:18,719
they're painting

2736
01:39:22,229 --> 01:39:20,480
some of these folks into a corner and

2737
01:39:24,149 --> 01:39:22,239
eventual corner that they really won't

2738
01:39:25,990 --> 01:39:24,159
be able to get out of that that you know

2739
01:39:28,470 --> 01:39:26,000
they can only squirm a little bit so

2740
01:39:30,390 --> 01:39:28,480
much by using you know officially we

2741
01:39:33,189 --> 01:39:30,400
didn't know this or not to my knowledge

2742
01:39:35,350 --> 01:39:33,199
or no contract whatever was like no

2743
01:39:36,149 --> 01:39:35,360
contractual uh

2744
01:39:37,830 --> 01:39:36,159
you know

2745
01:39:39,510 --> 01:39:37,840
i forget that i think it was moultrie

2746
01:39:40,950 --> 01:39:39,520
who's using that that phrase

2747
01:39:43,830 --> 01:39:40,960
so they are

2748
01:39:46,470 --> 01:39:43,840
uh you know positioning themselves in a

2749
01:39:49,109 --> 01:39:46,480
way the representatives are to again

2750
01:39:51,910 --> 01:39:49,119
kind of set this topic up so that there

2751
01:39:54,709 --> 01:39:51,920
will be follow-on conversations that

2752
01:39:56,470 --> 01:39:54,719
make it harder and harder for the those

2753
01:39:59,270 --> 01:39:56,480
who are officially representing the

2754
01:40:01,270 --> 01:39:59,280
subject to kind of get out of it

2755
01:40:03,189 --> 01:40:01,280
i also think that this from just

2756
01:40:04,790 --> 01:40:03,199
stepping back into taking taking a look

2757
01:40:06,790 --> 01:40:04,800
at this from what we thought was going

2758
01:40:08,709 --> 01:40:06,800
to be happening yesterday

2759
01:40:10,950 --> 01:40:08,719
i was very encouraged by some of the

2760
01:40:12,709 --> 01:40:10,960
questions um you know and we had we had

2761
01:40:14,950 --> 01:40:12,719
a couple shockers too i think that we

2762
01:40:16,550 --> 01:40:14,960
weren't expecting so to me and just as

2763
01:40:19,990 --> 01:40:16,560
far as entering this into the public

2764
01:40:21,750 --> 01:40:20,000
conversation this is a very strong start

2765
01:40:23,350 --> 01:40:21,760
from my perspective yeah it's been

2766
01:40:25,590 --> 01:40:23,360
mentioned a lot recently about excessive

2767
01:40:27,270 --> 01:40:25,600
secrecy as well and that almost came out

2768
01:40:28,709 --> 01:40:27,280
there that there is excessive secrecy

2769
01:40:29,990 --> 01:40:28,719
they were talking about sources and

2770
01:40:32,229 --> 01:40:30,000
methods and why they can't tell us

2771
01:40:34,790 --> 01:40:32,239
certain things well what about shapes

2772
01:40:36,790 --> 01:40:34,800
you redacted the shapes from the report

2773
01:40:39,590 --> 01:40:36,800
there's no sources and methods there

2774
01:40:41,189 --> 01:40:39,600
it's simply shapes it doesn't tell us

2775
01:40:42,870 --> 01:40:41,199
anything about recording or sensor

2776
01:40:45,030 --> 01:40:42,880
equipment except

2777
01:40:47,830 --> 01:40:45,040
the only possibility with that would be

2778
01:40:50,070 --> 01:40:47,840
is if it was a recognizable object say a

2779
01:40:52,790 --> 01:40:50,080
russian or a chinese origin and they

2780
01:40:55,270 --> 01:40:52,800
didn't want the other side as it were to

2781
01:40:56,790 --> 01:40:55,280
know that they know what they are

2782
01:40:58,790 --> 01:40:56,800
that would be the only

2783
01:41:00,709 --> 01:40:58,800
method i would have think the reason why

2784
01:41:02,470 --> 01:41:00,719
i think they might want that secret

2785
01:41:04,470 --> 01:41:02,480
however the rest of it yeah you're right

2786
01:41:05,830 --> 01:41:04,480
um i can't see that that that speaks

2787
01:41:06,950 --> 01:41:05,840
towards what they were saying at the end

2788
01:41:09,590 --> 01:41:06,960
but they were saying that there's kind

2789
01:41:11,590 --> 01:41:09,600
of two competing goals here the one is

2790
01:41:13,350 --> 01:41:11,600
you know the wow what could this be even

2791
01:41:14,870 --> 01:41:13,360
if one of these things are what we think

2792
01:41:17,430 --> 01:41:14,880
they could be this is a paradigm shift

2793
01:41:19,750 --> 01:41:17,440
for everybody versus national security

2794
01:41:21,510 --> 01:41:19,760
and it's almost a reason for it not

2795
01:41:23,590 --> 01:41:21,520
being conducted by the people we just

2796
01:41:25,030 --> 01:41:23,600
saw like they should have a hand in it

2797
01:41:27,109 --> 01:41:25,040
they should be able to say we can't talk

2798
01:41:28,229 --> 01:41:27,119
about these specific shapes here but

2799
01:41:29,750 --> 01:41:28,239
there should be a different office

2800
01:41:31,270 --> 01:41:29,760
handling and saying well i'm gonna you

2801
01:41:32,870 --> 01:41:31,280
know tell people there was a source of

2802
01:41:34,470 --> 01:41:32,880
shape or there was a triangle shape like

2803
01:41:36,709 --> 01:41:34,480
that's nonsense if you want me to keep

2804
01:41:38,629 --> 01:41:36,719
that from them um you know they're just

2805
01:41:40,390 --> 01:41:38,639
burning up ahead the the rf transmission

2806
01:41:42,310 --> 01:41:40,400
thing really tickled me as well when

2807
01:41:43,830 --> 01:41:42,320
they were talking about no no possible

2808
01:41:45,590 --> 01:41:43,840
way to tell if they were comms and then

2809
01:41:47,270 --> 01:41:45,600
they say that they were rf transmissions

2810
01:41:49,270 --> 01:41:47,280
detected there's a lot of that double

2811
01:41:51,510 --> 01:41:49,280
speak dan or exactly what the point that

2812
01:41:53,189 --> 01:41:51,520
you're making is like we're we're

2813
01:41:54,709 --> 01:41:53,199
aware that we were collecting this yeah

2814
01:41:56,229 --> 01:41:54,719
we weren't communicating with them our

2815
01:41:57,750 --> 01:41:56,239
sensors are actually very good and we

2816
01:41:59,590 --> 01:41:57,760
have a lot of detail yeah actually we

2817
01:42:01,030 --> 01:41:59,600
don't have a lot of detail so you know

2818
01:42:02,390 --> 01:42:01,040
they really are trying to have it both

2819
01:42:03,510 --> 01:42:02,400
ways and i think that that's pretty

2820
01:42:05,189 --> 01:42:03,520
clear if those are paying close

2821
01:42:07,189 --> 01:42:05,199
attention

2822
01:42:09,510 --> 01:42:07,199
when we interviewed um lou

2823
01:42:12,470 --> 01:42:09,520
i i asked him about whether

2824
01:42:14,550 --> 01:42:12,480
sensor systems were being re-tasked um

2825
01:42:16,149 --> 01:42:14,560
and and you know informed by uap

2826
01:42:18,390 --> 01:42:16,159
encounters and he said he can talk about

2827
01:42:20,550 --> 01:42:18,400
it and that came up here and it's a yes

2828
01:42:22,950 --> 01:42:20,560
so uh maybe maybe ask him about it again

2829
01:42:24,310 --> 01:42:22,960
nathan yeah write that down um also

2830
01:42:26,149 --> 01:42:24,320
let's not forget they asked about the

2831
01:42:28,709 --> 01:42:26,159
underwater stuff yeah we'll have to talk

2832
01:42:30,310 --> 01:42:28,719
about that in the closed session okay um

2833
01:42:31,830 --> 01:42:30,320
yeah nathan you also mentioned about the

2834
01:42:33,830 --> 01:42:31,840
double speaker they also went asked

2835
01:42:36,149 --> 01:42:33,840
about uh crash retrievals in a

2836
01:42:38,629 --> 01:42:36,159
roundabout way asking about it without

2837
01:42:39,830 --> 01:42:38,639
not asking directly mentioned about was

2838
01:42:43,270 --> 01:42:39,840
it um

2839
01:42:45,750 --> 01:42:43,280
organic or non-organic material

2840
01:42:47,350 --> 01:42:45,760
not within the uap test for us that's

2841
01:42:50,790 --> 01:42:47,360
right yeah

2842
01:42:53,030 --> 01:42:50,800
that's huge about a wiggle room there

2843
01:42:54,870 --> 01:42:53,040
did anyone else get a sense that

2844
01:42:56,709 --> 01:42:54,880
they may be kind of making the argument

2845
01:42:58,149 --> 01:42:56,719
that it should be an sap

2846
01:43:00,390 --> 01:42:58,159
oh yeah big time they're obviously

2847
01:43:02,629 --> 01:43:00,400
trying to make it one yeah and this is

2848
01:43:04,629 --> 01:43:02,639
what osap wanted right and exactly

2849
01:43:06,709 --> 01:43:04,639
and i wonder like is it is it there has

2850
01:43:08,149 --> 01:43:06,719
to be a purpose you know is this is this

2851
01:43:09,590 --> 01:43:08,159
how we get to those pearly gates and

2852
01:43:11,270 --> 01:43:09,600
start knocking that door and going oi

2853
01:43:12,709 --> 01:43:11,280
give us your data

2854
01:43:14,550 --> 01:43:12,719
but the big thing as well was the data

2855
01:43:16,629 --> 01:43:14,560
sharing with uh other countries and

2856
01:43:17,830 --> 01:43:16,639
stuff now they said they were doing it

2857
01:43:19,990 --> 01:43:17,840
they were going to take it to the closed

2858
01:43:21,430 --> 01:43:20,000
hearings to discuss in detail

2859
01:43:24,390 --> 01:43:21,440
but if you look at this we've got open

2860
01:43:26,390 --> 01:43:24,400
hearings here in the us today the uk are

2861
01:43:28,629 --> 01:43:26,400
still saying nothing to see here that

2862
01:43:29,910 --> 01:43:28,639
doesn't add up if data is being shared

2863
01:43:33,270 --> 01:43:29,920
and it's going to be five eyes it's

2864
01:43:35,430 --> 01:43:33,280
going to be australia new zealand

2865
01:43:38,310 --> 01:43:35,440
what they said about what the

2866
01:43:39,910 --> 01:43:38,320
data they share and is it reliable and

2867
01:43:42,310 --> 01:43:39,920
how reliable are the people they share

2868
01:43:45,590 --> 01:43:42,320
with so i think they're being cagey in

2869
01:43:47,830 --> 01:43:45,600
terms of what they send out and also

2870
01:43:49,350 --> 01:43:47,840
quite maybe not entirely trusting of

2871
01:43:50,390 --> 01:43:49,360
what they get back in

2872
01:43:52,229 --> 01:43:50,400
so

2873
01:43:54,629 --> 01:43:52,239
yes why they might you know say they're

2874
01:43:56,310 --> 01:43:54,639
sharing you just don't know how much the

2875
01:43:58,629 --> 01:43:56,320
share in there how often and who with

2876
01:44:01,109 --> 01:43:58,639
scale the lowest well maybe yeah this

2877
01:44:03,350 --> 01:44:01,119
low hanging fruit yes they might send

2878
01:44:05,990 --> 01:44:03,360
they might have shared the the the stuff

2879
01:44:07,750 --> 01:44:06,000
that jeremy corbell has said and the the

2880
01:44:10,070 --> 01:44:07,760
thing that was in on the presentation

2881
01:44:12,149 --> 01:44:10,080
there uh but just to say well look this

2882
01:44:14,149 --> 01:44:12,159
is what that's why saying we know it's

2883
01:44:15,669 --> 01:44:14,159
nothing this is really what it is so

2884
01:44:17,830 --> 01:44:15,679
that's not anything of defense

2885
01:44:20,070 --> 01:44:17,840
significance so in that respect it could

2886
01:44:21,350 --> 01:44:20,080
be right what the mod is saying but then

2887
01:44:22,870 --> 01:44:21,360
again we don't know what else has been

2888
01:44:25,510 --> 01:44:22,880
going on the last 50 years because don't

2889
01:44:27,109 --> 01:44:25,520
they have shared servers i don't know is

2890
01:44:28,790 --> 01:44:27,119
it jaywix servers that a lot of

2891
01:44:30,310 --> 01:44:28,800
different agencies and groups can access

2892
01:44:32,070 --> 01:44:30,320
where they find

2893
01:44:34,310 --> 01:44:32,080
classified information whether it be

2894
01:44:36,149 --> 01:44:34,320
videos and materials of that respect or

2895
01:44:37,669 --> 01:44:36,159
reports

2896
01:44:38,550 --> 01:44:37,679
i don't know if anybody knows that is

2897
01:44:42,229 --> 01:44:38,560
anyone

2898
01:44:44,790 --> 01:44:42,239
that you are correct websites

2899
01:44:46,790 --> 01:44:44,800
did they publicly debunk the pyramid

2900
01:44:48,870 --> 01:44:46,800
video by the way well that was weird

2901
01:44:50,550 --> 01:44:48,880
right the first video we don't know what

2902
01:44:52,229 --> 01:44:50,560
it is the second one which looks a lot

2903
01:44:53,430 --> 01:44:52,239
like it we do know what it is and it's

2904
01:44:55,590 --> 01:44:53,440
bokeh

2905
01:44:57,430 --> 01:44:55,600
that's kind of what that

2906
01:44:59,189 --> 01:44:57,440
how i took it but they didn't say book

2907
01:45:00,629 --> 01:44:59,199
they just said that that's like with

2908
01:45:02,790 --> 01:45:00,639
this camera

2909
01:45:05,510 --> 01:45:02,800
outside they said something like outside

2910
01:45:06,790 --> 01:45:05,520
experts or outside analysis right are

2911
01:45:07,990 --> 01:45:06,800
they just

2912
01:45:09,910 --> 01:45:08,000
when they're saying

2913
01:45:12,550 --> 01:45:09,920
they're saying an slr camera it has an

2914
01:45:14,310 --> 01:45:12,560
aperture and that aperture creates that

2915
01:45:15,590 --> 01:45:14,320
you know that that triangular bokeh

2916
01:45:16,629 --> 01:45:15,600
effect that's that's the mick west

2917
01:45:18,390 --> 01:45:16,639
argument

2918
01:45:20,709 --> 01:45:18,400
it is but then we've got jeremy corbell

2919
01:45:23,590 --> 01:45:20,719
stating it's definitely not more will

2920
01:45:25,830 --> 01:45:23,600
come out like okay i guess we need that

2921
01:45:28,709 --> 01:45:25,840
now jared witness is saying it's their

2922
01:45:32,870 --> 01:45:28,719
pyramids yeah so

2923
01:45:34,629 --> 01:45:32,880
um but that that to me is a little

2924
01:45:37,350 --> 01:45:34,639
i don't know what's happening there i

2925
01:45:39,109 --> 01:45:37,360
think mick west will take those away

2926
01:45:40,950 --> 01:45:39,119
um there's a comment here and i just

2927
01:45:42,470 --> 01:45:40,960
want to address it because somebody says

2928
01:45:44,390 --> 01:45:42,480
so lou is lying then because he said

2929
01:45:45,669 --> 01:45:44,400
that we they do have wreckage it's

2930
01:45:48,390 --> 01:45:45,679
important to state that they kept saying

2931
01:45:49,910 --> 01:45:48,400
within the ua within their task force

2932
01:45:52,149 --> 01:45:49,920
there's other data from other

2933
01:45:54,149 --> 01:45:52,159
organizations so no um lou is not

2934
01:45:56,310 --> 01:45:54,159
necessarily lying they might be the ones

2935
01:45:59,350 --> 01:45:56,320
just compartmentalizing what they have

2936
01:46:01,189 --> 01:45:59,360
no i mean for for instance um like those

2937
01:46:03,669 --> 01:46:01,199
of you who know like the history of this

2938
01:46:05,270 --> 01:46:03,679
like um during blue book and all that

2939
01:46:07,669 --> 01:46:05,280
when you know

2940
01:46:10,390 --> 01:46:07,679
pieces of of whatever

2941
01:46:12,629 --> 01:46:10,400
ufo would crash or or they'd get a piece

2942
01:46:14,470 --> 01:46:12,639
of it or whatever for analysis that

2943
01:46:16,229 --> 01:46:14,480
would go to battelle

2944
01:46:17,990 --> 01:46:16,239
i mean and i've shown the documents over

2945
01:46:19,430 --> 01:46:18,000
and over again that would go to patella

2946
01:46:21,430 --> 01:46:19,440
who worked something called project

2947
01:46:23,990 --> 01:46:21,440
stork who would analyze it and check it

2948
01:46:26,390 --> 01:46:24,000
for radiation including soil samples and

2949
01:46:27,750 --> 01:46:26,400
all that stuff so but the patel

2950
01:46:30,310 --> 01:46:27,760
is uh

2951
01:46:32,229 --> 01:46:30,320
you know not the uap task force for

2952
01:46:34,550 --> 01:46:32,239
instance you know just answer a question

2953
01:46:36,870 --> 01:46:34,560
that um e.t persons just put on you said

2954
01:46:39,990 --> 01:46:36,880
am i suggesting that the the triangles

2955
01:46:42,229 --> 01:46:40,000
are bouquet as um you know as um

2956
01:46:43,510 --> 01:46:42,239
suggested no i'm not i don't know enough

2957
01:46:45,750 --> 01:46:43,520
about the case and i'm not a

2958
01:46:47,430 --> 01:46:45,760
photographic expert i've got no idea

2959
01:46:49,109 --> 01:46:47,440
what they are still and it still hasn't

2960
01:46:51,430 --> 01:46:49,119
been categorically proven one way or

2961
01:46:53,030 --> 01:46:51,440
another what they are but according to

2962
01:46:55,350 --> 01:46:53,040
what was said in the hearings they

2963
01:46:58,229 --> 01:46:55,360
certainly suggesting thus i think that's

2964
01:47:00,790 --> 01:46:59,510
you should be a politician i love the

2965
01:47:02,390 --> 01:47:00,800
way i mean

2966
01:47:03,430 --> 01:47:02,400
along those lines one thing that's

2967
01:47:05,590 --> 01:47:03,440
really important here is that you know

2968
01:47:07,590 --> 01:47:05,600
it's been 56 years is that right since

2969
01:47:10,629 --> 01:47:07,600
the last congressional hearing on ufos

2970
01:47:12,310 --> 01:47:10,639
and uips and you know we in that time as

2971
01:47:15,270 --> 01:47:12,320
was mentioned before you know we have

2972
01:47:17,590 --> 01:47:15,280
the cockpit videos we have we have more

2973
01:47:19,910 --> 01:47:17,600
hardcore data but what we've been shown

2974
01:47:21,990 --> 01:47:19,920
in this hearing or what was referenced

2975
01:47:24,470 --> 01:47:22,000
are like that like the bokeh like the

2976
01:47:25,510 --> 01:47:24,480
quote-unquote bokeh case right or that

2977
01:47:27,910 --> 01:47:25,520
or that

2978
01:47:29,430 --> 01:47:27,920
that smartphone video that lasted a half

2979
01:47:31,430 --> 01:47:29,440
a second that only showed us that these

2980
01:47:33,350 --> 01:47:31,440
pilots are able to opt that are able to

2981
01:47:36,470 --> 01:47:33,360
like text and fly at the same time or

2982
01:47:39,270 --> 01:47:36,480
whatever and then you know and then

2983
01:47:41,750 --> 01:47:39,280
and and and the wilson davis docks and

2984
01:47:43,270 --> 01:47:41,760
like you know i i i know that the wilson

2985
01:47:45,030 --> 01:47:43,280
davis stocks came from like

2986
01:47:46,950 --> 01:47:45,040
exceptionally good sources but you know

2987
01:47:49,750 --> 01:47:46,960
that is there's a lot of plausible

2988
01:47:52,390 --> 01:47:49,760
deniability that that are put into the

2989
01:47:55,189 --> 01:47:52,400
docks that they have in this particular

2990
01:47:57,270 --> 01:47:55,199
hearing and i have to wonder whether

2991
01:47:59,430 --> 01:47:57,280
some of that was intentional you know we

2992
01:48:01,350 --> 01:47:59,440
didn't see that we didn't see the gimbal

2993
01:48:03,430 --> 01:48:01,360
video we didn't see the video why

2994
01:48:05,590 --> 01:48:03,440
wouldn't you use the three videos that's

2995
01:48:07,430 --> 01:48:05,600
what i was starting in 2017 to begin

2996
01:48:09,189 --> 01:48:07,440
with unless there's some sort of crazy

2997
01:48:10,149 --> 01:48:09,199
sensor crap they don't want us to know

2998
01:48:12,229 --> 01:48:10,159
about that they're saying they didn't

2999
01:48:15,350 --> 01:48:12,239
have but they actually had um the tic

3000
01:48:17,590 --> 01:48:15,360
tac immediately is a bizarre case

3001
01:48:20,070 --> 01:48:17,600
to them and we have a video of that so

3002
01:48:21,990 --> 01:48:20,080
why aren't we discussing that more since

3003
01:48:22,870 --> 01:48:22,000
come on let's get real that's why we're

3004
01:48:24,470 --> 01:48:22,880
here

3005
01:48:26,310 --> 01:48:24,480
so they're also questioning about the

3006
01:48:27,510 --> 01:48:26,320
the videos themselves about you know the

3007
01:48:29,350 --> 01:48:27,520
you know really

3008
01:48:30,629 --> 01:48:29,360
wasn't that right towards the end there

3009
01:48:32,390 --> 01:48:30,639
was a question about have you got

3010
01:48:34,070 --> 01:48:32,400
procedures where you'll be able to stop

3011
01:48:35,910 --> 01:48:34,080
i think it was towards the the

3012
01:48:37,830 --> 01:48:35,920
questioning the line was step jeremy

3013
01:48:39,510 --> 01:48:37,840
stop that happening again so they're

3014
01:48:42,070 --> 01:48:39,520
clearly conscious of the fact that

3015
01:48:44,229 --> 01:48:42,080
things are leaking out into the media uh

3016
01:48:45,669 --> 01:48:44,239
and to interest groups and they clearly

3017
01:48:47,270 --> 01:48:45,679
don't want that to happen before they've

3018
01:48:49,109 --> 01:48:47,280
had a chance to analyze it and get their

3019
01:48:50,629 --> 01:48:49,119
ducks in the row beforehand well they

3020
01:48:52,470 --> 01:48:50,639
mentioned that

3021
01:48:54,629 --> 01:48:52,480
these reports they're getting in now are

3022
01:48:56,550 --> 01:48:54,639
going into a database well what database

3023
01:48:57,990 --> 01:48:56,560
is this coming into the task force and

3024
01:48:59,830 --> 01:48:58,000
it's their database or is it a

3025
01:49:02,149 --> 01:48:59,840
multi-agency database where it all gets

3026
01:49:03,990 --> 01:49:02,159
put in separately and then gets analyzed

3027
01:49:05,990 --> 01:49:04,000
so many questions are now arising from

3028
01:49:07,910 --> 01:49:06,000
these briefings so i'll take away the

3029
01:49:09,669 --> 01:49:07,920
positives where we can then look

3030
01:49:10,950 --> 01:49:09,679
going forward i know a lot of people are

3031
01:49:11,990 --> 01:49:10,960
going to say it was a nothing burger it

3032
01:49:16,390 --> 01:49:12,000
was just

3033
01:49:19,990 --> 01:49:17,830
and then it gives you a new direction

3034
01:49:21,510 --> 01:49:20,000
going forward follow his instagram

3035
01:49:24,550 --> 01:49:21,520
because they're going to be up there

3036
01:49:26,149 --> 01:49:24,560
guaranteed what was katie about to say

3037
01:49:28,709 --> 01:49:26,159
what what katie were you about to say

3038
01:49:29,910 --> 01:49:28,719
something yeah thanks um so the one

3039
01:49:32,149 --> 01:49:29,920
thing that i

3040
01:49:34,229 --> 01:49:32,159
found really interesting was if you guys

3041
01:49:35,830 --> 01:49:34,239
were the brian bender's

3042
01:49:38,229 --> 01:49:35,840
political article

3043
01:49:41,189 --> 01:49:38,239
they mentioned that there were

3044
01:49:44,790 --> 01:49:41,199
oral conversations about other off-book

3045
01:49:47,510 --> 01:49:44,800
programs that preceded asap and you know

3046
01:49:49,990 --> 01:49:47,520
came after project blue book if that's

3047
01:49:52,390 --> 01:49:50,000
the case and those sources that brian

3048
01:49:54,629 --> 01:49:52,400
news were legitimate which i respect

3049
01:49:57,270 --> 01:49:54,639
brian as a journalist and i you know

3050
01:50:00,149 --> 01:49:57,280
would assume they are legitimate then

3051
01:50:02,550 --> 01:50:00,159
there's a possibility that they misled

3052
01:50:04,229 --> 01:50:02,560
on the stand um because they explicitly

3053
01:50:07,589 --> 01:50:04,239
said that they were unaware of any

3054
01:50:09,030 --> 01:50:07,599
interim programs so i think that's a

3055
01:50:10,950 --> 01:50:09,040
subtle thing but i think we should pay

3056
01:50:12,870 --> 01:50:10,960
attention to that because

3057
01:50:15,270 --> 01:50:12,880
um i'm sure brian will have something to

3058
01:50:18,149 --> 01:50:15,280
say about that uh in the coming year i

3059
01:50:20,550 --> 01:50:18,159
mean i mean you can say already like nsa

3060
01:50:24,470 --> 01:50:20,560
has gotten ufo reports after that you

3061
01:50:27,350 --> 01:50:24,480
know i have them like 360 some reports

3062
01:50:28,790 --> 01:50:27,360
that they say it's probably a balloon on

3063
01:50:31,910 --> 01:50:28,800
each and every one of them

3064
01:50:34,470 --> 01:50:31,920
but that was after project blue book and

3065
01:50:37,109 --> 01:50:34,480
a ufo was reported so

3066
01:50:39,669 --> 01:50:37,119
so you know that's not entirely accurate

3067
01:50:43,109 --> 01:50:39,679
but aware of programs specifically like

3068
01:50:44,310 --> 01:50:43,119
uaptf and the aim song you know so there

3069
01:50:46,870 --> 01:50:44,320
is a lot of

3070
01:50:49,750 --> 01:50:46,880
legalese and you can hide behind that

3071
01:50:51,030 --> 01:50:49,760
sort of definition the the video i know

3072
01:50:53,510 --> 01:50:51,040
where there's some talk there what was

3073
01:50:54,390 --> 01:50:53,520
it the acorn or but to me it was one of

3074
01:50:56,629 --> 01:50:54,400
those

3075
01:50:59,589 --> 01:50:56,639
mystery wire images right from george

3076
01:51:01,109 --> 01:50:59,599
knapp it seemed like a still from one of

3077
01:51:02,709 --> 01:51:01,119
the mystery wires were still from the

3078
01:51:03,830 --> 01:51:02,719
video that we saw today and also i

3079
01:51:10,870 --> 01:51:03,840
thought it was interesting that video

3080
01:51:15,189 --> 01:51:12,790
yeah the object they showed just looked

3081
01:51:17,030 --> 01:51:15,199
like a kind of a like a tick like a deer

3082
01:51:17,910 --> 01:51:17,040
tick it didn't look like the party

3083
01:51:32,550 --> 01:51:17,920
balloon

3084
01:51:37,750 --> 01:51:33,669
right one

3085
01:51:37,760 --> 01:51:40,149
there we go

3086
01:51:43,270 --> 01:51:42,070
that doesn't quite look like the blimp

3087
01:51:45,750 --> 01:51:43,280
or the a chord

3088
01:51:48,149 --> 01:51:45,760
or the other one that's obviously

3089
01:51:49,270 --> 01:51:48,159
somebody dropped a ping-pong ball out of

3090
01:51:51,189 --> 01:51:49,280
that plane

3091
01:51:53,109 --> 01:51:51,199
and they photographed it

3092
01:51:54,390 --> 01:51:53,119
but you kind of see it

3093
01:51:56,950 --> 01:51:54,400
you see a

3094
01:51:58,550 --> 01:51:56,960
yeah like a triangular shape around it

3095
01:51:59,990 --> 01:51:58,560
it's weird all of this

3096
01:52:01,830 --> 01:52:00,000
pieces down here

3097
01:52:03,830 --> 01:52:01,840
it looks like there's some fuzziness but

3098
01:52:04,200 --> 01:52:03,840
here we are relegated to this blurry

3099
01:52:07,589 --> 01:52:04,210
crap

3100
01:52:11,830 --> 01:52:07,599
[Laughter]

3101
01:52:15,270 --> 01:52:13,510
crazy about it and mick west is going to

3102
01:52:16,790 --> 01:52:15,280
say it's a seagull

3103
01:52:18,709 --> 01:52:16,800
oh obviously a single with its wings

3104
01:52:21,270 --> 01:52:18,719
tucked in right yep yeah it's just

3105
01:52:22,629 --> 01:52:21,280
diving so that means that's et right

3106
01:52:26,310 --> 01:52:22,639
oh absolutely it's clutter it's

3107
01:52:30,390 --> 01:52:26,320
definitely air clutter airborne clutter

3108
01:52:32,229 --> 01:52:30,400
they kind of deferred a little bit to um

3109
01:52:34,310 --> 01:52:32,239
nasa did you notice that when it comes

3110
01:52:37,270 --> 01:52:34,320
to intelligent life so

3111
01:52:40,229 --> 01:52:37,280
um that that could be you know reading

3112
01:52:42,070 --> 01:52:40,239
into it too much maybe i am but um they

3113
01:52:44,470 --> 01:52:42,080
could be deferring to

3114
01:52:45,750 --> 01:52:44,480
the fact that if uh intelligent life was

3115
01:52:49,189 --> 01:52:45,760
discovered

3116
01:52:52,070 --> 01:52:49,199
um or they decided to disclose that

3117
01:52:53,910 --> 01:52:52,080
um it would be by way of nasa

3118
01:52:55,350 --> 01:52:53,920
i mean lou mentioned nasa again when his

3119
01:52:57,030 --> 01:52:55,360
interview with howard hughes something

3120
01:52:59,430 --> 01:52:57,040
coming up possibly in the near future

3121
01:53:01,350 --> 01:52:59,440
regarding uab and nasa so

3122
01:53:03,109 --> 01:53:01,360
something to look out for but the one

3123
01:53:07,030 --> 01:53:03,119
thing to think about or remember about

3124
01:53:09,589 --> 01:53:07,040
nasa is nasa is very in tune and in step

3125
01:53:11,669 --> 01:53:09,599
with the dod on

3126
01:53:12,790 --> 01:53:11,679
just about everything so

3127
01:53:15,030 --> 01:53:12,800
you know whatever there's so many

3128
01:53:17,510 --> 01:53:15,040
deflections you know like deflecting

3129
01:53:19,430 --> 01:53:17,520
like oh not in our agency oh well nasa

3130
01:53:20,550 --> 01:53:19,440
might you know it's just uh

3131
01:53:21,990 --> 01:53:20,560
right it's kind of i think they're

3132
01:53:23,750 --> 01:53:22,000
testing the waters guys to see what they

3133
01:53:25,990 --> 01:53:23,760
could kind of like well there's like a

3134
01:53:27,750 --> 01:53:26,000
convergence of to me like

3135
01:53:30,310 --> 01:53:27,760
there are ways to think about this right

3136
01:53:32,229 --> 01:53:30,320
and from a public and worldwide i mean

3137
01:53:34,070 --> 01:53:32,239
the us is obviously front and center in

3138
01:53:35,270 --> 01:53:34,080
many ways and when it comes to the

3139
01:53:36,550 --> 01:53:35,280
attention

3140
01:53:38,229 --> 01:53:36,560
on this topic

3141
01:53:40,950 --> 01:53:38,239
there are avenues by which this

3142
01:53:43,910 --> 01:53:40,960
information needs to come forward that

3143
01:53:45,830 --> 01:53:43,920
make it more trustworthy and more

3144
01:53:47,669 --> 01:53:45,840
reliable relatable when people go oh

3145
01:53:50,070 --> 01:53:47,679
well you know that organization you know

3146
01:53:51,589 --> 01:53:50,080
they do space and so that makes if

3147
01:53:53,669 --> 01:53:51,599
they're saying it then i get it you know

3148
01:53:56,229 --> 01:53:53,679
so they're kind of like roles to play

3149
01:53:57,750 --> 01:53:56,239
here in my mind in the political theater

3150
01:53:59,750 --> 01:53:57,760
uh you know as much as it can be

3151
01:54:01,830 --> 01:53:59,760
orchestrated obviously it can't all be

3152
01:54:03,669 --> 01:54:01,840
but to me there are certain specific

3153
01:54:06,310 --> 01:54:03,679
things that have to come from specific

3154
01:54:08,629 --> 01:54:06,320
agencies as they really kind of converge

3155
01:54:10,310 --> 01:54:08,639
together on whatever this happens to be

3156
01:54:12,470 --> 01:54:10,320
i don't think it's going to be a

3157
01:54:14,229 --> 01:54:12,480
haphazard you know oopsie you know yeah

3158
01:54:15,990 --> 01:54:14,239
here it is and we you know we didn't

3159
01:54:17,990 --> 01:54:16,000
talk to nasa about this before we just

3160
01:54:19,750 --> 01:54:18,000
decided to tell everybody today what

3161
01:54:22,709 --> 01:54:19,760
this also could be is

3162
01:54:26,149 --> 01:54:22,719
is a segway to try to get beyond

3163
01:54:28,870 --> 01:54:26,159
uh the the fence so to speak of the uap

3164
01:54:30,870 --> 01:54:28,880
task force you know you couldn't answer

3165
01:54:32,950 --> 01:54:30,880
these specific questions so now we have

3166
01:54:35,669 --> 01:54:32,960
to talk to the people who can which are

3167
01:54:37,350 --> 01:54:35,679
outside of this task force it's a good

3168
01:54:39,270 --> 01:54:37,360
point they name-dropped the department

3169
01:54:41,510 --> 01:54:39,280
of energy they named john

3170
01:54:44,470 --> 01:54:41,520
the national labs you know a lot

3171
01:54:46,149 --> 01:54:44,480
a lot noah a lot came up that that could

3172
01:54:47,350 --> 01:54:46,159
be followed up on if they were to choose

3173
01:54:49,910 --> 01:54:47,360
to do so

3174
01:54:51,750 --> 01:54:49,920
um rather than you know take a take a

3175
01:54:53,270 --> 01:54:51,760
long hour and a half lunch break because

3176
01:54:55,589 --> 01:54:53,280
it seemed opportune before the closed

3177
01:54:57,270 --> 01:54:55,599
door hearing i want to get folks to

3178
01:54:59,430 --> 01:54:57,280
sorry go ahead no i was gonna ask did

3179
01:55:01,430 --> 01:54:59,440
anyone else catch the the biology

3180
01:55:03,109 --> 01:55:01,440
mention though um so they made the

3181
01:55:04,390 --> 01:55:03,119
comment that nasa would handle any

3182
01:55:05,910 --> 01:55:04,400
discussions about

3183
01:55:07,350 --> 01:55:05,920
you know extraterrestrial life and then

3184
01:55:08,629 --> 01:55:07,360
they said and someone else would handle

3185
01:55:10,470 --> 01:55:08,639
biology

3186
01:55:12,790 --> 01:55:10,480
and it was just like this throwaway line

3187
01:55:14,950 --> 01:55:12,800
and i don't know what they meant by that

3188
01:55:16,070 --> 01:55:14,960
they don't have any biological

3189
01:55:18,709 --> 01:55:16,080
um

3190
01:55:20,629 --> 01:55:18,719
samples if they meant biological effects

3191
01:55:22,310 --> 01:55:20,639
um but that would be interesting to know

3192
01:55:24,709 --> 01:55:22,320
who's working on that because they

3193
01:55:27,189 --> 01:55:24,719
weren't clear and i assumed that you

3194
01:55:29,910 --> 01:55:27,199
know based on the ndaa that that would

3195
01:55:31,910 --> 01:55:29,920
be housed within amesog uh so i thought

3196
01:55:34,229 --> 01:55:31,920
that was interesting i didn't hear them

3197
01:55:35,189 --> 01:55:34,239
say astrobiology which i know nasa has

3198
01:55:37,430 --> 01:55:35,199
like a

3199
01:55:39,669 --> 01:55:37,440
group that does look at that stuff um i

3200
01:55:41,750 --> 01:55:39,679
wanted to give folks thoughts on the the

3201
01:55:43,270 --> 01:55:41,760
moultrie sort of uh

3202
01:55:44,470 --> 01:55:43,280
off the cuff you know i'm a science

3203
01:55:46,149 --> 01:55:44,480
fiction guy

3204
01:55:47,030 --> 01:55:46,159
you know i actually think that was kind

3205
01:55:49,189 --> 01:55:47,040
of

3206
01:55:51,109 --> 01:55:49,199
healthy and helpful because it to me it

3207
01:55:54,229 --> 01:55:51,119
actually personalizes

3208
01:55:56,870 --> 01:55:54,239
the topic a lot more it personalizes the

3209
01:55:58,790 --> 01:55:56,880
department of defense i think that

3210
01:56:00,870 --> 01:55:58,800
was intentional to ask him to kind of

3211
01:56:02,229 --> 01:56:00,880
like just share a little bit about his

3212
01:56:03,990 --> 01:56:02,239
interest there

3213
01:56:06,390 --> 01:56:04,000
what do you guys think about that i'm a

3214
01:56:08,709 --> 01:56:06,400
bit dubious about that actually sure

3215
01:56:09,910 --> 01:56:08,719
sorry because in what way what do you

3216
01:56:11,990 --> 01:56:09,920
mean

3217
01:56:13,830 --> 01:56:12,000
because he it was easy for him to say

3218
01:56:14,870 --> 01:56:13,840
yeah i've been to conferences i'm into

3219
01:56:17,030 --> 01:56:14,880
sci-fi

3220
01:56:18,870 --> 01:56:17,040
does that doesn't simply mean that he

3221
01:56:20,310 --> 01:56:18,880
that means he's going to be open and

3222
01:56:22,070 --> 01:56:20,320
transparent when he comes to this

3223
01:56:23,430 --> 01:56:22,080
subject yeah and i don't think that's

3224
01:56:25,189 --> 01:56:23,440
what i'm saying i'm saying if you're

3225
01:56:26,950 --> 01:56:25,199
thinking about entering this into the

3226
01:56:29,830 --> 01:56:26,960
public consciousness right and you're

3227
01:56:31,910 --> 01:56:29,840
trying to make a cognitive connection

3228
01:56:34,550 --> 01:56:31,920
with the viewership on what this topic

3229
01:56:36,790 --> 01:56:34,560
is not just moultrie but many of the the

3230
01:56:38,790 --> 01:56:36,800
representatives are saying you know i'm

3231
01:56:40,629 --> 01:56:38,800
interested in this that our constituents

3232
01:56:42,470 --> 01:56:40,639
are interested in this we as human

3233
01:56:44,870 --> 01:56:42,480
beings are interested in this we we've

3234
01:56:46,950 --> 01:56:44,880
always been interested you know and so i

3235
01:56:49,109 --> 01:56:46,960
think that to me says that there is a

3236
01:56:52,550 --> 01:56:49,119
willingness and a desire

3237
01:56:54,709 --> 01:56:52,560
to be accepting of whatever this may be

3238
01:56:57,270 --> 01:56:54,719
and the fact that he is able to say you

3239
01:56:59,189 --> 01:56:57,280
know i'm not just a military guy you

3240
01:57:00,709 --> 01:56:59,199
know i'm a person who also has these

3241
01:57:02,709 --> 01:57:00,719
curiosities

3242
01:57:04,310 --> 01:57:02,719
that to me you know opens that up a

3243
01:57:06,070 --> 01:57:04,320
little bit more that's what i got from

3244
01:57:07,629 --> 01:57:06,080
it nathan and i thought the difference

3245
01:57:10,870 --> 01:57:07,639
between that and if you look back at

3246
01:57:12,310 --> 01:57:10,880
1952 he um press conference shortly

3247
01:57:14,709 --> 01:57:12,320
after the washington weekends when

3248
01:57:15,830 --> 01:57:14,719
general major general stanford sanford

3249
01:57:18,229 --> 01:57:15,840
sat you know

3250
01:57:20,070 --> 01:57:18,239
sat in front of the press and was like a

3251
01:57:22,390 --> 01:57:20,080
rabbit in the headlights you know kind

3252
01:57:23,750 --> 01:57:22,400
of thing um it's totally different from

3253
01:57:25,669 --> 01:57:23,760
that he was trying to establish like

3254
01:57:27,669 --> 01:57:25,679
look i'm one of the guys you know i i

3255
01:57:29,669 --> 01:57:27,679
know about sci-fi i'm interested i also

3256
01:57:31,990 --> 01:57:29,679
thought he was going to name check e.t

3257
01:57:33,350 --> 01:57:32,000
or close encounters or something able to

3258
01:57:35,030 --> 01:57:33,360
try and say look i'm you know i'm

3259
01:57:36,790 --> 01:57:35,040
interested in all this stuff so you can

3260
01:57:39,350 --> 01:57:36,800
trust me i think that was the inherent

3261
01:57:40,870 --> 01:57:39,360
message you can trust what i'm saying

3262
01:57:42,550 --> 01:57:40,880
and that was the thing he didn't say but

3263
01:57:44,470 --> 01:57:42,560
that was what it was meant to be which

3264
01:57:46,629 --> 01:57:44,480
could be a double-edged sword trust me

3265
01:57:48,629 --> 01:57:46,639
as i as i later tell you more about this

3266
01:57:49,910 --> 01:57:48,639
or trust me as i totally later tell you

3267
01:57:51,830 --> 01:57:49,920
there's nothing to see here it depends

3268
01:57:52,870 --> 01:57:51,840
if you already trust him or not yeah

3269
01:57:54,310 --> 01:57:52,880
that's true

3270
01:57:56,149 --> 01:57:54,320
you could be like look at me i'm just

3271
01:57:57,830 --> 01:57:56,159
like you but i'm not you know or you

3272
01:57:59,270 --> 01:57:57,840
don't trust someone breaking the ice

3273
01:58:01,270 --> 01:57:59,280
just i don't trust someone and they say

3274
01:58:03,430 --> 01:58:01,280
trust me that makes it worse does

3275
01:58:05,510 --> 01:58:03,440
anybody want to hear a quote from a

3276
01:58:06,790 --> 01:58:05,520
tweet from christopher mellon

3277
01:58:08,870 --> 01:58:06,800
yes

3278
01:58:11,270 --> 01:58:08,880
that was a frustrating hearing as well

3279
01:58:13,830 --> 01:58:11,280
as a reminder both of how far we've come

3280
01:58:14,629 --> 01:58:13,840
and how far we still have to go

3281
01:58:16,070 --> 01:58:14,639
yeah

3282
01:58:18,470 --> 01:58:16,080
makes sense i agree i think it's

3283
01:58:20,790 --> 01:58:18,480
frustrating on what you heard you know

3284
01:58:23,430 --> 01:58:20,800
bray and moultrie say

3285
01:58:24,550 --> 01:58:23,440
um and it was it was optimistic from the

3286
01:58:27,669 --> 01:58:24,560
standpoint of the questions that we

3287
01:58:29,350 --> 01:58:27,679
heard so i get that

3288
01:58:30,390 --> 01:58:29,360
yeah i don't think it sets back any

3289
01:58:32,870 --> 01:58:30,400
further

3290
01:58:35,109 --> 01:58:32,880
no i know some people will say that

3291
01:58:36,790 --> 01:58:35,119
it's just a reminder to keep doing what

3292
01:58:37,830 --> 01:58:36,800
we're doing and keep pushing you know

3293
01:58:39,830 --> 01:58:37,840
the people in power to do what they're

3294
01:58:41,189 --> 01:58:39,840
doing because if we just let them keep

3295
01:58:42,470 --> 01:58:41,199
doing this it's going to be another blue

3296
01:58:43,430 --> 01:58:42,480
book you know so

3297
01:58:45,910 --> 01:58:43,440
it this

3298
01:58:48,470 --> 01:58:45,920
doesn't we can't let this kind of like

3299
01:58:49,830 --> 01:58:48,480
satiate us i guess we have to keep going

3300
01:58:51,270 --> 01:58:49,840
um they're kind of getting away with

3301
01:58:54,550 --> 01:58:51,280
bare minimum right now but it is a

3302
01:58:56,709 --> 01:58:54,560
stepping stone as like the big picture

3303
01:58:59,589 --> 01:58:56,719
positives i i mean we can go around and

3304
01:59:01,270 --> 01:58:59,599
do positives negatives i guess um my

3305
01:59:03,750 --> 01:59:01,280
positives

3306
01:59:04,950 --> 01:59:03,760
a-tip further substantiated

3307
01:59:06,470 --> 01:59:04,960
right yes

3308
01:59:07,910 --> 01:59:06,480
i think that's awesome

3309
01:59:09,669 --> 01:59:07,920
um

3310
01:59:12,310 --> 01:59:09,679
other positives

3311
01:59:14,440 --> 01:59:12,320
the wilson docks put in the record

3312
01:59:15,589 --> 01:59:14,450
mel's from putting the record

3313
01:59:17,589 --> 01:59:15,599
[Music]

3314
01:59:19,910 --> 01:59:17,599
and um some great

3315
01:59:22,550 --> 01:59:19,920
some great questions some historical

3316
01:59:26,149 --> 01:59:22,560
and uh the tic tac event

3317
01:59:28,070 --> 01:59:26,159
for their substantiated you know so

3318
01:59:30,310 --> 01:59:28,080
and that helps a lot that helps people

3319
01:59:33,189 --> 01:59:30,320
who are in the mainstream are just

3320
01:59:36,629 --> 01:59:33,199
watching this you know feel okay to

3321
01:59:39,669 --> 01:59:36,639
cling on to these things as substantial

3322
01:59:42,149 --> 01:59:39,679
things to hang on to as far as uh you

3323
01:59:44,310 --> 01:59:42,159
know unidentifieds go and

3324
01:59:47,189 --> 01:59:44,320
the fact that they do have plenty of

3325
01:59:49,750 --> 01:59:47,199
cases that uh where they do have

3326
01:59:51,350 --> 01:59:49,760
multiple forms of sensors on it and they

3327
01:59:53,430 --> 01:59:51,360
couldn't explain it

3328
01:59:56,870 --> 01:59:53,440
you know um yeah

3329
01:59:58,709 --> 01:59:56,880
so i think those are all positives uh

3330
02:00:00,629 --> 01:59:58,719
and also you know the fact that they

3331
02:00:02,149 --> 02:00:00,639
could take this farther into other areas

3332
02:00:03,910 --> 02:00:02,159
of the government when that being

3333
02:00:05,189 --> 02:00:03,920
satisfied with the some of the answers

3334
02:00:06,149 --> 02:00:05,199
that they got

3335
02:00:07,510 --> 02:00:06,159
um

3336
02:00:09,750 --> 02:00:07,520
some

3337
02:00:11,669 --> 02:00:09,760
the only uh

3338
02:00:14,790 --> 02:00:11,679
it's hard for me to think of of any

3339
02:00:17,109 --> 02:00:14,800
negatives that aren't just based in um

3340
02:00:18,950 --> 02:00:17,119
uh bright-eyed bushy tail kind of stuff

3341
02:00:21,910 --> 02:00:18,960
like well they didn't say aliens were

3342
02:00:24,470 --> 02:00:21,920
real or they didn't say crafts they have

3343
02:00:27,270 --> 02:00:24,480
alien crafts you know those are really

3344
02:00:29,830 --> 02:00:27,280
like being realistic about about this

3345
02:00:31,589 --> 02:00:29,840
which i know all of us were were you

3346
02:00:32,629 --> 02:00:31,599
know trying to be

3347
02:00:33,830 --> 02:00:32,639
i think

3348
02:00:36,070 --> 02:00:33,840
you know it's a

3349
02:00:37,430 --> 02:00:36,080
it's a positive thing and i think for

3350
02:00:39,350 --> 02:00:37,440
any progress

3351
02:00:40,709 --> 02:00:39,360
it's gonna have to be taken outside of

3352
02:00:42,870 --> 02:00:40,719
this group

3353
02:00:44,870 --> 02:00:42,880
yeah to be quite honest i agree with all

3354
02:00:47,270 --> 02:00:44,880
of those hey guys vinnie i'm so sorry to

3355
02:00:49,510 --> 02:00:47,280
interrupt before you guys carry on um i

3356
02:00:51,510 --> 02:00:49,520
have to go because i do have a doctor's

3357
02:00:53,510 --> 02:00:51,520
appointment um on the phone

3358
02:00:55,750 --> 02:00:53,520
anything you want to leave us with yeah

3359
02:00:57,669 --> 02:00:55,760
i think that i was surprised at the

3360
02:00:59,189 --> 02:00:57,679
questions and i'm excited that they're

3361
02:01:00,629 --> 02:00:59,199
going to learn more on the closed part

3362
02:01:02,310 --> 02:01:00,639
of it and they're going to have even

3363
02:01:04,950 --> 02:01:02,320
better questions next time so that's

3364
02:01:06,470 --> 02:01:04,960
like my hope and also this is great for

3365
02:01:09,270 --> 02:01:06,480
people that are just getting into the

3366
02:01:11,430 --> 02:01:09,280
subject to kind of um to make them

3367
02:01:13,669 --> 02:01:11,440
realize that it's a real thing because

3368
02:01:15,589 --> 02:01:13,679
of today because a lot of people don't

3369
02:01:17,510 --> 02:01:15,599
know the history like us

3370
02:01:19,109 --> 02:01:17,520
so it's important to keep that in mind

3371
02:01:27,589 --> 02:01:19,119
but thank you so much for having me it

3372
02:01:30,390 --> 02:01:28,629
all right

3373
02:01:31,669 --> 02:01:30,400
so yeah all i was going to say was that

3374
02:01:33,270 --> 02:01:31,679
the only thing i would take away on top

3375
02:01:34,870 --> 02:01:33,280
of what you already said sean is that

3376
02:01:36,950 --> 02:01:34,880
like i kind of mentioned earlier with

3377
02:01:38,950 --> 02:01:36,960
the fact that the us is having these

3378
02:01:41,270 --> 02:01:38,960
hearings in the uk

3379
02:01:43,030 --> 02:01:41,280
not a pipe out of them nothing we can

3380
02:01:44,629 --> 02:01:43,040
now continue our efforts over here

3381
02:01:46,470 --> 02:01:44,639
speaking to whether it be the government

3382
02:01:48,070 --> 02:01:46,480
the media or even the ministry of

3383
02:01:48,870 --> 02:01:48,080
defense and the intelligence communities

3384
02:01:50,790 --> 02:01:48,880
that

3385
02:01:52,790 --> 02:01:50,800
they need to catch up or at least meet

3386
02:01:54,550 --> 02:01:52,800
somewhere in the middle and and start to

3387
02:01:55,750 --> 02:01:54,560
realize that listen you've got to be

3388
02:01:58,390 --> 02:01:55,760
honest because

3389
02:02:01,270 --> 02:01:58,400
we don't buy the fact that there's no

3390
02:02:03,030 --> 02:02:01,280
nothing nothing you know no security

3391
02:02:05,109 --> 02:02:03,040
issues or anything there's got to be

3392
02:02:07,589 --> 02:02:05,119
they've got to be speaking so it gives

3393
02:02:09,030 --> 02:02:07,599
us more work to do over here for sure

3394
02:02:12,870 --> 02:02:09,040
yeah vinnie

3395
02:02:15,669 --> 02:02:12,880
um dan radio 4 half five just just never

3396
02:02:19,430 --> 02:02:15,679
mind i know yeah yeah yeah okay

3397
02:02:21,589 --> 02:02:19,440
um not me obviously um so yeah my puzzle

3398
02:02:24,070 --> 02:02:21,599
did you eat your fish and chips

3399
02:02:25,270 --> 02:02:24,080
i did yeah i did governor i did oh all

3400
02:02:31,510 --> 02:02:25,280
right

3401
02:02:33,910 --> 02:02:31,520
positives yeah the questions i felt uh

3402
02:02:36,149 --> 02:02:33,920
showed that was actually some research

3403
02:02:38,070 --> 02:02:36,159
or some knowledge of the phenomenon that

3404
02:02:40,310 --> 02:02:38,080
existed and they'd actually done some

3405
02:02:42,550 --> 02:02:40,320
you know background into it to get some

3406
02:02:44,790 --> 02:02:42,560
questions say admiral wilson was name

3407
02:02:46,390 --> 02:02:44,800
check maelstrom was name checked that

3408
02:02:48,149 --> 02:02:46,400
was probably over and above what i

3409
02:02:51,030 --> 02:02:48,159
expected to start with

3410
02:02:53,430 --> 02:02:51,040
i was also pleased

3411
02:02:55,350 --> 02:02:53,440
that i think as already being said they

3412
02:02:57,510 --> 02:02:55,360
were kind of like setting things so it

3413
02:02:59,430 --> 02:02:57,520
paints the two people into a corner for

3414
02:03:01,750 --> 02:02:59,440
future reference so when there is

3415
02:03:03,350 --> 02:03:01,760
another set of hearings which presumably

3416
02:03:05,589 --> 02:03:03,360
there will be if you go back to history

3417
02:03:08,550 --> 02:03:05,599
for the 66 hearings there were hearings

3418
02:03:10,310 --> 02:03:08,560
two years later in 68 um which was a

3419
02:03:12,390 --> 02:03:10,320
scientific panel but nonetheless there

3420
02:03:14,070 --> 02:03:12,400
was still there was still hearings so

3421
02:03:16,149 --> 02:03:14,080
that's a good one because it does pin

3422
02:03:17,990 --> 02:03:16,159
them down into well as we said before

3423
02:03:19,109 --> 02:03:18,000
look you've said this already and now

3424
02:03:20,790 --> 02:03:19,119
you what you're trying to do you're

3425
02:03:22,790 --> 02:03:20,800
trying to wiggle out of it you know have

3426
02:03:26,470 --> 02:03:22,800
you not found this out now this kind of

3427
02:03:28,870 --> 02:03:26,480
stuff the negative i think was that

3428
02:03:31,669 --> 02:03:28,880
they did pick low hanging fruit as andre

3429
02:03:33,510 --> 02:03:31,679
carson mentioned about the videos and i

3430
02:03:35,510 --> 02:03:33,520
think they could have shown the gimbal

3431
02:03:37,990 --> 02:03:35,520
video that one would have been the one

3432
02:03:39,589 --> 02:03:38,000
where it would have the most impact and

3433
02:03:41,189 --> 02:03:39,599
that could have led to a bit more kind

3434
02:03:43,510 --> 02:03:41,199
of information coming out of either

3435
02:03:45,350 --> 02:03:43,520
moultrie or bray or both of them i would

3436
02:03:48,069 --> 02:03:45,360
like to have heard what they might have

3437
02:03:49,669 --> 02:03:48,079
commented on that particular video so

3438
02:03:51,910 --> 02:03:49,679
yeah i'm looking forward to the next set

3439
02:03:53,109 --> 02:03:51,920
and what the fallout from this is and

3440
02:03:56,149 --> 02:03:53,119
looking forward to what the rest of you

3441
02:03:57,669 --> 02:03:56,159
say about this

3442
02:04:00,229 --> 02:03:57,679
yeah i mean i agree with everything that

3443
02:04:02,550 --> 02:04:00,239
everyone has said so far i think for me

3444
02:04:04,709 --> 02:04:02,560
like from a congressional perspective

3445
02:04:07,189 --> 02:04:04,719
i really think this was useful in

3446
02:04:09,270 --> 02:04:07,199
figuring out where the different numbers

3447
02:04:10,950 --> 02:04:09,280
stand um obviously we didn't hear from

3448
02:04:13,030 --> 02:04:10,960
all of the members of the subcommittee

3449
02:04:14,709 --> 02:04:13,040
but i think it became very apparent who

3450
02:04:17,350 --> 02:04:14,719
would be potential allies who would be

3451
02:04:19,910 --> 02:04:17,360
potential blocks um

3452
02:04:22,069 --> 02:04:19,920
and i mean gallagher man like let's just

3453
02:04:23,270 --> 02:04:22,079
give him a big pat on the back there

3454
02:04:25,350 --> 02:04:23,280
um

3455
02:04:27,109 --> 02:04:25,360
and i think also you know

3456
02:04:29,510 --> 02:04:27,119
i'm a little fangirling right now

3457
02:04:31,589 --> 02:04:29,520
because a small group of us submitted

3458
02:04:32,950 --> 02:04:31,599
questions to the offices and

3459
02:04:35,669 --> 02:04:32,960
two of them got either fully or

3460
02:04:37,750 --> 02:04:35,679
partially asked so i think you know not

3461
02:04:39,750 --> 02:04:37,760
just to toot my own horn and

3462
02:04:42,229 --> 02:04:39,760
the porn of the people i worked with who

3463
02:04:43,669 --> 02:04:42,239
i would love to give a shout out to but

3464
02:04:45,589 --> 02:04:43,679
i don't know if they want to be publicly

3465
02:04:47,750 --> 02:04:45,599
identified um

3466
02:04:50,470 --> 02:04:47,760
but i think it goes further to say that

3467
02:04:53,030 --> 02:04:50,480
our advocacy matters right um the

3468
02:04:54,950 --> 02:04:53,040
community has the power to shift the

3469
02:04:57,270 --> 02:04:54,960
narrative and to you know somewhat

3470
02:04:59,510 --> 02:04:57,280
influence what is being discussed so i

3471
02:05:02,770 --> 02:04:59,520
think that's really positive uh in terms

3472
02:05:05,189 --> 02:05:02,780
of negatives i think my only concern is

3473
02:05:09,430 --> 02:05:05,199
[Music]

3474
02:05:11,350 --> 02:05:09,440
is that that's my biggest concern

3475
02:05:14,550 --> 02:05:11,360
just shooting your horn for you sorry

3476
02:05:16,069 --> 02:05:14,560
there we go great um no i i think my

3477
02:05:18,470 --> 02:05:16,079
biggest concern is that there was a lot

3478
02:05:20,950 --> 02:05:18,480
of nuance in what was said for example

3479
02:05:22,550 --> 02:05:20,960
like the we have no evidence of this in

3480
02:05:25,350 --> 02:05:22,560
the uaptf

3481
02:05:27,109 --> 02:05:25,360
and i don't think the media is going to

3482
02:05:29,750 --> 02:05:27,119
reflect that so i think we should all be

3483
02:05:32,550 --> 02:05:29,760
very mindful over the coming days

3484
02:05:34,390 --> 02:05:32,560
as we see articles come out to kind of

3485
02:05:36,069 --> 02:05:34,400
gently correct the record because i

3486
02:05:40,390 --> 02:05:36,079
think it could be misleading to folks

3487
02:05:45,109 --> 02:05:43,430
totally agreed um yeah i think that it's

3488
02:05:46,709 --> 02:05:45,119
important that

3489
02:05:49,270 --> 02:05:46,719
that sean

3490
02:05:51,350 --> 02:05:49,280
what are you doing man come on

3491
02:05:52,950 --> 02:05:51,360
it's a historic day we don't need like

3492
02:05:53,750 --> 02:05:52,960
the uh clown routine

3493
02:05:55,750 --> 02:05:53,760
uh

3494
02:05:56,790 --> 02:05:55,760
i'm just getting a horn bro

3495
02:05:59,109 --> 02:05:56,800
um

3496
02:06:00,470 --> 02:05:59,119
you know i think that the you know

3497
02:06:02,629 --> 02:06:00,480
it's important that this is breaching

3498
02:06:05,430 --> 02:06:02,639
water and and has been said by priscilla

3499
02:06:06,709 --> 02:06:05,440
and others you know and katie it's it's

3500
02:06:07,830 --> 02:06:06,719
great that

3501
02:06:09,350 --> 02:06:07,840
we have

3502
02:06:11,990 --> 02:06:09,360
you know there's always new people

3503
02:06:13,910 --> 02:06:12,000
entering in in to the debate and

3504
02:06:15,270 --> 02:06:13,920
entering into the conversation when a

3505
02:06:17,270 --> 02:06:15,280
subject like this

3506
02:06:19,910 --> 02:06:17,280
and when a hearing like this would

3507
02:06:21,270 --> 02:06:19,920
breach water you know if we even get

3508
02:06:22,229 --> 02:06:21,280
when we get these

3509
02:06:24,870 --> 02:06:22,239
uh

3510
02:06:26,629 --> 02:06:24,880
any time that there's kind of one of

3511
02:06:29,830 --> 02:06:26,639
these big blaring headlines in the new

3512
02:06:32,470 --> 02:06:29,840
york times more people get get turned on

3513
02:06:34,069 --> 02:06:32,480
to the subject matter and not only that

3514
02:06:36,069 --> 02:06:34,079
people that have had that have seen

3515
02:06:36,950 --> 02:06:36,079
things people that have experienced

3516
02:06:39,430 --> 02:06:36,960
things

3517
02:06:41,589 --> 02:06:39,440
also you know it tends to wake people up

3518
02:06:44,069 --> 02:06:41,599
as well you know it it's there's a

3519
02:06:47,350 --> 02:06:44,079
legitimacy factor i remember you know

3520
02:06:49,109 --> 02:06:47,360
before my grandfather passed um

3521
02:06:52,069 --> 02:06:49,119
you know we were able to have

3522
02:06:53,589 --> 02:06:52,079
uh some straightforward conversations

3523
02:06:56,550 --> 02:06:53,599
about the subject matter with the

3524
02:06:57,910 --> 02:06:56,560
original blumenthal kane helene cooper

3525
02:07:00,709 --> 02:06:57,920
article on the front of the new york

3526
02:07:02,149 --> 02:07:00,719
times you know and i really value that

3527
02:07:04,229 --> 02:07:02,159
you know years later we were able to

3528
02:07:06,229 --> 02:07:04,239
have that conversation before he passed

3529
02:07:08,470 --> 02:07:06,239
and it was totally because it sat there

3530
02:07:10,550 --> 02:07:08,480
on the front of the new york times so

3531
02:07:12,629 --> 02:07:10,560
the fact that this can destigmatize

3532
02:07:14,390 --> 02:07:12,639
these conversations among loved ones i

3533
02:07:17,589 --> 02:07:14,400
think is really important i think it's

3534
02:07:19,669 --> 02:07:17,599
really important that you know that the

3535
02:07:21,830 --> 02:07:19,679
as katie was saying like the grassroots

3536
02:07:24,950 --> 02:07:21,840
effort of what we're doing and what

3537
02:07:27,990 --> 02:07:24,960
others online are doing and that it it

3538
02:07:30,390 --> 02:07:28,000
helps bolster our case as much as even

3539
02:07:32,390 --> 02:07:30,400
within the hearing itself it sounded

3540
02:07:34,069 --> 02:07:32,400
like they would love to be able to

3541
02:07:35,270 --> 02:07:34,079
stifle some of the conversations that

3542
02:07:37,510 --> 02:07:35,280
people have

3543
02:07:39,510 --> 02:07:37,520
um you know as

3544
02:07:41,910 --> 02:07:39,520
like with regards to the maelstrom case

3545
02:07:43,510 --> 02:07:41,920
you know that's one thing to to address

3546
02:07:46,629 --> 02:07:43,520
here is that there is so much lip

3547
02:07:49,589 --> 02:07:46,639
service paid to destigmatizing reports

3548
02:07:52,310 --> 02:07:49,599
right but there is very little in terms

3549
02:07:54,790 --> 02:07:52,320
of destigmatizing the reporters the

3550
02:07:57,589 --> 02:07:54,800
people that actually report the cases

3551
02:07:59,270 --> 02:07:57,599
that that is a fundamental you know

3552
02:08:02,470 --> 02:07:59,280
difference there's overlap there but

3553
02:08:04,310 --> 02:08:02,480
it's not absolutely the same thing

3554
02:08:07,589 --> 02:08:04,320
and you know i think that it's really

3555
02:08:09,350 --> 02:08:07,599
important to to recognize that that

3556
02:08:12,629 --> 02:08:09,360
these are people that you know they'll

3557
02:08:15,030 --> 02:08:12,639
constantly valorize the data as much as

3558
02:08:17,270 --> 02:08:15,040
they try to hide it and at the same time

3559
02:08:20,470 --> 02:08:17,280
they'll valorize the data but they'll

3560
02:08:22,870 --> 02:08:20,480
they'll you know there was no mention

3561
02:08:24,709 --> 02:08:22,880
except unless you're a navy pilot

3562
02:08:27,109 --> 02:08:24,719
you know you don't you don't necessarily

3563
02:08:28,950 --> 02:08:27,119
deserve respect for talking about this

3564
02:08:30,950 --> 02:08:28,960
stuff you don't deserve necessarily

3565
02:08:33,589 --> 02:08:30,960
respect for reporting that stuff and i

3566
02:08:35,510 --> 02:08:33,599
think that is absolute bs it needs to

3567
02:08:37,430 --> 02:08:35,520
stop immediately

3568
02:08:39,910 --> 02:08:37,440
and you know and

3569
02:08:41,109 --> 02:08:39,920
we should stop kind of accepting i mean

3570
02:08:43,109 --> 02:08:41,119
i know that you all you know i'm

3571
02:08:46,069 --> 02:08:43,119
preaching to the choir here but like we

3572
02:08:47,910 --> 02:08:46,079
need to stop accepting that the tiny

3573
02:08:49,830 --> 02:08:47,920
little crumb that we get

3574
02:08:52,390 --> 02:08:49,840
in terms of being like you know they did

3575
02:08:54,550 --> 02:08:52,400
give us 12 instances of double speak and

3576
02:08:57,189 --> 02:08:54,560
that's great let's just use that for the

3577
02:09:00,550 --> 02:08:57,199
next 10 years

3578
02:09:09,030 --> 02:09:02,149
um

3579
02:09:10,870 --> 02:09:09,040
standardizing public reporting

3580
02:09:13,189 --> 02:09:10,880
procedures and i thought that was

3581
02:09:15,750 --> 02:09:13,199
encouraging i'd love to see that happen

3582
02:09:17,750 --> 02:09:15,760
asap because like you say jay it's just

3583
02:09:19,189 --> 02:09:17,760
as valuable and sure you know there

3584
02:09:21,270 --> 02:09:19,199
might be some narratives when one's

3585
02:09:23,750 --> 02:09:21,280
mixed in but our

3586
02:09:25,830 --> 02:09:23,760
planet is bathed in sensors now you know

3587
02:09:27,830 --> 02:09:25,840
there's probably no no bit of it that

3588
02:09:29,430 --> 02:09:27,840
has gone untouched so why can't you

3589
02:09:31,189 --> 02:09:29,440
corroborate you know what i saw one

3590
02:09:33,510 --> 02:09:31,199
night or what you guys saw or you know

3591
02:09:34,709 --> 02:09:33,520
something like that

3592
02:09:36,950 --> 02:09:34,719
when when i looked at the hearing

3593
02:09:38,550 --> 02:09:36,960
whether it was successful i asked myself

3594
02:09:40,629 --> 02:09:38,560
what it was for

3595
02:09:42,790 --> 02:09:40,639
and i i think it was for further

3596
02:09:45,589 --> 02:09:42,800
conversation and nothing more to get the

3597
02:09:47,109 --> 02:09:45,599
ball rolling um and and i think it's

3598
02:09:48,069 --> 02:09:47,119
done exactly that the public have now

3599
02:09:50,709 --> 02:09:48,079
seen

3600
02:09:53,350 --> 02:09:50,719
the the kind of i know i can't swear but

3601
02:09:54,870 --> 02:09:53,360
i'll say the cluster f with the video um

3602
02:09:57,430 --> 02:09:54,880
and they've seen that these people

3603
02:09:59,910 --> 02:09:57,440
aren't prepped uh properly they've

3604
02:10:03,990 --> 02:09:59,920
there's probably intrigue there and a

3605
02:10:06,470 --> 02:10:04,000
desire for for a more robust uh

3606
02:10:08,310 --> 02:10:06,480
hearing the next time around so

3607
02:10:10,390 --> 02:10:08,320
we're we're probably gonna see in the

3608
02:10:12,149 --> 02:10:10,400
future some more legislation coming out

3609
02:10:14,709 --> 02:10:12,159
that holds their feet to the fires but

3610
02:10:16,709 --> 02:10:14,719
in very very specific ways and like

3611
02:10:17,990 --> 02:10:16,719
graham said it'll come back around to

3612
02:10:19,510 --> 02:10:18,000
bite him in the ass a lot of the stuff

3613
02:10:21,830 --> 02:10:19,520
that they said today

3614
02:10:23,430 --> 02:10:21,840
and that's a good thing so i'm pleased

3615
02:10:25,030 --> 02:10:23,440
with it you know there were no alien

3616
02:10:27,750 --> 02:10:25,040
bodies kind of trotted out but i never

3617
02:10:29,990 --> 02:10:27,760
expected that this was as i said

3618
02:10:32,629 --> 02:10:30,000
yesterday this wasn't an ending this is

3619
02:10:34,790 --> 02:10:32,639
finally the beginning

3620
02:10:36,709 --> 02:10:34,800
completely agree uh and echo everything

3621
02:10:39,270 --> 02:10:36,719
that others have said

3622
02:10:41,270 --> 02:10:39,280
uh i think that i was pleasantly

3623
02:10:43,270 --> 02:10:41,280
surprised with what we heard today it

3624
02:10:45,270 --> 02:10:43,280
exceeded my expectations and i set the

3625
02:10:47,430 --> 02:10:45,280
bar very low we got some to me some

3626
02:10:49,669 --> 02:10:47,440
really interesting questions that i was

3627
02:10:52,950 --> 02:10:49,679
not expecting to hear also i think it

3628
02:10:55,750 --> 02:10:52,960
doesn't uh you know we really do need to

3629
02:10:56,870 --> 02:10:55,760
realize how bipartisan this actually is

3630
02:10:59,109 --> 02:10:56,880
yes there were a couple of

3631
02:11:01,350 --> 02:10:59,119
representatives that were really pushing

3632
02:11:03,189 --> 02:11:01,360
the adversarial technology you know we

3633
02:11:04,629 --> 02:11:03,199
don't want to be one-upped by them but i

3634
02:11:06,790 --> 02:11:04,639
think some of those questions actually

3635
02:11:08,790 --> 02:11:06,800
were addressed you know let's not forget

3636
02:11:10,470 --> 02:11:08,800
there was a more a point in the

3637
02:11:12,310 --> 02:11:10,480
conversation where

3638
02:11:14,629 --> 02:11:12,320
they specifically said that china was

3639
02:11:16,149 --> 02:11:14,639
looking at this as well and and there

3640
02:11:18,069 --> 02:11:16,159
was going to be more information about

3641
02:11:19,669 --> 02:11:18,079
that in the closed session so

3642
02:11:21,189 --> 02:11:19,679
uh you know i find it hard to believe

3643
02:11:23,510 --> 02:11:21,199
that the chinese have the technology yet

3644
02:11:26,310 --> 02:11:23,520
they're also really looking at it so

3645
02:11:28,550 --> 02:11:26,320
to me uh it really does say a lot about

3646
02:11:30,790 --> 02:11:28,560
where we are with the topic that most of

3647
02:11:32,870 --> 02:11:30,800
these representatives are on the same

3648
02:11:34,069 --> 02:11:32,880
page here and they're wanting they're

3649
02:11:36,229 --> 02:11:34,079
asking good questions and wanting the

3650
02:11:38,550 --> 02:11:36,239
information i think also you know

3651
02:11:40,709 --> 02:11:38,560
remembering that we're in a time where

3652
02:11:43,189 --> 02:11:40,719
at least in america there's this sort of

3653
02:11:45,589 --> 02:11:43,199
strong distrust of the government and uh

3654
02:11:47,189 --> 02:11:45,599
you know to me this was a if you're

3655
02:11:48,790 --> 02:11:47,199
taking a kind of meta view of this this

3656
02:11:50,790 --> 02:11:48,800
was a situation where the

3657
02:11:53,350 --> 02:11:50,800
representatives really in fact do mirror

3658
02:11:55,189 --> 02:11:53,360
many ways the population uh and

3659
02:11:57,430 --> 02:11:55,199
oftentimes that that's not the case that

3660
02:11:58,950 --> 02:11:57,440
uh the representatives don't necessarily

3661
02:12:01,270 --> 02:11:58,960
mirror what the constituents really want

3662
02:12:02,629 --> 02:12:01,280
to know this is this is this is the

3663
02:12:04,149 --> 02:12:02,639
opposite of that and that that's very

3664
02:12:06,950 --> 02:12:04,159
encouraging this is an opportunity in my

3665
02:12:09,589 --> 02:12:06,960
mind for the government to really show a

3666
02:12:11,189 --> 02:12:09,599
sign of solidarity and and uh in a way

3667
02:12:13,669 --> 02:12:11,199
that they could repair you know some

3668
02:12:15,510 --> 02:12:13,679
historical damage to the reputation that

3669
02:12:17,990 --> 02:12:15,520
is there uh of not being straight with

3670
02:12:19,669 --> 02:12:18,000
people so to me again i think this is uh

3671
02:12:21,510 --> 02:12:19,679
it's a great first start um we're

3672
02:12:23,350 --> 02:12:21,520
talking with lu tomorrow we are

3673
02:12:25,350 --> 02:12:23,360
absolutely going to ask for his thoughts

3674
02:12:27,109 --> 02:12:25,360
on this hearing uh and going to spend a

3675
02:12:28,709 --> 02:12:27,119
lot of time on that so i'm definitely

3676
02:12:30,550 --> 02:12:28,719
looking forward to look to talking with

3677
02:12:32,470 --> 02:12:30,560
him and also going through this again uh

3678
02:12:34,229 --> 02:12:32,480
just to see what i may have missed and

3679
02:12:36,870 --> 02:12:34,239
maybe cue up some specific questions

3680
02:12:38,470 --> 02:12:36,880
from from what we heard today

3681
02:12:40,390 --> 02:12:38,480
yeah i mean i think all you guys have

3682
02:12:42,550 --> 02:12:40,400
brought up really good points sorry for

3683
02:12:45,430 --> 02:12:42,560
the car horn if that offended anybody if

3684
02:12:47,430 --> 02:12:45,440
i knew how uh intense and emotional what

3685
02:12:48,470 --> 02:12:47,440
jay was going to share was coming i

3686
02:12:50,870 --> 02:12:48,480
wouldn't i wouldn't have did that

3687
02:12:52,870 --> 02:12:50,880
because that was really beautiful and

3688
02:12:56,669 --> 02:12:52,880
um and inspired me to to kind of leave

3689
02:12:59,430 --> 02:12:56,679
you with this it's it's like you know as

3690
02:13:01,830 --> 02:12:59,440
experiencers you know whether you're not

3691
02:13:03,350 --> 02:13:01,840
or you are or whatever i'm not saying

3692
02:13:06,149 --> 02:13:03,360
anything about that but

3693
02:13:08,550 --> 02:13:06,159
you know it in being one um the reality

3694
02:13:10,709 --> 02:13:08,560
of this situation is is highly personal

3695
02:13:12,709 --> 02:13:10,719
and emotional you know

3696
02:13:16,790 --> 02:13:12,719
um when i think about

3697
02:13:20,069 --> 02:13:16,800
the experience that i've been through

3698
02:13:21,910 --> 02:13:20,079
um these these hearings suck

3699
02:13:23,990 --> 02:13:21,920
right these hearings are

3700
02:13:25,990 --> 02:13:24,000
uh a speck of my shoe

3701
02:13:28,229 --> 02:13:26,000
and and they're terrible

3702
02:13:31,750 --> 02:13:28,239
and it doesn't restore

3703
02:13:34,870 --> 02:13:31,760
um the emotional baggage that has been

3704
02:13:36,550 --> 02:13:34,880
added onto my life you know

3705
02:13:38,629 --> 02:13:36,560
um

3706
02:13:40,470 --> 02:13:38,639
and that stinks and you know what i

3707
02:13:42,709 --> 02:13:40,480
really want there are some sort of

3708
02:13:45,030 --> 02:13:42,719
answers for what i've experienced in

3709
02:13:49,189 --> 02:13:45,040
other people who've experienced much

3710
02:13:50,229 --> 02:13:49,199
more severe uh traumatic things

3711
02:13:51,430 --> 02:13:50,239
and

3712
02:13:52,629 --> 02:13:51,440
um

3713
02:13:55,350 --> 02:13:52,639
in that

3714
02:13:56,790 --> 02:13:55,360
aspect you know these hearings were

3715
02:13:58,629 --> 02:13:56,800
unacceptable

3716
02:14:02,069 --> 02:13:58,639
you know because so many people have

3717
02:14:07,270 --> 02:14:04,470
and it didn't even get close

3718
02:14:10,229 --> 02:14:07,280
to touching anything that would even

3719
02:14:11,750 --> 02:14:10,239
restore anything as far as emotional

3720
02:14:16,310 --> 02:14:11,760
damage or

3721
02:14:19,910 --> 02:14:16,320
or um you know just years of intense

3722
02:14:21,189 --> 02:14:19,920
uh inside curiosity and obsession you

3723
02:14:22,870 --> 02:14:21,199
know

3724
02:14:25,910 --> 02:14:22,880
um

3725
02:14:27,750 --> 02:14:25,920
but and then there's also you know where

3726
02:14:29,669 --> 02:14:27,760
i have to play

3727
02:14:32,310 --> 02:14:29,679
and this is really hard for experiencers

3728
02:14:34,870 --> 02:14:32,320
is to play the other side of the line

3729
02:14:37,270 --> 02:14:34,880
and being realistic that

3730
02:14:40,629 --> 02:14:37,280
most people have not

3731
02:14:43,430 --> 02:14:40,639
experienced something dramatic like that

3732
02:14:44,870 --> 02:14:43,440
and you know to even think of ufos as

3733
02:14:47,350 --> 02:14:44,880
being reality

3734
02:14:50,390 --> 02:14:47,360
is extremely difficult

3735
02:14:53,510 --> 02:14:50,400
to accept you know and i understand that

3736
02:14:56,790 --> 02:14:53,520
and i have empathy for people like that

3737
02:14:58,229 --> 02:14:56,800
so on the one hand for me personally

3738
02:14:59,589 --> 02:14:58,239
um

3739
02:15:01,270 --> 02:14:59,599
you know i don't know what would be

3740
02:15:03,350 --> 02:15:01,280
enough to be quite honest with you

3741
02:15:05,350 --> 02:15:03,360
especially if they don't even know what

3742
02:15:08,790 --> 02:15:05,360
screws with your consciousness when you

3743
02:15:10,470 --> 02:15:08,800
have an experience you know

3744
02:15:13,030 --> 02:15:10,480
but i have to put

3745
02:15:15,109 --> 02:15:13,040
that part of me aside as

3746
02:15:17,589 --> 02:15:15,119
hard as that is

3747
02:15:19,669 --> 02:15:17,599
and root for the general public to have

3748
02:15:22,629 --> 02:15:19,679
a general awareness of that

3749
02:15:25,270 --> 02:15:22,639
so in the generations to come

3750
02:15:27,510 --> 02:15:25,280
people like me and other experiencers

3751
02:15:30,229 --> 02:15:27,520
that will have experiences

3752
02:15:32,870 --> 02:15:30,239
uh will have more support groups more

3753
02:15:34,550 --> 02:15:32,880
answers more people to talk to more

3754
02:15:38,390 --> 02:15:34,560
hands to hold

3755
02:15:40,870 --> 02:15:38,400
you know and um more emotional support

3756
02:15:41,990 --> 02:15:40,880
than than what we have currently you

3757
02:15:43,350 --> 02:15:42,000
know

3758
02:15:46,629 --> 02:15:43,360
so

3759
02:15:49,589 --> 02:15:46,639
speak

3760
02:15:52,229 --> 02:15:49,599
and and i hope other people

3761
02:15:55,189 --> 02:15:52,239
who are experiencers can put

3762
02:15:57,750 --> 02:15:55,199
their experience aside sometimes

3763
02:15:59,830 --> 02:15:57,760
in order to you know try to push this

3764
02:16:01,030 --> 02:15:59,840
ball forward for future generations and

3765
02:16:02,950 --> 02:16:01,040
our kids and other people who have

3766
02:16:04,550 --> 02:16:02,960
experiences like this that they can live

3767
02:16:06,069 --> 02:16:04,560
in a better world than we live in right

3768
02:16:14,069 --> 02:16:06,079
now

3769
02:16:16,550 --> 02:16:14,079
forget your experience either as

3770
02:16:19,189 --> 02:16:16,560
unfortunately or for better for worse

3771
02:16:20,870 --> 02:16:19,199
for some people um those completely

3772
02:16:21,750 --> 02:16:20,880
create who we are for the rest of our

3773
02:16:23,030 --> 02:16:21,760
life

3774
02:16:23,830 --> 02:16:23,040
you know

3775
02:16:25,990 --> 02:16:23,840
so

3776
02:16:28,310 --> 02:16:26,000
that's all i have to say

3777
02:16:29,990 --> 02:16:28,320
appreciate that sean very well said very

3778
02:16:30,790 --> 02:16:30,000
well said

3779
02:16:35,030 --> 02:16:30,800
yeah

3780
02:16:37,669 --> 02:16:35,040
baby i love you brother

3781
02:16:41,190 --> 02:16:37,679
yeah um let's see um what else would we

3782
02:16:42,870 --> 02:16:41,200
like to address uh today um before we

3783
02:16:44,469 --> 02:16:42,880
get out of here okay someone had a

3784
02:16:47,349 --> 02:16:44,479
question that i thought was important in

3785
02:16:49,270 --> 02:16:47,359
the chat about whether or not eric davis

3786
02:16:51,429 --> 02:16:49,280
can

3787
02:16:53,669 --> 02:16:51,439
reveal more information now my

3788
02:16:56,070 --> 02:16:53,679
understanding would be no that it would

3789
02:16:58,549 --> 02:16:56,080
still remain classified

3790
02:17:00,469 --> 02:16:58,559
so what would what would be different

3791
02:17:01,910 --> 02:17:00,479
would just be that um

3792
02:17:04,150 --> 02:17:01,920
it would not be

3793
02:17:06,709 --> 02:17:04,160
for example a violation of a security

3794
02:17:08,549 --> 02:17:06,719
clearance to have access to information

3795
02:17:10,469 --> 02:17:08,559
that was classified and was leaked right

3796
02:17:11,910 --> 02:17:10,479
it's now in the public domain

3797
02:17:14,230 --> 02:17:11,920
but that should not change what he's

3798
02:17:17,990 --> 02:17:14,240
able to speak about publicly unless that

3799
02:17:18,000 --> 02:17:21,509
well said

3800
02:17:26,389 --> 02:17:24,230
any anybody else want to

3801
02:17:28,790 --> 02:17:26,399
leave on anything else if you know me

3802
02:17:31,750 --> 02:17:28,800
i'm hangry as hell

3803
02:17:34,950 --> 02:17:33,030
i think it'll just be important to keep

3804
02:17:36,549 --> 02:17:34,960
an eye on what the conversation how it

3805
02:17:38,469 --> 02:17:36,559
evolves in the next couple of days

3806
02:17:40,150 --> 02:17:38,479
because for me i can't speak for anybody

3807
02:17:42,389 --> 02:17:40,160
else i'll be going back and re-watching

3808
02:17:43,990 --> 02:17:42,399
it probably a numerous times to see what

3809
02:17:47,270 --> 02:17:44,000
crops up that i didn't pick up on the

3810
02:17:49,990 --> 02:17:47,280
first time and i think that will alter

3811
02:17:51,270 --> 02:17:50,000
my outlook on it i will be pulling the

3812
02:17:53,030 --> 02:17:51,280
positives

3813
02:17:55,349 --> 02:17:53,040
not ignoring the negatives because there

3814
02:17:58,709 --> 02:17:55,359
was obfuscation there was negatives in

3815
02:18:00,389 --> 02:17:58,719
there but it will be

3816
02:18:01,270 --> 02:18:00,399
interesting to see how the conversation

3817
02:18:03,429 --> 02:18:01,280
uh

3818
02:18:04,389 --> 02:18:03,439
evolves in the next day or two

3819
02:18:06,150 --> 02:18:04,399
yeah

3820
02:18:07,669 --> 02:18:06,160
totally

3821
02:18:09,750 --> 02:18:07,679
um

3822
02:18:11,270 --> 02:18:09,760
yeah also i mean just that comment right

3823
02:18:12,870 --> 02:18:11,280
there just made me remember something i

3824
02:18:14,389 --> 02:18:12,880
didn't think of why do they need experts

3825
02:18:17,750 --> 02:18:14,399
in metallurgy

3826
02:18:20,469 --> 02:18:17,760
you know exactly exactly

3827
02:18:21,349 --> 02:18:20,479
right so yeah

3828
02:18:24,469 --> 02:18:21,359
but

3829
02:18:27,270 --> 02:18:24,479
yeah anything else for me guys yeah

3830
02:18:28,950 --> 02:18:27,280
oh just i i really appreciate a seeing

3831
02:18:31,030 --> 02:18:28,960
all of you and i really appreciate

3832
02:18:32,950 --> 02:18:31,040
everybody in the chat it's been really

3833
02:18:34,950 --> 02:18:32,960
great to see this

3834
02:18:37,270 --> 02:18:34,960
this conversation develop on such an

3835
02:18:39,750 --> 02:18:37,280
important and historic day and you know

3836
02:18:42,230 --> 02:18:39,760
though i'm sure that we all have varying

3837
02:18:44,309 --> 02:18:42,240
levels you know like put a number on the

3838
02:18:45,910 --> 02:18:44,319
zero to ten amount of frustration that

3839
02:18:48,629 --> 02:18:45,920
you have after watching the hearing you

3840
02:18:51,270 --> 02:18:48,639
know there there was definitely i i mean

3841
02:18:53,030 --> 02:18:51,280
i saw plenty of a positive movement if

3842
02:18:54,870 --> 02:18:53,040
nothing else you know like kids are

3843
02:18:56,870 --> 02:18:54,880
great detectors you know what i

3844
02:18:58,629 --> 02:18:56,880
mean and i feel like this is going to

3845
02:18:59,509 --> 02:18:58,639
pass on to younger generations that can

3846
02:19:01,349 --> 02:18:59,519
really

3847
02:19:03,750 --> 02:19:01,359
speak to these issues as well you know

3848
02:19:05,990 --> 02:19:03,760
that this will be remembered as much for

3849
02:19:08,790 --> 02:19:06,000
what wasn't said as for what was said in

3850
02:19:11,509 --> 02:19:08,800
this hearing yeah at some point

3851
02:19:13,830 --> 02:19:11,519
i'm pleasantly surprised um so i'm

3852
02:19:16,150 --> 02:19:13,840
taking away as much as i can from it i'm

3853
02:19:18,870 --> 02:19:16,160
you know i'm not gonna like concentrate

3854
02:19:20,950 --> 02:19:18,880
too much on what wasn't said and how

3855
02:19:23,349 --> 02:19:20,960
things were maybe hidden away or

3856
02:19:25,509 --> 02:19:23,359
obfuscated but because that's that's the

3857
02:19:27,030 --> 02:19:25,519
ufology anyway you know that's the

3858
02:19:28,950 --> 02:19:27,040
baseline for what the official

3859
02:19:31,990 --> 02:19:28,960
engagement has been over the last 70 odd

3860
02:19:34,070 --> 02:19:32,000
years so anything above that is a plus

3861
02:19:35,830 --> 02:19:34,080
as far as i'm concerned and i meant i

3862
02:19:37,990 --> 02:19:35,840
tweeted earlier this morning to dial

3863
02:19:40,070 --> 02:19:38,000
down your expectations and actually the

3864
02:19:46,830 --> 02:19:40,080
expectations that have been exceeded so

3865
02:19:50,469 --> 02:19:48,710
excellent anybody else

3866
02:19:52,150 --> 02:19:50,479
historic nathan

3867
02:19:53,990 --> 02:19:52,160
uh thank you to chris villan and to

3868
02:19:55,429 --> 02:19:54,000
lozando and everybody else that's been

3869
02:19:56,309 --> 02:19:55,439
working hard behind the scenes to make

3870
02:19:59,510 --> 02:19:56,319
this

3871
02:20:01,110 --> 02:19:59,520
you know day happen um jeez i mean

3872
02:20:03,030 --> 02:20:01,120
i can't just imagine

3873
02:20:04,950 --> 02:20:03,040
a few years ago telling yourself that

3874
02:20:06,309 --> 02:20:04,960
you'd be seeing this right now i think

3875
02:20:07,670 --> 02:20:06,319
this i mean again exceeded my

3876
02:20:09,270 --> 02:20:07,680
expectations

3877
02:20:10,630 --> 02:20:09,280
i'm very pleased and i think this will

3878
02:20:12,070 --> 02:20:10,640
will not be the last this is the

3879
02:20:13,349 --> 02:20:12,080
beginning of a larger public

3880
02:20:16,870 --> 02:20:13,359
conversation that we're about to see

3881
02:20:18,870 --> 02:20:16,880
take place here oh yes i agree we're not

3882
02:20:21,590 --> 02:20:18,880
too far from the first james webb

3883
02:20:22,790 --> 02:20:21,600
uh photos either so who knows

3884
02:20:25,110 --> 02:20:22,800
i mean

3885
02:20:26,950 --> 02:20:25,120
great point with the historic aspect

3886
02:20:28,389 --> 02:20:26,960
just real quick you know i get into that

3887
02:20:31,510 --> 02:20:28,399
stuff um

3888
02:20:34,550 --> 02:20:31,520
bringing up the historical record on

3889
02:20:36,150 --> 02:20:34,560
everything from 1958 when congress was

3890
02:20:39,469 --> 02:20:36,160
trying to get their hands on special

3891
02:20:42,710 --> 02:20:39,479
report blue book number 14 to you know

3892
02:20:45,510 --> 02:20:42,720
1968 like that's all stuff that you know

3893
02:20:47,830 --> 02:20:45,520
we study and look back on right now for

3894
02:20:50,710 --> 02:20:47,840
for little bits of information so

3895
02:20:53,910 --> 02:20:50,720
um and none of that was like televised

3896
02:20:54,870 --> 02:20:53,920
and live streamed on youtube like so

3897
02:20:57,030 --> 02:20:54,880
just

3898
02:20:58,870 --> 02:20:57,040
all that together that here we go is

3899
02:21:01,750 --> 02:20:58,880
something right now that other people

3900
02:21:03,590 --> 02:21:01,760
can get into and use to you know further

3901
02:21:06,469 --> 02:21:03,600
their studies or whatever and it's on

3902
02:21:08,550 --> 02:21:06,479
video like we would kill to see those

3903
02:21:10,309 --> 02:21:08,560
hearings on video you know and be able

3904
02:21:11,750 --> 02:21:10,319
to fast forward and

3905
02:21:13,030 --> 02:21:11,760
you know all that kind of stuff and look

3906
02:21:15,190 --> 02:21:13,040
how they move their mouths when they

3907
02:21:16,309 --> 02:21:15,200
said something but we can't do that but

3908
02:21:17,190 --> 02:21:16,319
you know

3909
02:21:18,790 --> 02:21:17,200
so

3910
02:21:20,150 --> 02:21:18,800
we're better for worse

3911
02:21:22,630 --> 02:21:20,160
like people can do that with these

3912
02:21:24,550 --> 02:21:22,640
hearings and you know if all the talk is

3913
02:21:27,110 --> 02:21:24,560
correct i think this is going to be the

3914
02:21:29,349 --> 02:21:27,120
first of many which is great and

3915
02:21:31,670 --> 02:21:29,359
last thing i said i want to say is i i

3916
02:21:33,910 --> 02:21:31,680
couldn't uh imagine a better group to

3917
02:21:35,590 --> 02:21:33,920
have done this with like i do care about

3918
02:21:37,510 --> 02:21:35,600
each and every one of you and i'm so

3919
02:21:40,790 --> 02:21:37,520
grateful that you're able to share this

3920
02:21:41,590 --> 02:21:40,800
moment uh together you know uh with me

3921
02:21:43,349 --> 02:21:41,600
so

3922
02:21:45,270 --> 02:21:43,359
and everybody loves chat obviously i

3923
02:21:45,990 --> 02:21:45,280
catch you man totally great for loving

3924
02:21:46,870 --> 02:21:46,000
us

3925
02:21:49,349 --> 02:21:46,880
yeah

3926
02:21:55,429 --> 02:21:49,359
this has been awesome

3927
02:21:59,690 --> 02:21:56,710
the conversation on twitter and